Pakistan's nuclear blackmail ends as India shuns restraint policy

From hunting down Hizbul Mujahideen commander Burhan Wani to conducting surgical strikes across the LoC in 2016, to the major pre-emptive strike on a Jaish-e-Mohammed camp across the international border on Tuesday, signifies that India has over past few years adopted a new counter-insurgency doctrine and abandoned the cautious and restraint approach, while responding to terror strikes.

Significantly, the IAF strikes have also finished the nuclear deterrent theory forever. Just two days ago, Pakistan Army PR chief Maj Gen Asif Ghafoor had warned that in case of any kind of aggression, the right of escalation would remain with Pakistan, obliquely threatening nuclear retaliation.

"The bold strike by a dozen IAF jets have called the recurring nuclear bluff of Islamabad. The message: do what you want to do, we will not be cowed anymore by any kind of threat," said an expert.

Since the 1971 war, India for the first time broke a self-imposed psychological barrier. Also, all the 12 Mirage jets that hit targets inside Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province returned safe to their base.

During the initial days of Kargil war, a MiG-21 and MiG-27 had attempted to breach Pakistani airspace on May 28, 1999, but were shot down. The same day an Mi-17 helicopter with four IAF personnel on board was also brought down. That a dozen IAF jets crossing the LoC from Keran Sector, flying over the Athmuqam, Nowshehri passing along Muzaffarabad district skies in PoK, before crossing Garhi Habibullah, town of Mansehra district in the KPK—somewhat 80 km into the hinterland has sent across a message that no place in Pakistan is safe.

Looking at India's counter-insurgency doctrine, baring Operation Blue Star in 1984, it had been largely modelled on the patterns of British doctrine. It did not entail hunting the top leadership, but only softening them to force them to return to table for talks. It was feared that in case of elimination of leadership, it is hard to deal with splinter groups. In contrast, the American way of tackling counter-insurgency involved targeting the top leadership for quick results and headlines. Right from North-East to Jammu and Kashmir, India had relied on choking funds, arms supplies and hitting middle-rung and cadres to soften the top leadership, thereby, forcing them to enter into negotiations. While Hizbul chief Syed Salahuddin is based in PoK for over two decades, many former security officers say his top operational commanders back in Kashmir Valley – Master Ahsan Dar and Abdul Majeed Dar – were deliberately allowed to repeatedly escape security nets. While Ahsan Dar later defected and was arrested, another Dar, who was instrumental in July 2000 ceasefire, was later killed by terrorists. They also recall that JKLF supremo Yasin Malik wore political mettle only after security forces launched a major offensive against his JKLF cadres.

The 76-page counter-insurgency doctrine unveiled in 2006, compiled by the Shimla-based Army Training Command, also spelled policy of the velvet glove with an eye on alienating terrorists from public. Describing J&K, a combination of proxy war, supported by external elements and also an insurgency where a section of local population is against the State, it called for a protracted struggle of competing principles and ideologies. It affirms that while the use of military force may help contain insurgency, it demands the backing of appropriate political and economic measures to adequately resolve counter-insurgency situations.

Also, by carefully choosing the main Jaish terror training camp located deep in a forest area in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, India has also demonstrated that it has the ground-level intelligence capabilities and there is a possibility of hitting the Lashkar headquarters in Muridke near Lahore or Jaish HQ in Bahawalpur in south Punjab as well. The IAF has also established its technical superiority and capacity of deep penetration. Sources said that the IAF had deployed high-powered jammers that emasculated Pakistan's US-made radar defences.

Former Air Marshal Vinod Patney, who led Kargil air operations, described these strikes risky but necessary. "We had crossed the PoK border in 1965, 1971 and every time there was a war, except during Kargil. However, this is for the first time we have done so during peacetime, to the best of my knowledge," Patney said. "The risks involved in an airstrike are being shot down. You can be shot down in the air, you can be shot down from the ground. And for these aircraft, even a small shot can mean a lot of trouble for the pilots. If there is a strategic hit, it can be fatal as well," the retired Air Marshal added. However, Patney believes such risks are calculated that one must often take in order to deliver the mission. "Nothing is 100 percent foolproof. You plan and choose the best way forward and then adopt it."