US did nothing to stop India-Pakistan war in 1965: Lyndon Johnson

Former US President Lyndon Johnson's government did little to prevent the India-Pakistan conflict in 1965 from escalating into a full-blown 21-day war in September, despite being fully aware of Pakistan regulars being sent to Kashmir dressed as Mujahidin between July and August 1965.

In fact, a day before the Pakistan attack on Chamb that took the Indians by surprise on September 1, an internal memorandum from Robert Komer of the national security to Johnson, quoting the CIA, said that an attack was imminent. The 36th president of the United States, who chaired a special meeting the following day on the subject, gave instructions to "sit it out".

This has been revealed in declassified state department documents from Johnson's office. In fact, the memo dated August 31, 1965 — a day before Pakistan's attack on Chamb — says: "We just got some very disturbing reports about Pakistanis having decided to escalate the war in Kashmir by throwing in regulars, because they couldn't otherwise cope with Indian retaliation across the cease-fire, line. The rationale seemed to be that the Pakistanis, having failed to spark a "war of liberation" via a Kashmiri uprising, might then feel they would have to enter the lists directly to forestall a humiliating failure. CIA was inclined to believe that the Pakistani generals were very unhappy with their bum intelligence and with the failure of the Ayub/Bhutto gambit to stir up Kashmir."

American Ambassadors posted in Islamabad and New Delhi, have in their cables, described President Ayub to be under the "maniacal influence of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto", while describing the mild mannered Lal Bahadur Shastri as someone who was cool and composed, and not a "mad man who would fly off at an emotional tangent".

One of the reasons for United State's coyness to act against Pakistan was what an American diplomat described, in the declassified cables, as Pakistan's hole card — the United States air base in Peshawar — from where Gay Power's U2 flight took off on a spy mission over the Soviet Union. It was shot down leading to increased tensions between the US and the Soviet Union in the cold war environment then. The air force station run by the CIA remained at that time the only authentic source of information on Soviet and Chinese missile plans.

The cables reveal that the U2 base in Peshawar needed to continue but they were aware that Pakistan was uncomfortable after its existence was made known. Pakistan threatened periodically to shut it down. Some of the US employees were denied entry and at times construction was prevented. Ayub Khan, when asked by the US officials about harassment to its staff, pretended he knew nothing about it, says the cable.

A memo from Robert Komer in August 20 1965 65, less than a fortnight before the actual war, to the President's special assistant, indicated that Pakistan was acting tough because of the US decision to postpone a Pakistan Aid Consortium meeting. The US was worried at that time that Pakistan was cozying up to China.

"He (Mann-Under Secretary Economic Affairs) wanted to be sure the President was really prepared to see September 23 go by without a pledge, even at the cost of considerably increased risk to Peshawar (about which the whole intelligence lobby will scream). He believed 'we must make a deliberate choice as to whether we're willing to lose it, if necessary'. Tom said he had seen too many cases in which we got chicken at the last minute.

"Talbot (Undersecretary, South Asia) and the experts (powerfully ably supported by Pickard) were leading the chickens, with an assist from Ball. They were genuinely fearful that we could push the psychotic Pakistanis too far, with the result that, (a) a major crisis could be precipitated in the subcontinent, maybe even a rash Pakistani attack on India; and/or (b) the Pakistanis could tell us to go jump, and take Peshawar with us. The Pakistanis were playing with fire by their continued major infiltration into Kashmir; if the Indians decide to strike back elsewhere or Hindu-Muslim riots occur, we would have a big mess.

"Clearly, as cables the point out, Americans were on the defensive because they did not want to lose out on the Peshawar base --it was giving them authentic spy-in-the-sky intelligence on the Soviets even after the U2 plane was shot down by the Soviets in 1960. Spy satellites had not been fully developed as yet. With increased Soviet pressure, Pakistan formally terminated the Peshawar facilities in 1968.

The Pakistani aid consortium was postponed because Johnson was not keen about Pakistan heading in the direction of the Chinese and lso as a rap on Pakistani knuckles for fanning anti US sentiment.

When Pakistan launched an attack on India, on September 1, there was very little the US could do with one hand tied behind its back. Pakistan, initially took a tough position of not vacating parts of Kashmir till the Kashmir issue was discussed or a plebiscite held in the state. Bhutto's position to the US diplomats was that they would fight for Kashmir even if it meant destruction of Pakistan.

Both Ayub Khan and Bhutto told US interlocutors that there would be no compromise on Kashmir, which was a pre-condition for withdrawal. But faced with an attack on Lahore and Sialkot, losing out on ammunition and a US arms embargo, Pakistan finally buckled.

On September 18, according to the declassified cables, Pakistan Finance Minister, Shoaib, sent word to the US that Ayub, "fed up with Bhutto's adamance", was prepared for a ceasefire, provided there was a some sort of face-saver.

At this point sensing that Pakistan had come around, Johnson went for the kill. He sent a terse message with the US agenda: any fresh resistance to the UN ceasefire proposal to expire on September 23 would encourage a China attack. The message was clear that if that happened, it was a case of "us versus them". "This is not a threat, but a reality" was the terse message.

Finally, Pakistan accepted the ceasefire on September 23.