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Gafoor changed the script at last minute

Every officer had been assigned a specific role just a week before 26/11, but when terror struck they did not stick to the plan.

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Gafoor changed the script at last minute
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Command and control goof-ups on 26/11 contributed substantially to the killing of Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) chief Hemant Karkare, additional commissioner of police (Eastern Region) Ashok Kamte and inspector Vijay Salaskar at the hands of terrorists near Cama Hospital. The goof-ups happened despite the fact that Mumbai police commissioner Hasan Gafoor had already prepared a plan of action on who should do what if terror struck.

The meeting, held in Gafoor’s official chamber at Crawford Market, was attended by all the then joint commissioners of police (JCPs) — Rakesh Maria (crime), KL Prasad (law & order) and ATS chief Hemant Karkare — sources revealed. The meeting was organised to take stock of the terror alert received from intelligence sources, and to ensure  a smooth command and control structure in the event of a crisis.

All the senior officers were assigned specific duties in the event of a terror attack. Among the important decisions taken was that Prasad would be in overall charge of the main control room, coordinating between agencies to take strategic spot decisions.

If the need arose, he would interact with the army or any other outside force.

Crime branch chief Rakesh Maria was to supervise field operations and coordinate with all concerned at the ground level. Hemant Karkare was assigned the job of countering any terror attack with the deployment of the Quick Response Team commandos at his disposal.

Similarly, several other decisions on the role of additional commissioners, deputy commissioners, assistant commissioners and senior inspectors of police were also taken at the meeting and guidelines issued.

On the night of terror, however, Gafoor deviated from the agreed script. He asked Maria to man the main control room, when Prasad was already at the job. This sent confusing signals on command and control.

Even this would have been okay if it had been communicated quickly to the staff who had to take orders from the control room, but this did not happen smoothly. Those calling control, including Karkare, were calling Prasad, but were surprised to find Maria in place. Maria, who is considered an excellent field officer, was not available for directing field officers. The chain of command was thus broken during those initial crucial hours.

Karkare, who was near Cama Hospital at 11.24pm on 26/11, called up the control room and gave the message: “We are at Cama Hospital. Firing and grenade blasts are going on (in Cama Hospital), 3-4 grenade blasts have taken place in the last five minutes. We need to encircle Cama Hospital. We are near SB-II (special branch-II) office side. Send a team from the front side of Cama Hospital. This needs to be coordinated so that there is no cross-firing. Please ask KL Prasad, joint commissioner (law & order) to call the army.”

Prasad explains his presence at the control room thus: “I just followed the standing orders and reached the control room. At no point was I asked by the CP (Gafoor) to leave the control room. I was there till 2am and later reached the Taj where I had to coordinate with the navy commandos and later with the NSG that was to arrive. I supervised the rescue of nearly 500 persons from the Taj. I was there till the end of the three-day operation,” he told DNA.

The then additional CP (south region) K Venkatesam, too was there at the Trident, along with Parambir Singh, then additional CP (ATS).

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