US intelligence stakes out own view on Iran

WASHINGTON: The US government's decision to publish new intelligence that appeared to undermine the White House's hardline policy on Iran's nuclear ambitions may seem puzzling.

But experts who keep a close eye on US intelligence agencies believe they have a pretty good idea of why the spies wanted the information out in the open, even if it raised questions about President George W. Bush's policy.

"They're saying, in effect, we are not the puppets of this or any administration, we will present our findings even if they don't correspond to the latest press statement by the White House," said Steven Aftergood, an intelligence analyst at the Federation of American Scientists in Washington.

US intelligence agencies, especially the CIA, took the brunt of the criticism for intelligence blunders over Iraqi weapons of mass destruction - used by Bush to justify the 2003 US-led invasion but never found.

Critics suggested that the CIA bent to White House pressure in interpreting the intelligence and told Bush and his top aides what they wanted hear.

Postwar bickering between the White House and the CIA was settled when Bush ordered sweeping reforms of the US intelligence community.

The National Intelligence Estimate released Monday contradicted White House allegations that Iran was pursuing atomic weapons, concluding that Tehran ended the programme in 2003 and appeared less determined to obtain a nuclear bomb than was believed in a 2005 intelligence report that was the cornerstone of Bush's Iran policy.

"Since our understanding of Iran's capabilities has changed, we felt it was important to release this information to ensure that an accurate presentation is available," said Donald Kerr, deputy director of the new Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).

Bush insisted Tuesday that Iran remains dangerous and that US policy will not change and that Iraq could covertly resume the weapons programme. He said the new assessment showed that his intelligence reforms were working.

"It's important for the American people to see that there's been a re-evaluation," he said.

But the analysts believe the White House had little choice but to go along with publicizing the new estimate. Otherwise, intelligence officials might have used the more harmful method of leaking it to the press to protect themselves from being castigated in the event of another policy failure.

"There is incentive inside the intelligence community because they felt burned by what happened with the Iraq intelligence, and that contributes even more to the forces that would have brought this into the open," said John Prados, a senior analyst at the National Security Archive, an independent Washington think tank.

A spokeswoman for the ODNI, Venee Vines, said the White House did not sign off on publishing the report. The decision was "not at all" connected to the mishap over Iraq. "It had nothing to do with previous political decisions," she said.

Aftergood said that ultimately the president is the final arbiter of what information is declassified for public consumption, and theoretically could have thwarted the release of the new intelligence estimate.

"But there would be a price to pay for that in terms of relations with the intelligence agency leaders," he said.

By allowing the estimate to be published, Bush and his aides were able go before reporters and put their own spin on it.

"It's a politcal ploy to stay ahead of the story," Prados said, "knowing they would be damaged if it came out in a different fashion."