Tech denial regime no longer applies

 

Now that the Senate has passed the bill to enable Indo-US civilian nuclear cooperation, those who have been opposing such cooperation are bound to focus attention on some of the unacceptable clauses in the legislation and demand that India should reject the deal and suspend further steps to conclude the 1-2-3 agreement and call off negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for India-specific safeguards.

 

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh will be reminded of the situation he faced 15 years ago, when he initiated economic liberalisation. There were people who argued that it would take away jobs from our workers, swamp the country with imports, and lead to a takeover by a neo-East India Company. They were all wrong.

 

There should be clear understanding what the US legislation signifies. It is not just a bilateral Indo-US deal. Most of the industrialised countries, including Russia and China, accepted the US lead in the technology denial regime imposed on India after the Pokhran II tests. The regime encompassed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Missile Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Agreement, and Australia Group, thereby denying India access to high technology in a range of areas.

 

The other industrial powers did not enact legislation to enforce technology denial; they did it through administrative measures. Therefore, clearance of the US legislative hurdle was a prerequisite for India to get access to high technology from the other countries.  

 

Russia did not release fuel for Tarapur until President George W Bush gave the green signal through the joint statement of March 2, 2006.

 

Consequently, the passage of the US legislation should be viewed from two perspectives. The first and more important aspect is that it frees India from technology denial. Even if there are caveats and conditions unacceptable to India in the legislation, its passage signals to all other major powers that they can deal with India on high technology on the basis of existing arms control provisions. The conditionalities of the US legislation are not binding on them.

 

The second aspect is the bilateral Indo-US nuclear cooperation, which comes with some of the conditionalities that India finds unacceptable. In these circumstances, what should it do? Some people advocate that we should reject the US deal and not proceed to conclude the Indo-US bilateral cooperation (1-2-3) agreement. That would be throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

 

We should negotiate and conclude the 1-2-3 agreement as well as the India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA and get the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group modified to enable civilian nuclear transactions with its members. There is no need for India to get its requirements from the US. China has a similar cooperation agreement, with similarly objectionable clauses, with the US. But China gets its reactors from Canada, Russia, and France. India can follow China’s example. If the US wants to sell reactors to India, it would have to remove the objectionable clauses.

 

But there are people who are opposed to India freeing itself from technology apartheid. In the 1990s, many leftist admirers of China objected to India following China’s example in opening up its economy.

 

China has always been pragmatic. Long before it was admitted to the World Trade Organisation, the country threw open its doors to FDI and became a major trading power. In spite of its one-China policy, the US has a Taiwan Relations Act and gives Taipei sophisticated weapons. China has an effective strategy of stooping to conquer. India, in assessing its next course of action, will do well to borrow from it.