Moratorium clause may push UPA into a corner

Arms control association says nuclear cooperation will end if India tests

NEW DELHI: The fine print of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver for India shows it may not be as clean as expected. Critics, both at home and abroad, are unanimous that the waiver is not unconditional and links exemptions to India’s unilateral moratorium announced after the 1998 atomic tests. In fact, Pranab Mukherjee’s statement reiterating India’s traditional stand is noted in the waiver document — the actual text is yet to be made public.

According to the website of the arms control association on Sunday, if India decides to go ahead with another test, international cooperation will stop.

Incidentally, this clause does not apply just to India but is part of section 16 of the NSG guidelines, which says that if a supplier country “detects explosive activity,” a meeting of NSG can be called for consultation and nuclear transfer to the recipients can be terminated. This clause was there even in the second draft presented to the NSG last Thursday.

The association, a major non-proliferation group, claims: “If India tests, the NSG would immediately meet in an emergency session and the widespread expectation would be for all NSG states to terminate nuclear trade immediately. And, despite the Indian government’s false representations to its public and parliament, neither the US nor other responsible nuclear suppliers are going to feel obliged to respect earlier fuel supply guarantees...if India tests for any reason or violates its safeguards commitments.”  

The major change made to the draft placed before the NSG at the September 4 meeting was to include Mukherjee’s statement made on Friday morning to reassure sceptics about India’s commitment to non-proliferation. This ringing endorsement of India’s stand went a long way to salvage the day for New Delhi.

Though along the Indian government’s oft-repeated position, it’s going to be difficult for the government to explain this to the opposition, which will settle for whatever little ammo it can get to target the UPA.

The most potent argument the government is likely to put forward is that India no longer needs to test a device and its nuclear arsenal is complete. This is supported by many experts, including former president APJ Abdul Kalam and former national security adviser Brajesh Mishra.

But Kalam, in an interview to a television channel, also pointed out that in the case of supreme national interest every country had the right to do what was best and face the consequences.

Mishra had also said that when the Vajpayee government decided on a unilateral moratorium on testing, it did so not as a whim but after much thought and discussions with the scientific community and strategic experts. His take is that India does not need another test, unless the security environment in the neighbourhood changes.

Ironically, India’s stand on the nuclear issue has never been on solid ground, mainly because it had tested even as early as 1974 and developed a weapons programme despite proclaiming that the test was for peaceful use of nuclear energy. But despite all this, India’s statement reassured most members.

While India is allowed to have bilateral agreements on the transfer of sensitive technology, including enrichment and reprocessing, the draft advises countries to exercise “utmost restraint” on such transfers. “Participating governments may transfer nuclear related dual-use equipment, material software and related technology for peaceful purposes for use in the IAEA safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities provided the transfer satisfies all other conditions,” the NSG waiver says.

The arms control association has lambasted the NSG waiver as a blow to the international non-proliferation regime but said that even if the waiver text was not clear there were certain encouraging elements.

The association’s website spells them out as: NSG states should not and will not likely engage in “full” nuclear trade with India; NSG states should and very likely would terminate nuclear trade with India if it resumes testing; and India’s compliance with it pre-2005 non-proliferation commitments and the implementation of bilateral trade with India will be reviewed on a regular (probably annual) basis by the NSG.

It also points out that “most states will try to remain consistent with US law, policy, and the US interpretations of its bilateral trade agreement with India. Collectively, these bar the transfer of enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water technology to Indian national facilities, the Hyde Act also mandates a cut-off of US trade if India resumes testing, and according the State department’s January 16 responses to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, US fuel supply assurances will be invalid if India tests for any reason”.