Unedited portions of WikiLeaks cables on Narendra Modi

SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/2/2016 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, CVIS, PHUM, KIRF, KISL, ECON, IN
SUBJECT: GUJARAT CHIEF MINISTER MODI SETS HIS SIGHTS ON NATIONAL POLITICS
REF: A: MUMBAI 1719; B: MUMBAI 818; C: 05 MUMBAI 1727
CLASSIFIED BY: Michael S. Owen, Consul General, Consulate General Mumbai, State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

Summary and Comment
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1. (C) Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi has his sights on national politics. Everyone we spoke to during a recent trip to Ahmedabad told us that Modi will use an expected state election victory next year to make a bid for the national presidency of the BJP. RSS and BJP leaders in Delhi echo these sentiments. Many in the party leadership believe that Modi is the only person of the BJP's many aspiring leaders who can reinvigorate the party and stop its further slide into oblivion. No one doubts that Modi will be reelected as Chief Minister of Gujarat in elections scheduled for late 2007, since he remains immensely popular among Gujarat's largely Hindu voters. Modi has successfully branded himself as a non-corrupt, effective administrator, as a facilitator of business in a state with a deep commercial culture, and as a no-nonsense, law-and-order politician who looks after the interests of the Hindu majority. Modi's backers in the BJP now hope to convince the party leadership that he can use these positive traits to attract voters throughout India. Some BJP leaders believe, or hope, that voters will forget or forgive Modi's role in the 2002 bloodshed, once they learn to appreciate his other qualities. Views differ in Gujarat on whether Modi can overcome his negative baggage to assume a national role. Some think that the memory of 2002 will turn off voters. Others say his arrogant and blunt leadership style will alienate the BJP hierarchy in New Delhi as it has in Ahmedabad, or that Modi's lower caste origins could become an obstacle at the national level.
2. (C) Against this backdrop of opinions, we believe that Modi's rise in the BJP seems likely. In coordination with Embassy New Delhi, we intend to continue our policy of interaction with the Chief Minister, whose B1/B2 visa we revoked in 2005, at the level of the Consul General. Since 2002, Mumbai Consul Generals have routinely sought meetings with Modi whenever they visited Ahmedabad. Such interaction allows us to deliver a clear message on human rights and religious freedom directly to the source. It will also shield us from accusations of opportunism from the BJP that would invariably arise if we ignored Modi now but sought a dialogue with him in the likely event that he makes it to the
national stage. End summary and comment.

Modi Sets Sights on National Politics
-------------------------------------
3. (SBU) Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi remains immensely popular among the state's non-Muslim voters. Everyone we spoke to during an Oct. 7-8 trip to Ahmedabad predicted that Modi would easily win the next state elections, scheduled for late 2007. Views differ only on how large his victory will be.
4. (C) Our interlocutors were also unanimous in their belief that Modi has already set his sights on national politics. Modi hopes to use an electoral success as a springboard into the national BJP leadership, we heard repeatedly. The BJP national leadership, and particularly former deputy prime minister L.K. Advani, were convinced that only Modi could rejuvenate the party, Gujarat MP and BJP politician Harin Pathak told us. According to our interlocutors, Advani and former law minister Aroon Jaitley are the biggest Modi votaries in the central leadership, as no other clear successor to the party's aging leadership is in sight, and Modi's relative youth and obvious leadership talents are attracting more attention at the party center. The RSS's Ram Madhav told Embassy New Delhi the same thing, going so far as to say that Modi's ascendancy is not a question of if but when, and the USG must start considering now how it will deal with Modi when he becomes head of the BJP and leads the party's electoral campaign in the national elections scheduled for 2009.
5. (C) Separately, Piyush Goyal, General Secretary for the BJP in Maharashtra, said the BJP leadership is convinced that Modi can appeal to wide segments of Indian voters outside of Gujarat, and that his role in the 2002 bloodshed will not necessarily damage his popularity. Goyal said many within the BJP believe that Modi has the potential to become Prime Minister, and that voters may forget 2002 once the Chief Minister's other qualities become widely known. The attributes that have made Modi so popular in Gujarat are the qualities that the BJP would use at the national level as well,
Goyal said.
MUMBAI 00001986 002 OF 005

Modi the Administrator
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6. (C) Most BJP insiders tell us that Gujarat's voters like Modi because he has successfully branded himself as an effective administrator and a pro-business, no-nonsense, law-and-order politician. Supporters and critics alike acknowledge that Modi is an effective administrator. He has successfully cultivated the image of a clean politician who has reduced corruption in public life in Gujarat. Views differ on how clean and non-corrupt Modi actually is, however. All our interlocutors acknowledge that Modi is a modest man who, unlike many elected officials in India, has not used his position to enrich himself or his family. Most contacts also say that he has purged the state administration of petty corruption at the mid- and lower levels of the bureaucracy. However, several people tell us that big ticket corruption is still common. Journalist Javed Rahmatullah claimed that Reliance Industries Ltd. (RIL) paid a large bribe for permission to expand its refinery in Jamnagar. The money went into the BJP's party coffers, Rahmatullah claimed, and not to Modi or any other individual. Other contacts have told us that business money flows to the BJP in Gujarat, but nobody had been this specific. We have been unable to verify Rahmatullah's claim.

Modi and Business
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7. (SBU) Modi's supporters claim that the state's economy has flourished under his leadership. They cite the state's annual growth rate of around nine percent, 15 per cent growth in industrial production, sizable public investment in infrastructure and Gujarat's top ranking among Indian states as a destination for domestic investment. Among the five state governments in our Consular district, the GOG is the most visibly active in its attempts to attract investment, both domestic and foreign. One state agency recently supported a road show to the U.S. aimed at attracting foreign investment. The GOG is aggressively promoting special economic zones (SEZs) as a means to create new jobs and modernize infrastructure in the state.
8. (SBU) Modi's pro-business stance has won over the state's large business and trader community. Most businessmen say Modi has created a positive business climate in the state. Under Modi's leadership, red tape has been reduced, and most government officials support business rather than act as an obstacle to it, we hear repeatedly.
9. (SBU) The economic reality of Gujarat, however, may be far more complex than the ebullient statements of Modi's supporters suggest. Although Gujarat tops all Indian states in terms of investment intentions, actual investment is far less, and certainly less than the neighboring state of Maharashtra. Despite the presence of a few well-known international companies, FDI flows into the state are relatively small. Gujarat received less than four percent of the FDI coming into India in the past five years (Note: Delhi and Maharashtra, the top two FDI destinations, got 28 percent and 22 percent respectively. End Note) Ahmedabad does not have the visible construction activity, and increasingly noticeable foreign presence, of Pune in neighboring Maharashtra, for example. Many Gujaratis will say that the state is still not sufficiently known abroad. Some contacts are confident that investment will increase in tandem with growing awareness of Gujarat's business climate spawned by the GOG's aggressive marketing. Other sources were far less sanguine, and argue that the stain of the 2002 riots and the poor human rights record of its leadership continue to deter foreign companies fearful of further communal violence. Arvind Agarwal, GOG Industries Commissioner, conceded to us that the riots continue to negatively influence images of the state abroad.
MUMBAI 00001986 003 OF 005

Modi, Law-and-Order and Hindutva
--------------------------------
10. (C) Modi has successfully cultivated the image of a no-nonsense, law-and order politician among Gujarat voters. This image of Modi as a strong, decisive leader is what his BJP supporters hope will help him establish a foothold at the
national level.
11. (C) Modi's role in the 2002 bloodshed continues to divide Gujaratis and Indians in general. While he remains repugnant to large numbers of people, particularly Muslims, human rights activists and educated urbanites with liberal or leftist leanings, many in the Hindu majority view his actions in 2002 favorably. Negative attitudes towards Muslims remain firmly anchored among Gujarati Hindus. Many feel that they, and not the Muslim minority, are the true second class citizens of India. Muslims often ""stepped out of line,"" prior to 2002, we often hear, demanding and receiving exceptional treatment by politicians who felt the need to placate them on the basis of perceived injustices carried out by the Hindu majority. That changed when Modi came into power in 2002, they say. While no one will openly condone the bloodshed of 2002, many Gujarati Hindus feel that Modi ""put Muslims into their place."" The BJP continues to echo these themes in its national political stance, especially over issues such as Hajj subsidies, the Muslim civil code, the singing of Vande Mataram, or other such
religiously sensitive concerns.
12. (C) Modi continues to support a Hindutva agenda in the state, with the recent passage of amendments to the state's anti-conversion law (ref A) being seen as a concession to his supporters on the Hindu right. Both supporters and critics of Modi confirm that the state government continues to use administrative tools to marginalize and ghettoize the Muslim minority.
13. (C) At the same time, most interlocutors tell us that Modi cannot gain anything more by openly pursuing an aggressive Hindutva agenda. He already has the backing of those who applaud his firm stand against Muslims, and he risks alienating swing voters in Gujarat by being too openly communal. Modi understands that, outside of Gujarat, his role in the 2002 riots has damaged both his reputation and that of the state. He also realizes that outbreaks of communal violence in Gujarat will harm both his chances in the state and nationally, and hence he has given law enforcement agencies clear instructions to act swiftly if violence breaks out, we have been told. Several interlocutors cited Modi's rapid reaction to the communal rioting in Vadodara in May (ref B) as proof of his new strategy. Modi allowed federal army troops to establish order, and he even visited hospitalized Muslim victims of the riots in an attempt to portray himself as a leader of
all Gujaratis.

Modi's Leadership Style
-----------------------
14. (C) Views remain divided on whether Modi's leadership style will help or harm him if he enters national politics. In public appearances, Modi can be charming and likeable. By all accounts, however, he is an insular, distrustful person who rules with a small group of advisors. This inner circle acts as a buffer between the Chief Minister and his cabinet and party. He reigns more by fear and intimidation than by inclusiveness and consensus, and is rude, condescending and often derogatory to even high level party officials. He hoards power and often leaves his ministers in the cold when making decisions that affect their portfolios. His abrasive leadership style alienated much of the state BJP leadership in 2005. He was able to quell their subsequent rebellion by branding them as corrupt opportunists who were angry because he denied them the tools of political patronage and corruption (ref C). Modi maintains the support of most MLAs in the state because they understand his popularity with voters. His leadership style has created many enemies within the state party, however. This opposition could come back to haunt him at the national level, some critics hope. In any case there is consensus that Modi has failed to attract a sustainable, loyal cadre of followers within the state party, and that his few confidants will likely be pushed out of power and influence if and when Modi leaves the state for New Delhi. At the national stage, he will have to depend on opportunists who want to latch onto his bandwagon, some believe.
MUMBAI 00001986 004 OF 005

Modi and Caste
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15. (C) Caste resentments exacerbate the bad feelings between Modi and much of the state party's leadership. Modi heralds from a so-called Other Backward Caste (OBC), while many of his opponents are from higher castes, and in particular from the Patel caste that dominates public life in the state. The Chief Minister is openly distrustful of the higher-caste party officials around him, yet is careful not to make caste an issue since he seeks the support of the Gujarati commercial class, most of whom are Patels or other higher castes. Gujarat Congress spokesman Himanshu Vyas told us his party hopes to play the caste card in the 2007 elections to divide Modi's support among Hindus, yet none of our other interlocutors believed that caste issues could endanger a Modi victory at the polls. Some believe, however, that Modi's lower caste status could create problems for him in national politics.

Econoff's Unscheduled Meeting with the
Chief Minister
--------------------------------------------- --------
16. (C) The USG has not met Modi since his B1/B2 visa was revoked in 2005, yet Embassy Econoff had an unscheduled courtesy call with the Chief Minister on the margins of our recent visit to Gujarat. While paying a personal visit to a family friend who works in Modi's office, she was quickly whisked through the several perimeters of security surrounding the Chief Minister and introduced to Modi himself. Modi was pleasant and, conversing only in Gujarati, asked her the purpose of the USG visit to the state (Note: The local edition of the Times of India speculated earlier that day why USG officials were in Gujarat and indicated they might be on a ""secret"" mission. End note) After Econoff clarified the purpose of the visit to meet with contacts to assess Gujarat's political, economic, and social environment, Modi seemed surprised that U.S. officials would travel to Gujarat, saying the USG had warned the state is ""unsafe."" Econoff responded by stressing that while the USG has serious concerns about human rights and religious freedom, we do not restrict visitors or opportunities for U.S. companies to invest in Gujarat. Modi also asked what our contacts said about the current state of human rights and religious freedom in Gujarat. Econoff replied that the opinions were mixed.

Comment
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17. (C) Modi's dominance of Gujarat politics is likely to continue for now, and by all accounts he should get reelected easily next year. Among our contacts, there is not yet a consensus on Modi's chances for success at the national level, but some feel strongly in Delhi and Gujarat that his rise is inevitable. If Modi does eventually get a national leadership role in the BJP in the foreseeable future, the USG will be obliged to decide how it wants to deal with a figure of national prominence whose B1/B2 we revoked. We believe it would dilute our influence to avoid Modi completely. If we waited to engage Modi after he attains national stature within India's largest and most important opposition party, many in the BJP would likely view this as an opportunistic move and only deepen the suspicions cultivated by some BJP leaders in western India since the visa revocation. Since the riots of 2002, we have declined to engage Modi at the Ambassadorial level, but Mumbai Consul Generals have routinely sought meetings with Modi whenever they visited Ahmedabad. We will continue to seek such meetings at the level of the CG to emphasize that the USG does not have a formal no-contact policy (Note: The CG requested a meeting during his initial visit to Gujarat in 2005, but Modi was traveling that day), and to demonstrate to the BJP that we are interested in cultivating relationships with the party while it is in the opposition. Direct encounters with Modi will also enable us to deliver a clear message regarding USG concerns for the state of human rights and religious freedom in Gujarat.
MUMBAI 00001986 005 OF 005
End comment.
18. (U) Embassy New Delhi cleared this cable.
OWEN

Reference ID Created Released    Classification Origin
05NEWDELHI2094
2005-03-18 13:01
2011-03-22 01:01
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 002094
 
SIPDIS
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV CVIS KIRF IN

SUBJECT: FOREIGN SECRETARY SARAN REQUESTS REVIEW OF MODI VISA DECISION
 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr., for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

1.  (U) This is an action request, see paragraph 6.

2.  (C) Summary: Amid extensive media coverage of the USG decision to not issue an A2 visa to Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi and to revoke his B1/B2 visa, Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran called the DCM to his office late afternoon on March 18 to express the GOI's ""grave concern"" and to request the USG to reconsider the decision.  Characterizing it as ""uncalled for"" and a display of a ""lack of courtesy and sensitivity,"" in an otherwise friendly meeting Saran conveyed GOI concern that our decision had already incited a controversy and threatened to spark just the kind of divisiveness the US alleges Modi himself facilitated.  Saran emphasized the GOI considers Modi a democratically-elected Chief Minister under the Indian Constitution, and that the US should take this into consideration.  The DCM assured the Foreign Secretary that the USG's decision has been in accordance with US law, which he explained in some detail. Following the meeting with the DCM, the MEA issued a statement, the full text of which is in paragraph 7.  End Summary.

Opinion Versus Office
---------------------
3.  (C) Saran argued to the DCM that the USG had made a decision based on opinion, an opinion that even some in India hold.  That opinion, however, is a separate issue from the fact that Modi is a constitutionally-mandated office holder whose position derives from the people.  Saran argued that the US as a democracy would appreciate this, and argued that the dignity of the office of Chief Minister cannot be overridden.  Calling the USG determination that Modi had failed to act in Gujarat during the 2002 riots a ""subjective judgment,"" Saran suggested that perhaps Washington had not considered that this was a separate issue in the Indian mind.

Reverse Effect
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4.  (C) Appreciating the importance the USG attaches to religious freedom, Saran cautioned that this determination could have an effect opposite from that intended -- a strong emotional reaction which had the potential to polarize the Indian people.  This would not be in the interest of religious harmony, or shared US and Indian objectives, he noted.  Highlighting the political ramifications, Saran observed that Parliament was in session and said ""this will no doubt become a major issue,"" adding that the BJP was ""up in arms.""  Saran stated that this incident might ""open up an odd type of standard to give or not give visas.""

Request for Reconsideration
---------------------------
5.  (C) In light of the above considerations: that Modi's office is separate from the subjective judgment of his complicity, and the possibility that this decision could heighten intercommunal tensions, Saran requested the DCM to ask Washington to reconsider its decision.  The DCM explained the two parts of our decision, the refusal of the A2, and the revocation of the B1/B2, highlighting that we had acted in accordance with our own law and democratic constitution. Noting the considerable popular and Congressional interest in this case, the DCM told Saran that we had taken into consideration independent reports, including that of India's own National Human Rights Commission, and that the decision was not taken capriciously, but involved many people in Washington.  The DCM also noted that the most recent USG International Religious Freedom Report had characterized the overall state of religious freedom in India as improving.

6.  (C) Action request: In light of Foreign Secretary Saran's request that the USG give Modi's visa application urgent reconsideration, post requests a review of the case, so we can respond back to Saran on March 19 (the day Modi was to travel.)  (Post does not expect any change, but would appreciate a cable telling the GOI we took a fresh look and decided to maintain our decision.)

7.  (U) The MEA issued a statement following Saran's meeting with the DCM.
Begin text:
The Government of India expresses its deep concern and regret that the Embassy of the United States of America denied a visa to Shri Narendra Modi, Hon. Chief Minister of Gujarat, to visit the US for an event organized by the Asian American Hotel Owners' Association.
The visa had been requested by the Ministry of External Affairs through a note verbal (sic) to the Embassy on February 28, 2005.  This action on the part of the US Embassy is uncalled for and displays lack of courtesy and sensitivity towards a constitutionally elected Chief Minister of a state of India.
The Ministry of External Affairs has called the Head of Mission of the Embassy to the Ministry to lodge a strong protest against the denial of visa to Modi and to request an urgent reconsideration.
End text.

MULFORD

Reference ID Created Released
Classification Origin
05NEWDELHI2140
2005-03-21 13:01
2011-03-22 01:01
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 002140
 
SIPDIS
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2015
TAGS: CVIS PREL PHUM PGOV KIRF IN

SUBJECT: MODI CASE REFLECTS DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIVIDE
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 2095  B. NEW DELHI 2094 C. NEW DELHI 2090 D. NEW DELHI 2081

Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

1.  (C) Summary: Aside from limited and localized protests in Gujarat and scattered nationalist editorial comment, BJP efforts to build a domestic political issue out of the Modi visa revocation seem to be dissipating.  Few outside the Sangh Parivar have risen to the bait and responded to BJP calls to make this into an India/USA confrontation.  In private conversations with us, Indians have expressed overwhelming support for the US decision.  Initial shock at the denial is now turning to embarrassment.  Modi harmed himself by making vitriolic anti-American statements that are not resonating well.  With Modi's political fortunes fading, the BJP leadership may decide at the appropriate time to quietly cast him aside.  The big loser could be Party President LK Advani, who may have been too quick and too outspoken in his support of Modi.  We will address BJP internal politics septel.  End Summary.

Deep Divide in Gujarat
----------------------
2.  (C) Gujarat CM Narendra Modi has been teetering on the edge of political ignominy for at least a year.  In 2004, then Prime Minister Vajpayee, with the concurrence of many within his party, pushed for Modi's dismissal, but lacked sufficient determination to deliver the final blow.  Just prior to the flap over Modi's visa denial, 60 members of the BJP parliamentary party in Gujarat called on him to step down, and the numbers were growing daily (Mumbai Septel). The BJP dissidents argued that Modi's dictatorial and arbitrary style of functioning was hurting the BJP in Gujarat, which could lose the next election there if Modi were not dismissed.

3.  (U) Initial press reports had claimed that the visa incident bought Modi a reprieve from his opponents in Gujarat.  The ""Hindustan Times"" argued that, ""the dissidents' campaign against Modi is bound to be weakened, at least for some time.""  One dissident noted that, ""Modi has proven to be lucky one again,"" as we ""will have to lie low.""  Another maintained that, ""Now that Mr. Modi has been denied a US visa, he has again become a hero in Gujarat...this has come as a reprieve for him.""

4.  (U) Even though the visa controversy is only days old, the dissidents are already coming back in strength. Dissident leader Vallabh  Kathiria indicated on March 19, that Modi's reprieve would prove short-lived, as the dissidents were in no mood to give up their agitation, noting that, ""People will not remember this forever.  There's no pro-Modi tempo in Delhi.  Our campaign is slow and steady. It may just take a little longer.""

BJP Turns to America Baiting
----------------------------
5.  (U) Among the BJP's national leadership, no figure is more closely connected with Modi than Party President and former DPM LK Advani, who quickly came to Modi's defense.  At a Modi rally in Ahmedabad on March 20, Advani was the most outspoken, charging the USG with treating India as a ""pushover,"" and warning that ""this is not the end, but just the beginning of the battle for vindicating the self respect of the country.""  Advani urged Indians to hold similar pro-Modi rallies across the country to ""awaken the nation, so that one ever dares to treat it as a pushover.""

6.  (U) At the rally, Modi launched new anti-American attacks on the USG in Advani's presence, claiming that the USG revoked his visa at the behest of an anti-Hindu lobby in the US upset over Gujarat's passage of an anti-conversion law. Modi further claimed the USG denied him a visa to prevent Gujarat from working with Iran to bring a gas pipeline to India, as ""the US was afraid this would lead to Gujarat and in turn India, becoming an economic power.""  Although not as outspoken as Advani, other BJP/NDA leaders also pledged support to Modi, including George Fernandes, BJP General Secretary Arun Jaitley, and Manohar Joshi.
SIPDIS

Deep Divides Between the BJP and Congress
-----------------------------------------
7.  (U) The United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government was largely silent after presenting a formal protest on March 18 (Ref B).  The BJP was quick to thank the GOI for its ""support"" of Modi, with Advani expressing gratitude to PM Manmohan Singh for his ""bold stand"" against a ""powerful country like the US against hurting India's pride.""  Congress Spokesman Anand Sharma quickly pointed out that the GOI protested the treatment of ""a duly elected chief minister who holds a constitutional post,"" but this ""does not dilute its opposition against the BJP leader.""  Sharma also declined to ""condemn"" the US action or characterize it as an ""insult"" to India.  Separately, a senior party strategist close to Sonia Gandhi contacted PolCouns on March 20 to make sure we understood the UPA was just ""doing what it had to"" in demonstrating support for Modi, and to ensure this would not detract from Secretary Rice's successful visit.  The Congress agenda, our contact added, is to make this issue disappear from public view as quickly as possible.

8.  (C) The Modi incident comes at a time when the political divide between Congress and the BJP is deep and growing.  The two parties are fiercely contesting state governments in Goa, Bihar, and Jharkhand, and Parliament has almost ceased to function due to BJP obstructionism.  The BJP has refused to cooperate with Congress on economic measures even when they are endorsed by both parties, including the new Patent Law (Ref D), and a BJP threat not to execute the Value Added Tax system scheduled for implementation on April 1.

The Secular/Communal Divide
---------------------------
9.  (C) Modi and his followers within the BJP have been attempting to use nationalism to rally mass support around Modi, painting his visa revocation as, ""against all principles of democracy and human rights,"" ""an ""insult to the Constitution of India, which infringes on India's sovereignty,"" and an ""audacious step that has been taken specifically for deriding and insulting India.""  Media reports indicate, however, that these arguments are having little impact outside Modi's core supporters within the BJP and Sangh Parivar.

10.  (C) A broad spectrum of ""secular"" groups, including political parties, NGOs and newspapers, have failed to take the bait, condemning Modi and applauding the USG move, despite the risk of being blamed ""unpatriotic.""  The Rashtriya Janata Dal, for example, stated that, ""Mr. Modi is an Indian, so we have no choice but to tolerate his presence here, but other sovereign nations do not have to allow religious bigots to enter.""  The leader of the Congress delegation in the Gujarat State Assembly suggested that his Chief Minister, ""refrain from going abroad,"" as he ""remained constantly surrounded by controversy.""

11.  (C) The GOI has also come under criticism for its rush to support visa issuance to Modi.  Press reports indicate that ""at least 35"" groups representing overseas Indians appealed to the PM ""to look at this not through a nationalistic lens or as a violation of protocol, but to consider the larger issues involved.""  Most editorials pointed out that sovereign nations have the right to deny visas to human rights abusers, and that India should have resolved this issue, the Indian legal system should have prosecuted Modi, the BJP leadership should have dismissed him, and the UPA failed to push for quick prosecution of riot related cases after coming to power in New Delhi.

12.  (C) BJP and Sangh Parivar calls for Indians to rally around Modi have not cowed his opponents, who continue to demand his dismissal.  The generally anti-America ""Hindu"" characterized the visa episode as ""an additional setback"" for Modi, predicting that he is ""in for a long hot summer."" While the ""Times of India"" urged the BJP to ""realize that it can't shield its poster boy of hate under the pretext of electoral mandate,"" and leading Indian columnist Pankaj Vohra urged the party to ""seize the opportunity and replace Modi before he causes any further embarrassment.""

13.  (U) Private comments by a wide range of Indians to Embassy officers show there has been strong support by most Indians for the USG's decision.  One former director of the Central Bureau of Investigation, for example, told DCM that ""Nine five percent of India stands with you.""

Comment 
---------------------------
14.  (C) Modi's political problems continue to grow, and his options narrow.  The BJP initially hoped to use Modi's visa problems to overcome deep internal divisions and rally public support.  Any gains are likely to be short-lived, as Modi's continued presence as a BJP leader exacerbates party divisions.  Rather than silencing his critics, the visa case is providing them with ammunition, sullying the BJP's reputation and keeping it on the defensive at a time when it hoped to make political gains against Congress.  Within Gujarat, emotions are currently running high, and Modi has won a reprieve, but it is likely to be short-lived.  As attention shifts from the visa issue, his opponents will re-emerge.

15.  (C) The UPA government having ""gone through the motions"" by protesting the USG decision, is unlikely to ratchet up the pressure further.  Congress has long viewed Modi as a vulnerable target and will, at the appropriate time, use the visa incident as further ammunition against him.  Both Congress and the BJP particularly value the US-India relationship and Modi's America bashing has made many nervous.  Both parties will likely move to ensure that the negative impact on the relationship from this incident is minimal.  With Modi's position deteriorating, the BJP leadership could decide to quietly push him aside at the appropriate time.  This could become a further liability for Advani, who the senior party leader most visibly supporting Modi.
MULFORD