Congress junks BJP govt's rapid response strategy to Pakistan attacks

India has more or less abandoned its ‘Cold Start’ doctrine -- put in place by the BJP government after the Parliamentary attacks of 2001 --designed to punish Pakistan for any future misadventure, according to the US embassy cable leaked by Wikileaks.

Characterising India’s rapid response strategy as a mix of myth and reality,  the American embassy felt that the Congress government seems to have abandoned the doctrine, as shown by its unwillingness to put it in motion even after the “audacious and bloody” Mumbai attacks of 2008.

Cold Start is an operational plan devised by the Indian Army and designed to make a rapid and limited penetration into Pakistani territory with the goal of quickly punishing Pakistan over some event, such as a Pakistan-linked terrorist attack in India, without threatening the survival of the Pakistani state or provoking a nuclear response, the cable pointed out.

“In order to avoid the Indian Army’s slow and lumbering military mobilization process and preserve the element of surprise in attack, Cold Start attacks could begin within 72 hours after the attack order has been given, and would be led by armored spearheads launched from prepared forward positions in Punjab and Rajasthan. As described, the plan emphasizes speed and overwhelming firepower: armored formations and accompanying infantry would advance into eastern Pakistan with limited goals in terms of distance and in terms of duration,” the cable, written in February this year, went on.

The Mumbai attacks of 2008 was a classic case that fit the Cold Start doctrine, but the Congress government did not seem to support the doctrine, the Americans observed. It pointed out that the Congress’ lengthy decision-making process -- which needs consensus between the party high command and senior leaders -- instead of a Prime Minister led approach is likely delay the Cold Start long enough to make it useless.

“The Manmohan Singh government.. has not since publicly embraced Cold Start. A political green-light to implement Cold Start, fraught as it is with potential nuclear consequences, would involve a highly opaque decision-making process and would likely necessitate broad political consensus, a factor that could prolong the time between a precipitating event such as a Pakistan-linked terror attack and Cold Start deployment (which in turn could reduce the element of surprise).

“The precise function of the Cabinet Committee on Security in ratifying decisions to take military action, the character of the military’s advisory responsibilities to the Cabinet, the possible ad hoc nature of decision-making in the upper levels of the Indian government and the role of Congress Party figures like Sonia Gandhi in this process are not clearly understood,” the cable added.

The embassy also pointed out that India did not follow the Cold Start doctrine after the Mumbai terror attacks.

“The Government of India refrained from implementing Cold Start even after an attack as audacious and bloody as the Mumbai attack, which calls into serious question India’s willingness to actually adopt the Cold Start option. Second, the Pakistanis have known about Cold Start since 2004, but this knowledge does not seem to have prompted them to prevent terror attacks against India to extent such attacks could be controlled,” it pointed out.

In other words, the embassy felt, 'Cold Start' has lost its relevance after the Mumbai attacks. “Cold Start is not India’s only or preferred option after a terrorist attack. Depending on the nature, location, lethality, public response, and timing of a terrorist attack, India might not respond at all or could pursue one of several other possible options,” it pointed out.

The embassy also felt that implementation of Cold Start, with its emphasis on quick and punitive attacks, would not be as smooth as Indians expected -- and would yield ‘mixed’ results.

“It is the collective judgment of the Mission that India would likely encounter very mixed results. Indian forces could have significant problems consolidating initial gains [in Pakistan] due to logistical difficulties and slow reinforcement... Challenges.. range from road and rail transportation to ammunition supply. In addition, Cold Start’s reliance on swift mobile advance would have to contend with a large number of built-up populated areas in Pakistan that the Indian Army did not have to face in 1971, the last time it advanced in force into Pakistani Punjab and Sindh,” the embassy pointed out.

The Americans also pointed out that the fear of a nuclear response from Pakistan and international condemnation is likely to keep Cold Start in cold storage, as far as the Indian political leadership is concerned.