#dnaEdit: End this favouritism

A recent Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) letter to Union secretaries seeking names for empanelment to the posts of Chief Vigilance Commissioner and Vigilance Commissioner exposes the imperfections in our system. The letter stated that the DoPT would not accept applications directly from applicants and entrusted the task of proposing names to the 37 secretary-level IAS officers. This is tantamount to excluding independent experts — even retired, but qualified, bureaucrats  — from applying for the positions. It also restricts the selection process to the whims of a clutch of serving bureaucrats. Questioning this selection process, a PIL has been moved alleging that the DoPT letter contravenes the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, and is at odds with the process enshrined in the Lokpal Act that encourages qualified citizens to apply for posts in the nine-member Lokpal. In its posers to the Attorney-General on the fairness of this procedure, the Supreme Court has wondered aloud if this procedure upholds the dictum of transparency, that the Centre claims is the driving spirit behind the Judicial Appointments Commission legislation. 

With judges appointing judges in the collegium system, and bureaucrats and politicians pursuing a similar nepotist course in appointments to statutory commissions, the vitiation of the selection processes will require not just a comprehensive overhaul of the statute, but also a change of mindsets. Not long back, the Supreme Court, in a benign attempt to rectify the parking of retired bureaucrats in Information Commissions and the resulting red-tapism in disposing RTI appeals, came up with a muddled solution: it ruled that only retired judges and persons with legal background could serve as Information Commissioners. The outrage that followed prompted the apex court to recall the nepotistic order. It is not surprising then, that like the judges, bureaucrats would find those from their own ilk as best qualified to hold constitutional, statutory and regulatory positions in the CVC, Election Commission, Information Commissions, CAG, TRAI, or the Lokpal, considering their vast experience in government positions. Similarly, the political monopoly over the minority, scheduled castes and tribes, backward classes and women’s commissions stems from a belief that these require popular representatives as members. Such niche-based appointments can be justified to a certain extent. But they must meet the test of transparency; an inconvenient but non-negotiable tenet in an era of increasing civil society participation in governance.

In the CVC’s case, the appointment process, especially of a retired bureaucrat, necessitates the highest standards of scrutiny since the CVC is tasked with monitoring bureaucrats, overseeing vigilance departments, investigating complaints, and vetting complaints forwarded by the Lokpal. In striking down PJ Thomas’ appointment, the Supreme Court ruled that the zone of consideration for appointments to the CVC must not be restricted to civil servants. As is evident, the DoPT’s letter on empanelment violates the PJ Thomas judgment. Perhaps, what the Supreme Court, Parliament and civil society need to discuss is ways to harmonise and bring uniformity into appointment policies. None of the statutory or constitutional bodies like the CAG and Election Commissioners created in the pre-CVC Act era require bipartisan consultation. None of the legislations for bodies created in the pre-Lokpal Act era have transparent empanelment procedures. Rather than the judiciary step into this legislative vacuum that facilitates the notification of arbitrary rules, and create new formulations that may not be apt, Parliament must set the discourse on streamlining appointments.