Assessing Pakistan: Situation on the other side complicated; need for a nuanced strategy

Director General of Military Operations (DGMO), Lieutenant General Ranbir Singh, rang up the Pakistan DGMO, Major General Sahir Shamshad Mirza, and told him that infiltrators from the Pakistan side had crossed over, and Mirza asked in return for ‘actionable intelligence’. At the ground level, the two commanders have followed what could be called the global best practice. But the rhetoric at the political level was different as it was bound to be. Union minister Rajnath Singh blamed Pakistan, and the security and diplomatic pundits as well as the media raised the demand for retaliatory action against Pakistan. The foreign office spokesperson in Islamabad had rejected the Indian charge as baseless, and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s foreign affairs advisor Sartaj Aziz had called it a ruse to deflect attention from the internal trouble in the Kashmir Valley. It will be another round of tedious exchange of barbs, which is no solace to the families of the 18 soldiers who were killed at Uri on Sunday.

The attack has provided an opportunity yet again for the experts in India and elsewhere to view Pakistan as the epicentre of terrorism, and how the country is on the verge of turning into a failed State. The general Indian recrimination has lost its sting because it lacks substance. It is necessary for the experts and opinion-makers in India, and even in the United States and Europe, to assess the Pakistan State for what it really is.

There are two types of terrorist organisations at work in Pakistan. There are groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Hizbul Mujahideen (HuM), which are focused on creating trouble in the Indian side of Kashmir, and who seem to enjoy the tacit support of Pakistan’s political and military establishment. It might be difficult to establish the direct linkages between these groups and the Pakistan government, though there will be enough traces of the connection. Even if these organisations are labelled terrorist by the United States and the United Nations, it will not follow that Pakistan would throw them out of the country.

The second type of terrorist organisations are the Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP), elements of al Qaeda and the Islamic State, which are mainly at work on the western borders of Pakistan. These organisations are fighting the Pakistan government, and they are attacking the security forces as well as followers of other sects. On Friday, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, considered an off-shoot of TTP, had claimed responsibility for the bombing of a mosque in the village of Payee Khan in Mohmand Agency, part of the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), where 30 people, including children were killed, and 30 others were injured. The same organisation had owned up to the September 2 attack in Mardan in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in which 14 people were killed and 50 injured, and an attack on lawyers in Quetta on August 8 where 73 were killed, apart from the bombing in April on Easter in Lahore, which killed 75. 

What India’s Pakistan-watchers may have to understand is that there is no homogenous terror network in Pakistan, and at a very simple level, there are at least two general types, one which works against India in Kashmir, and other which works against the civil and military government in Pakistan in a bid to make Pakistan a truly Islamic state according to their definition. It might appear that Pakistan is caught in a deep contradiction, fighting terrorist groups on the western front, and supporting other terrorist groups on its eastern front. Pakistani army and the political establishment do not see any contradiction in it. It would then be ineffective on the part of India to call Pakistan as a facilitator of terrorism because the rest of the world also takes into consideration Pakistan’s fight against TTP and its offshoots.

It will be interesting to know whether there is any kind of linkage between the two types of terrorist groups in Pakistan, and there is a possibility that the cadres from the one walk over to the other. Pakistani army and government might be indulging in juggling to keep a balance between these two kinds of terrorist organisations, keeping all the balls in the air, shooting some of them, and keeping others in the air. 

There is also the power struggle between the army and the civilian political establishment with regard to the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), where the army is demanding, according to reports in the Pakistan media, a clearly defined role in providing security to the 10,000 and more Chinese workers engaged in the construction of the CPEC, and which would involve administrative oversight as well. This is being resisted by the civilian administration as it is likely to increase the army’s leverage in managing the CPEC. There is the clear indication that the army recognises the importance of CPEC for the growth and development of Pakistan’s economy.

The situation in Pakistan then is quite complicated, and it could become more complicated as to create more problems for the country. But Pakistan is coping with the situation at the moment, allowing LeT, JeM and HuM to foment trouble in the Kashmir Valley, fighting TTP and its offshoots, and the tussle between the army and the civilian administration keeping the government in a taut state. One of these many strands could snap and create a veritable crisis. It is most likely that these different power players will reposition themselves in response to the exigency.

India will have to fight the terrorist groups on the other side of Kashmir while maintaining normal links with the Pakistani army and the civilian administration. Strategists must resist the temptation to join hands with the terrorist groups in Pakistan’s western parts in order to embarrass Islamabad. 

The Balochistan gambit is not a clever one at all. And New Delhi should deal with the civilian establishment to handle economic and administrative matters. It is not a strategic move to place India in an undeclared state of war with Pakistan even while fighting a subterranean war against the LeT, JeM and HuM. 

The author is consulting editor, dna