Swat analysis

The deal between the Pakistan government and pro-Taliban forces in the Swat valley is an ominous portent of Pakistan’s slide into jihadism, with strategic implications for India and other countries, warns Walid Phares, a counter-terrorism expert and director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington. Excerpts from an interview he gave to DNA 

Will the Obama administration’s strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan succeed or will this become ‘Obama’s Vietnam’?
The success of the strategy hinges not only on the military actions inside Afghanistan and Pakistan but rather more on the regional strategy the administration devises. It can succeed if it offers support to Afghanistan and crafts a campaign to isolate jihadists politically and broaden the anti-terror coalition in the subcontinent. 
The argument about ‘Obama’s Vietnam’ was advanced by the jihadi propaganda machine. But Afghanistan could become a Vietnam if the Taliban wins the hearts and minds of Afghans and if Pakistan falls to jihadists. So far, that’s not the case. To avoid a Vietnam-like situation, the US and NATO must ensure that Afghans reject the Taliban’s ideology and Pakistan doesn’t fall into the jihadists’ hands. 
 
The Pakistani military and power structure has already been infiltrated by jihadists.
The jihadi penetration of Pakistan’s armed forces is the centre of all concerns in any strategy. Pakistani high officials, particularly those who view the jihadi forces as a threat, know that many sectors have been penetrated, but they say this situation has been inherited from previous years and decades.

How serious is the recent proclamation of Sharia law in the Swat Valley?
It’s a setback to democracy and pluralism, and shows the power of jihadi movements. The Yousuf Raza Gilani government inherited a situation from past decades. The spread of fundamentalism in Pakistan is half-a-century old. If the Swat valley agreement is a prelude to a retreat by the government from jihadists, the future will be dark.  
 
What are the implications of this deal for Pakistan?
It will empower radical Islamists and jihadist movements to create a large pool of jihad-indoctrinated people. The jihadists are unstoppable: once they have Sharia control over a province, they will use it to spread their version of jihad and entice youth into the Taliban and other groups. Other provinces in the frontier areas will fall. Eventually, it will bring down the government. 

Is the ‘war on terror’ blind to the terrorism infrastructure in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir?
Washington’s first priority is to help Islamabad counter jihadists operating on the western border, because they can turn the situation in Afghanistan nasty. The Pakistani government can barely deal with one front at a time, so priority is given to the Taliban/al Qaeda. But in the long run, the US can’t consider these jihadi forces as a “blind zone” because eventually these “zones” will be used against all countries involved: India, Afghanistan, the US and eventually even Pakistan.
 
There are concerns about Pakistan’s earnestness in dismantling the India-directed terrorism infrastructure.

The architects of the Mumbai attack left a trail pointing to Pakistan. They wanted a clash between India and Pakistan so (the jihadists) can grab power in Pakistan. There is evidence that the terrorists had support in Pakistan, even from people inside the intelligence and defence apparatus. Perhaps one of the reasons the Pakistani government didn’t unleash a massive crackdown on these circles is this internal problem in Pakistan.

India should be patient regarding the situation in Pakistan, and for now should encourage the counter-jihadi movement in Pakistan to grow. It is more important for India to get a world consensus against terrorists than to expect higher results from counter-terrorism operations in Pakistan.   
 
A post-election BJP government might launch pre-emptive strikes against terrorist camps in Pakistan. Would that be the right response?
If India strikes at Pakistan in retaliation against cross-border jihadi acts, it will lead to a takeover of Pakistan by jihadists with access to nuclear weapons. The jihadists’ aim is to drag the two countries into confrontation, at the timing of jihadists: India must not grant them that wish. If it does, the Pakistan military, incited by radical elements, will move its forces from the Afghan border to the India border. Moderates in Pakistan will be isolated. It will free the Taliban to operate against the US and NATO in Afghanistan.

India — under any government — should act smartly by mobilising against jihadists first inside its own borders. Second, India can wage a ‘war of ideas’ with broadcasts and on the internet in languages the West has little skills in. Third, India should convene an international conference against the spread of the jihadi ideology, inviting Muslim moderates, the US, Russia and the rest of the international community. India will always have the military option open, but after a strong international coalition is up and running.