How Modi’s visit impacts Indo-US relations

Since Narendra Modi came to power in May 2014, he has invested huge political capital in strengthening relations with the US. His three-day visit to the US this month was the latest attempt in this regard. 

True, Modi’s US Congress address was impressive, touching on all the important aspects of bilateral ties. Modi’s saying that the constraints of past are behind us and foundations of the future firmly in place clearly reflected India’s desire to expand horizons of cooperation with the US. His appreciation of the US administration for sending a clear message to “those who preach and practice terrorism for political gains,” without naming Pakistan, was a good attempt to cement counter-terrorism cooperation with the US. However, the fact remains that the two countries differ on how to tackle the menace of terrorism in South Asia. Certainly, it is not clear whether Modi’s visit has reduced the gap between the two countries in this regard. The visit also did not see any breakthrough on how peace, security and developmental work can be promoted in Afghanistan, given the fact that India’s objection to Obama’s attempt of distinguishing between bad Taliban and good Taliban. 

Modi’s open assertion that a stronger India is in the US’s strategic interests and that a stronger US-India partnership can boost peace and prosperity from Asia to Africa and from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific, was indeed a bold statement. Unfortunately, the US Senate’s rejection of a bill recognising India as a “global strategic and defence partner” is a serious setback for the Modi government.  

Mod’s visit witnessed the signing of a joint statement entitled the ‘United States and India: Enduring Global Partners in the 21st Century’, with the two countries signing six agreements, including the formulation of a roadmap for cooperation under the 2015 US-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific, with the aim of containing China. However, unfortunately, the Indian government has not made any critical analysis of cost and benefit of explicitly jointing the US in its containment policy towards China. The civil nuclear area also did not see any substantive progress, except the mention of initial work on the nuclear plant sites in Andhra Pradesh. The visit did not see signing of the Logistic Exchange Memorandum Agreement and others, due to presumably continued differences between the two countries. Similarly, other big issues like the H1B and L1 visas, intellectual property right did not even find mention in the joint statement. There continues to hang a question mark over India’s entry into the Nuclear Supplier Group.  

Thus, many people have started arguing that Modi’s aggressive efforts to expand security ties with the US is ill-conceived in the sense that in doing  so India is not only unnecessarily angering China, thereby giving scope for expansion of close ties between Beijing and Islamabad, but is also inching towards losing its time-tested friend — Russia. 

The author is ICSSR Doctoral Fellow, UGC Centre for Southern Asia Studies, Pondicherry University