From anti-feudal to anti-capitalist: How Maoist strategies have changed

The nature of Maoist violence in Chhattisgarh ––and even in Jharkhand and Odisha — is different from the violence witnessed in the lush green farmlands of Bihar in the last quarter of 20th Century, when private armies of upper caste farmers and Naxalites would indulge in massacres and counter-massacres. In recent years, Maoists are taking on the state machinery, corporate houses, mining companies, while killing informers and special police officers drawn from Adivasi ranks. The origin of the ultra-Red upsurge can be traced to the Communist uprising in Telangana in the late 1940s, and in the 1967 revolt in the Naxalbari highlands — a block in West Bengal’s Darjeeling. However, the pattern of the bloody struggle in the tribal heartland of India in the 21st Century is somewhat different from the above two insurrections.

It is also dissimilar to the earlier strategies of the People’s War Group in Andhra Pradesh and Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) in pre-2000 united Bihar. The merger of these two groups to form the CPI (Maoist) led to the launch of an offensive against the state in the post-liberalisation era. Thus,it is not just an armed agrarian struggle against feudal forces, but a more forceful campaign for jal, zameen and jungle. The shift in strategy can be traced to September 1999, following the Lok Sabha elections, when 37 central paramilitary forces personnel were killed in three simultaneous attacks on the first day of polling in the jungles of southern Bihar (now Jharkhand).

The creation of new states in November 2000 with a sizeable tribal population –– Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh –– gave a major boost to the Maoists. They took Jharkhand by storm, carrying out a few daring raids on police stations and central paramilitary forces. In the initial few years, they killed hundreds by carrying out landmine blasts, and subsequently, ambushing them. As explosives –– which are used in mining –– are easily available in the coalmine region, triggering such blasts is not a difficult task. When the then deputy PM Lal Krishna Advani’s rath was entering Jharkhand from Bihar during the election campaign in April 2004, the ultras killed 26 security personnel. The Maoists gradually shifted their attention from the plains to the jungles and hills. Purulia and Midnapore districts of south Bengal and parts of Odisha also became their happy hunting grounds. In one daring raid, they looted 2,000 rifles from an armoury in Odisha. The Maoists actually stepped up their activities in Chhattisgarh after the 2003 Assembly election. The landscape of the southern districts bordering Odisha and Andhra Pradesh suited them. In their most deadly attacks, they killed 55 CRPF personnel on March 15, 2007 and 76 on April 6, 2010.

Even in Bihar, the Maoists retreated from the plains to the hills and forests adjoining Jharkhand. The last big attack in the plains took place on November 13, 2005 in the attack on the Jehanabad bail. Unlike in the plains where the Dalits and backwards form the main force, tribals are the backbone of the movement now. The process of industrialisation has hit them the hardest, causing large-scale displacement with little or no compensation or rehabilitation.

The problem is that unlike Jharkhand, where Jharkhand Mukti Morcha is a political platform, there is no prominent organisation to espouse the Adivasi cause in Chhattisgarh and Odisha. Another distinctive feature of the Maoist movement is that except the ideology, Maoism, almost everything is indigenous.

The author is a senior journalist based in Patna.