India must keep in mind that China has a gun under its pillow

Finally, defence ties between China and India are back on track. After Beijing gave its approval to let a division commander, a major general-ranked officer, from the Northern Army Command lead a military delegation to China later this year, the two sides decided to resume high-level bilateral defence exchanges during the Indian prime minister’s recent visit to China.

These exchanges were suspended last year after China decided that the Northern army commander would be given a stapled visa as he was in-charge of Jammu and Kashmir, a region for which Beijing issues stapled visas.

This was a significant escalation of bilateral dispute and demonstrated that China was ready to up the ante with India in a sign of its growing assertiveness.

Now after several rounds of negotiations, New Delhi was able to convince Beijing that a resumption of defence ties was essential if the growing distrust between the two sides needs to be bridged. India also proposed that the military delegation to China would be led by a major general from the Northern Command and not by the Northern army commander so as to give Beijing a cover to pull back from its maximalist position.

While high-level military exchanges with China have now been resumed, the underlying reality remains that so long as fundamental issues in the Sino-Indian relationship are not resolved, there is little likelihood of military relationships getting serious.

The latest defence white paper from Beijing says, “China pursues a national defence policy which is defensive in nature,” and “China will never seek hegemony, nor will it adopt the approach of military expansion now or in the future, no matter how its economy develops.” But the rest of the world will need more than mere words to take this assertion seriously, especially as the military gap between China and the rest of the region is widening at a frightening pace. Buoyed by double digit rates of economic growth, China’s official defence spending rose 12.7 per cent this year to about $91.5 billion, the second highest in the world behind the United States. This spectacular military rise is causing consternation among China’s neighbours who have called for greater transparency in China’s defence policy.

China’s largely secretive military modernisation programme is producing results faster than expected. Beijing is gearing up to challenge the US military prowess in the Pacific. Its anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) system, developed specifically to target US carrier strike groups, has reached initial operational capability much earlier than expected. And earlier this year, photographs appeared on Chinese internet sites of what is apparently China’s first stealth fighter during a runway test in western China.

China continues to defend its military upgradation by claiming that it needs offensive capability for Taiwan-related emergencies. But clearly its sights are now focused on the US. China wants to limit American ability to project power into the Western Pacific. It wants to prevent a repeat of its humiliation in 1996 when the US aircraft carriers could move around unmolested in the Taiwan Strait and deter Chinese provocations. Not surprisingly, the steady build up of a force with offensive capabilities well beyond Chinese territory is causing consternation in Washington and among China’s neighbours. This comes at a time of Chinese assertiveness on territorial disputes with Japan,

India and Southeast Asian countries.
China, Taiwan and a number of Southeast Asian nations have been squabbling for years over territorial claims to the South China Sea. Then last July, amid heightening tensions in the waters, secretary of state Hillary Clinton rallied with Southeast Asian nations to speak out against China when she suggested that the United States had a “national interest” in the area, and that China and other countries should abide by a 2002 agreement guaranteeing a resolution of the sovereignty disputes by “peaceful means.” This was as much due to America’s desire to reclaim its receding strategic space in the region as it was due to pressure from regional states. Despite this, civilian surveillance ships managed to plant a Chinese flag in the southern part of the sea last year.

Last November, Chinese admiral Hu Yanlin suggested that “international anti-China forces led by America” had stirred up discord in the region. Not surprisingly, China’s defence white paper argues that while the security situation in Asia and the Pacific was generally stable, it was becoming “more intricate and volatile,” with no clear solutions for tension points like the divided Korean Peninsula and with the United States increasing its involvement in regional issues.

Given this strategic reality confronting the regional landscape, a mere resumption of defence exchanges should not be viewed as anything substantive. These exchanges would be meaningful only if they provide Beijing with a better understanding of India’s core security interests and India’s rise as a major global political actor. Until that happens, New Delhi would be best advised to err on the side of caution.