A nuclear test

Speaking at The Brookings Institution in Washington in end March, Shyam Saran, special envoy to prime minister Manmohan Singh spoke about India’s differences with the United States on the CTBT in 1996. Much past history was unfolded. Many events have occurred thereafter, notably India’s five nuclear tests in 1998, inviting severe disapprobation by the United States. But both countries have since negotiated the Indo-US nuclear deal last fall.

The Clinton administration had taken leadership to negotiate the CTBT with the international community and signed it in 1996 but a Republican-dominated US Senate defeated the resolution to ratify the Treaty in 1999. The Bush administration had remained lukewarm towards ratifying the CTBT, since the weapons laboratories and armed forces in the US were opposed to a prohibition of nuclear tests — their reservations were grounded on doubts whether the development of new weapons could proceed, and weapon stockpiles properly validated. India was under no particular duress, therefore, to join the CTBT.  But president Obama has committed himself to reducing nuclear arsenals globally and ratifying the CTBT, which was highlighted in his election promises and reiterated recently in Prague.

Many reasons could be ascribed to Obama’s zeal — he has carefully cultivated his persona as an idealist cast in the Martin Luther King mould; hence promoting arms control and disarmament would furbish his public image, ahead of his seeking a second term in 2012.

A political reason is also obtaining — to distance himself from the unilateralist policies of former president Bush that had alienated America’s friends and allies. Above all, Obama is conscious of the real danger from nuclear weapons, which arises from problematical countries like North Korea and Iran, apart from non-state actors, acquiring these weapons and using them. It has become imperative, therefore, for the United States to lead the charge towards credibly reducing its own and Russia’s nuclear arsenals, comprising some 95 per cent of all the nuclear weapons in the world.

Operationalising the CTBT, which prohibits nuclear testing in all environments, including underground tests, is a major instrument for pursuing this laudable objective of nuclear disarmament.  

India’s present reluctance to sign the CTBT is ironical. It was in the forefront to ban nuclear tests in the 1950s. Jawaharlal Nehru had urged America and Russia “to stop all nuclear test explosions… and to proceed also to bring about effective disarmament” in end 1957. India’s resolute efforts thereafter led to the Partial Test Ban Treaty being negotiated in 1963, which only permitted underground nuclear tests.  Extending the no-testing envelope to underground tests was zealously pursued by India, despite conducting its so-called Peaceful Nuclear Explosion in May 1974. Later, India co-sponsored a resolution in September 1993, with the United States, urging the United Nations to finalise the CTBT. 

India’s objections, consequently, to joining the CTBT in 1996 was undoubtedly informed by strategic considerations, that it had not tested its nuclear devices before this modality would be foreclosed. After its 1998 nuclear tests, India declared a unilateral moratorium on further testing, which it reiterated in its Nuclear Doctrine (August 1999), and the Indo-US agreement embodying the nuclear deal (July 2005). The limited point being stressed here is that India committed to the United States and the international community that it will not conduct any more nuclear tests, despite a ‘moratorium’, by definition, only connoting a halt of indefinite duration that could be abandoned.

The technical argument on whether India needs to further test its nuclear devices is significant here. Immediately after the 1998 tests the Atomic Energy Commission and Defence Research and Development Organisation claimed that these tests “have provided critical data for the validation of our capability in the design of nuclear weapons of different yields for different applications and different delivery systems.” Former prime minister AB Vajpayee cited this technical opinion to justify his declaring a moratorium on further tests. Since no further tests are required on technical considerations, the objections now being raised seem based on political considerations, like anticipating allegations of a sell out. India’s current policy of not opposing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, but not participating in its negotiation seems to be a case of eating its cake and having it too!

To date nine countries stand outside the 44-nation dispensation for the CTBT to come into effect — China, Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, North Korea and the US. A ray of hope is available therefore for India to continue sitting on the fence, but linking India’s joining the CTBT with sufficient progress being made on nuclear disarmament could herald an upcoming frostiness in Indo-US relations.