Thinking cap

India’s defence has remained so sensitive — a holy cow, really — that it precludes serious and substantial discussions. So there is no alternative but to utilise sources who remain anonymous to get a picture of what exactly is going on.

As reported by this paper yesterday, there are pressures on India not to make certain weapons, and also to cap the Agni III missile range to 5,000km. This is not the first time this has happened.

In the 1990s, when the Agni missile tests were put off, it was speculated that it was done under American pressure. The Narasimha Rao government of the day promptly denied it. But very few took the government’s denial seriously.

In the bad world of big powers, it would be futile to pretend that there would be no international pressure on India’s weapons programmes as the country is poised to become a big power in its own right. But instead of turning away from the harsh truth that other countries will be worried by India’s weapons programmes, it will be better to face up to the issue squarely.

The issue here mainly concerns the development of the weapons programme. Capping it could only mean one of two things — that the scientists behind it are incompetent or many countries are getting nervous about India’s expansive ambitions. Both seem plausible; many a programme has failed to reach its full potential because the scientists running it simply could not deliver. This is not necessarily a reflection on their capabilities; often they have not been able to get crucial raw material or parts.

Which brings us to the next point. Many countries who feel they could be in the range of such missiles would understandably be unhappy, but even countries beyond have been known to watch India’s missile development with concern. On our part, there is a school of thought that argues that it would not matter if India were to cap a part of its weapons programme. Of course, this would be an unacceptable proposition to many who belong to the ‘nationalist pride-and-honour’ school of thought, but the practical aspects — getting nuclear technology, for example — would outweigh the
advantages. These are always hard decisions to be made, but they should be made based on hard thinking, rather than emotionalism and the evaluation of various
arguments.

There are always adjustments to be made in the international arena with regard to defence matters, and there is need for a framework to think out these adjustments. Seen in this broad framework, what appears to be a problematic decision may well turn out to have a rationale after all.