Calming ruffled feathers

Rajesh M Basrur & Shiping Tang

China’s successful test of an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon in January and India’s launching of the Agni III intermediate-range ballistic missile last week have raised the spectre of fresh strategic tensions between them. Though each has given the assurance that its new capabilities are not aimed at the other, the danger of an unwanted spiral of increasing tension between them is real.

The dynamic behind such a possibility is a volatile mixture of three developments: American efforts to build an alliance-like relationship with India and put together a coalition of democracies in Asia in order to contain China; India’s drive to reach some sort of strategic parity with China by bandwagoning with the US; and China’s endeavour to avert American encirclement and develop a strong military machine to deter the US in the event of a crisis over Taiwan. These factors have the potential to suck India and China into a spiral of tension.

China understands that Agni III is aimed specifically at it. Yet, quite remarkably, it issued a muted reaction to the test, just as it did when India conducted nuclear tests in 1998, before the then PM Vajpayee’s letter to President Clinton was leaked to the press. While China is somewhat reassured by India’s overall nuclear posture, which does not find active deployment of its nuclear weapons necessary, it will have to take India’s growing military power into account in its defence planning. But China does not look on India as its arch-enemy, simply because it does not see a serious probability of real conflict between itself and India. What China fears is not so much a powerful India, but a powerful India with its nationalism directed against China.

Likewise, what India fears is a rising China whose nationalism might be directed against it. Hence, it has sought to engage China positively, rather than merely compete with it. It would be misleading for India to take China’s ASAT weapons as targeting India, although they can certainly hit Indian satellites. China’s ASAT capability is aimed primarily at the US because there is a real probability of actual conflict between China and the US over Taiwan. Unfortunately, whatever capabilities China develops to deter the US can also be employed against India. Hence, it is natural for India to be suspicious of China’s intentions.

Ultimately, weapons do not in themselves constitute threats; policies do. For weapons development to be regarded as seriously threatening, one would have to consider armed conflict a significant possibility. The trajectory of India-China relations shows otherwise.

First, neither country has a significant political problem with the other that might produce a military confrontation. The border dispute is as yet unresolved, but it is evident that both sides are comfortable with the slow negotiation process, which has certainly not hindered increasing cooperation. India recognises China’s position on Tibet; China does likewise on Sikkim. Taiwan — China’s chief concern — is not a problem between them.

Second, India and China are actively seeking economic and political cooperation, which is reflected in their rapidly growing trade. Notwithstanding their image as “emerging powers,” both can benefit by being more open to  each other’s market presence. 

Both are entitled to engage in a degree of hedging. But since neither sees the other as an implacable adversary, prudence is called for in strategic responses. The positive aspect of the relationship is underlined by economic exchange, political dialogue, the beginnings of military cooperation, and the affirmation of a “strategic partnership.” To minimise the possibility of misperceptions, the two sides should initiate a genuine and broad reassurance programme in military affairs. China should unequivocally demonstrate to India that it does not oppose India becoming a great power and that China’s military modernisation is all about Taiwan. At the same time, India must avoid making China the sole reference point for augmenting its defence hardware, and assure China that it is not pursuing a containment strategy. It would be unwise for the two countries to see each other as arch-enemies and engineer a self-fulfilling prophecy of mutual threat. The future of Asia calls for a genuine reconciliation
between India and China.

The writers are Fellows at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.