Unclear explosion

Was the thermonuclear device tested by India at Pokhran on May 11, 1998 a failure? This question, first raised in the immediate aftermath of Pokhran-II, has been resurrected again.

Speaking at what was deemed to be a closed-door seminar in Delhi last week, Krishnan Santhanam, formerly with the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and part of the team that oversaw the Shakti series of tests in 1998, observed that the yield in the test results of the thermonuclear device was lower than what was expected and later claimed. Soon thereafter, a controversy seems to have started in some sections of the media — on television in particular— with words like ‘dud’ and ‘hoax’ being bandied about rather freely.

The official response has been to reject these doubts and the principal scientific adviser, R Chidambaram, has reiterated that the thermonuclear device test was “satisfactory” and had met the requisite design parameters. This view has been further endorsed by former president APJ Abdul Kalam who was the head of the DRDO during Pokhran-II. It is instructive that these two eminent scientists were part of the apex team that provided the necessary techno-strategic advice and assessment to the then prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee about the outcome of the Shakti series of nuclear tests that radically altered India’s strategic profile.

Post Pokhran-II, India declared that it had successfully acquired a ‘minimum credible deterrent’ and then realised that it was necessary to prioritise ‘credibility’ first before deciding on numbers. Hence the words were re-ordered and it was later declared that India had indeed acquired a credible minimum deterrent. Thus, the central question that arises post the Santhanam observation is the texture of India’s nuclear deterrent credibility. Is it robust enough to deal with what it was expected to — that is, ‘deter’ the potential adversary from embarking upon a nuclear attack against India? Here Santhanam clarified that India does indeed have the ability of ‘vacating’— the term he chose — any nuclear threat that may arise. So, to that extent the various audio-visual aspersions —  some very shrill — being cast about the quality of India’s deterrent capability are misplaced.

The more nuanced Santhanam formulation was about the implications of his view of “partial success” of the thermonuclear device apropos the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Again, this is an old debate that is often raised in India. In May 1998, when India had announced its no-first-use policy and a voluntary moratorium on further testing, numerous well-meaning critics castigated the Vajpayee government for its strategic naiveté. Yet, the government of the day represented by then national security adviser Brijesh Mishra and the apex scientific team assuaged the many concerns that were voiced.
Despite the limited number of tests, it was the considered strategic assessment of the establishment that India had acquired appropriate nuclear deterrent sufficiency. These misgivings about the CTBT came up more recently during the intense public debates that ensued over the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with the US. So, to that extent, these are old issues being re-visited with greater intensity and concomitant media glare. India is now committed to a de-facto CTBT and can decide when it wishes to move to a de-jure process after a careful and objective assessment of the prevailing regional and global environment.

The assertion that the thermonuclear test had a yield below that which was expected or desired is a very complex nuclear physics issue and has been discussed by domain experts for the last 10 years. A detailed technological assessment was published by Chidambaram in 2000 (re-published in 2008 with revisions), which reviews the seismic data collected in relation to the specific soil conditions obtained in Pokhran— and the conclusion is that the yield was satisfactory and not a ‘fizzle’.

Chidambaram and his core team of physicists and atomic scientists have spent the greater part of their professional lives in enabling India to reach its current nuclear status and their technical assessment has been validated by the peer group. Here Chidambaram’s suggestion is welcome, that since the doubts that have been raised are technical — the quantum of the yield and its analysis — if backed by appropriate scientific data, these can be referred to BARC.

In matters of nuclear strategy, while the actual capability and its complex technology is the purview of the scientist, the final decision about the quantity, quality and deployment of the arsenal is a political one based on an objective assessment by the national security professionals. And in India’s case, it is evident that prudent decisions to attain deterrence credibility have been arrived at. The current controversy is best resolved in the tea-cup of
scientists.