The relevance of conflict

It has taken more than a year after the Mumbai massacres for the peaceniks to crawl out of the woodworks.

Had the outrage been no more than a bomb blast at a market place or a train, they would not have waited for so long because of their naïve, wish-fulfilling assumptions about India-Pakistan relations. But the jehadi onslaught on Mumbai was a far more chilling affair.

Hence, the delay on the part of the peacemakers to get their act together.  But now that they have embarked on their mission, the pace is likely to pick up. A formal appeal has already been issued by a New Delhi seminar to resume the stalled dialogue.

Among those present were members of the group who are fond of holding candlelight vigils at the Wagah border. Earlier, there were newspaper articles bemoaning the absence of negotiations.     

The background, however, to all these efforts was less than propitious. First, there were gun battles between the security forces and the mercenaries in Srinagar.

Then, there were reports of hundreds of militants waiting to cross into India from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. And, to cap it all, Asif Ali Zardari sounded the bugle for a thousand-year war, recalling his late wife’s shrill “azadi, azadi, azadi” call in her heyday.

In addition, there was a report in America that the jehadis were itching to create conditions for a war so that the Pakistan army can call off its reluctant offensive in the north-west.

It will not be surprising if there is a conspiratorial nudge and a wink from the army and the ISI to the jehadis in this context.

There is little doubt that even as New Delhi remains firm in its insistence on Pakistan first providing credible evidence of action against the perpetrators of the Mumbai carnage before the talks can began, the renewed pressure from the peaceniks, the left-leaning media, including a major Chennai-based newspaper, and perhaps the Americans as well cannot but chip away at India’s resistance.

A few acts of tokenism by Pakistan can also prove to be the last straw.  Yet, even if the talks do begin, the likelihood of the dialogue preparing the ground for a durable peace will remain as elusive as ever for two reasons. The first and foremost is that real power in Pakistan — the army —  may have an agenda of its own.

Even if the civilian rulers tone down their thousand-year war rhetoric, their friendly gestures are unlikely to receive the army’s hearty endorsement. For the latter, a reconciliation with India will mean the shattering of its longstanding dream of dismembering India at a time when it may feel that it is nearing success.

It has to be remembered that the Pakistan army cannot be compared to any other such force which are all under civilian and political control, even in a totalitarian country like North Korea. Instead, the military in Pakistan is an entity which owes only formal allegiance to the government, but has a mind of its own.

What is more, the ease with which the military has grabbed power in the past must have inculcated the belief that it can do so again if it feels that the civilians are making a mistake.

There is a second reason why the army will be unhappy about any genuine prospect of peace. The Chinese seem to believe that the events in South Asia are moving in a direction which will be favourable for their hegemonic ambitions.

Their creeping encroachments on Indian territory, which have been acknowledged by New Delhi, and aggressive postures on Arunachal Pradesh —  along with the earlier unfriendly attitudes at the Asian Development Bank and Nuclear Suppliers Group meetings — demonstrate an unmistakable intent to balkanise India, as an article by a Chinese analyst suggested.

It may have been in this context that the Indian army chief, General Deepak Kapoor, had spoken of the country’s preparedness to fight on two fronts.

The Pakistan army is undoubtedly waiting for a time when the Americans will leave Afghanistan and it is able to redirect the energies of its longstanding strategic assets, the Taliban, against India. This may also be the time when the Chinese will up the ante in the north-east.

For any strategic planner in the Pakistan army, it will be absurd for Islamabad to opt for peace when its chances of success in a confrontation — or at least via the threat of a confrontation — with India are high since the nuclear angle will compel Americans to wrest concessions from India.

Pakistan army may allow a dialogue to begin and even lead to tentative agreements. But its interests and objectives are different from those of the civilians.

The writer is a Delhi-based commentator on political affairs