trendingNow,recommendedStories,recommendedStoriesMobileenglish1369895

What Chhattisgarh can learn from Andhra Pradesh

The police, the administration and the government addressed both law & order as well as the socio-economic issues of the people to make the Naxalites both unwelcome and irrelevant.

What Chhattisgarh can learn from Andhra Pradesh

The police, the administration and the government addressed both law & order as well as the socio-economic issues of the people to make the Naxalites both unwelcome and irrelevant. This took a long time, but Chattisgarh and other states can only succeed in their fight against today’s Maoists if they take a similar approach, says Pervaram Ramulu, former DGP of Andhra Pradesh, in an interview with DNA.

How did the AP police manage to turn the tables against the Naxalites?
We did not have any Aladdin’s lamp with us for that. We learnt our lessons the hard way. It took a focused effort to find a permanent and acceptable solution to the problem, which is still being debated on whether it is a law-and-order or socio-economic issue.
 
How did that happen?
We have seen the trajectory of the Naxalite and now Maoist movement for the last 40 years. We did not do anything major till 1974, though the movement took roots on AP soil in the late 60s. It was at its worst between 1969 and 1974. Then in 1980 again it came back, and the government started looking at it as a potential problem for future generations. Though we were using the police force against the Naxalites, we had designed a three-pronged strategy by then - social, economic and police. It was during the regime of the then chief minister NT Rama Rao that the Patel and Patwari system in village administration was abolished. This move satisfied many in the Telangana region, which was by then a hotbed of Naxalite activity. The government also focused on meeting the basic needs of the people by providing rice at Rs2 a kg, clothes at subsidised rates, housing, subsidies on power for farming, scholarships to the eligible and pensions to the aged, etc. This helped the government in alienating people from the Naxalites who were claiming that they were working for the people and opposing the anti-people policies of the government. It was the government that put things in place to ensure that there was no reason for discontent among the people of the region. Along with this, we as policemen were tackling the Naxalites on the field.
It is only after about 40 years that we have been successful in making the ideology of Naxalites irrelevant in this part of the country. This automatically took them to places like Chhattisgarh where the land is still fertile for them to propagate their ideology.
 
Can you elaborate on this?
In Chhattishgarh, where the Maoists are focused at this point of time, the land has a majority of tribals. Within tribals, the majority are Guttikoyas. There is another class of Koyas, who are now part of the Salwa Judum movement. This class is just 20 per cent of the total tribal population in the state, but they are more active in politics and other facets of civil society. The dominant role of this minority class is keeping the pot boiling. The Guttikoyas are a discontented lot. They are attracted towards the Maoists since the other class is closer to the government. Now, a solution has to be found out by looking at this perspective. Just killing the enemy is not going to solve the problem.

How did AP manage the intelligence aspect? Were there rewards for correct inputs?

The intelligence too has never focused just on the Naxalites. It moved beyond just policing and looked at the issues that concerned people. For example, the activities of middlemen at the market yards too were tracked. The Naxalites would gain ground if there were to be lapses in the administration at the market yard. So, apart from the organizational and operational intelligence about the Naxalites, we were also gathering a lot of other intelligence that concerned the socio-economic aspects of the people. Yes, there were rewards. The intelligence teams had about 40 per cent additional pay. But, we should always remember that intelligence is not always about spying. It is about capturing the public pulse. We were confident that if we could alienate the public from the Naxalites, there was a permanent solution.
 
Did it work?
I am not saying that we have completely rooted out Naxalism or Maoism from the state. There are still Maoists in AP and they will strike when the time is right for them. But there is no need being felt by the public for the intervention of these armed groups of Naxalites for administering justice or basic needs.
 
Is it possible to replicate this in other states?
It is possible. When I said it took 40 years for us to find a solution, it does not mean that it should take a similar amount of time for other states too to reach this point. For example, Chhattisgarh has been fighting the Maoists only for the last five years. Does it mean they should fight another 35 years? No. They can find a short cut and learn lessons from what we have gone through.

What are the lessons from AP that can be incorporated in the current operation?
If you want to focus just on the operation, there are three or four aspects. They should build a team like our Greyhounds with youngsters. The age of commandos should not be more than 35. Intelligence too should be sharpened. For intelligence, I would suggest to look beyond the age factor and hire seniors. The local police coordination is very important. What can the CRPF company do without speaking the local language? They will be completely lost in the forest.
 
Did the AP police too use paramilitary forces in anti-Naxal operations?
Yes we did. But, they were supporting the efforts of the state police. At the end of the day, this is a state subject. It should not be looked at as an issue the states cannot handle. But the Centre and forces like the CRPF should support the state forces.

What are the differences between the Naxals as an armed adversary of the state in AP in the 80s and 90s and the current Maoists in terms of capability and approach?
0There is a lot of difference. The earlier batch of Naxalites in the 1980s and early 90s had an ideology. There were scholarly people among them and we too respected them. They had their argument about solving society’s problems. Even when I was serving in some districts of the state, I used to meet them regularly and whenever they called on me I used to offer a seat and serve tea, etc. But the present-day Maoists have turned inhuman and barbaric. They’re killing whoever comes in their way, including their own men on suspicion of being informants. They’ve started killing villagers. In a way, this attitude of the Naxalites will help us since the people have started disliking them due to their mindless behavior.

LIVE COVERAGE

TRENDING NEWS TOPICS
More