India needs a robust national defence policy

We need to differentiate between the 9/11 attacks on the US by a non-state entity like the al-Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden and the attacks in Mumbai on 26/11 conducted by a state-sponsored and supported group — the Lashkar-e-Taiba.

While Osama declared ‘war’ on the US, Pakistan has been professing a desire for peace with India, and at the same time carrying out acts of war through surrogate terrorist groups, controlled by its premier external intelligence agency, the ISI.

The US response to the 9/11 attacks was swift, often based on imperfect intelligence, but unwavering in its aim of destroying the non-state attacker with its leadership being the primary target.

Osama was tracked to the Abbotabad area of Pakistan and killed in a clandestine operation by US Navy Seals without any prior permission from Pakistan. We should expect more such operations against the successors of Osama — never mind Pakistan’s sovereignty.

Our response to the 26/11 attacks was to raise a national clamour for ‘punishing’ Pakistan which denied any complicity on its part in the attacks and sought from us details of the attackers (if they were Pakistani citizens) so that they may be brought to justice under Pakistani laws. Meanwhile, we proceeded against the solitary attacker captured under Indian law and currently he is on ‘death row’ awaiting the outcome of his mercy petition.

The information sought by Pakistan was supplied to them but barring a bland statement that the information supplied was not legally tenable evidence, nothing worthwhile has been done.
Unlike the US, India is not contemplating a reprisal raid on, say Karachi or Lahore.

We have refrained from any trans-border action against Pakistan and after a few half-hearted and unconvincing threats to diplomatically enforce sanctions, we have resumed ‘normal’ relations with Pakistan — even holding talks on major territorial disputes like Siachen and inviting the Pakistani prime minister to watch a game of cricket.

But nothing brings out the comparison between the US and India as clearly as the response to acts of asymmetric war. Whereas we acted strictly within the bounds of international law, the US set its own interests above the constraints imposed by considerations of national sovereignty and borders — even of its close ally — Pakistan.

The US achieved its aim. We have not.

Does this mean that international relations must be conducted on the basis of ‘Might is Right’ and not on the civilised framework that has evolved in the past 100 years or so? Is there a possibility that we can achieve immunity acting in a civilised manner, if possible, from the 26/11 variety of attack? And, if not possible, can we identify courses of action within the framework of existing international law, to bring the perpetrators to justice?

To build immunity involves, first of all, deterrence at local as well as national levels. Under a National Security Policy, our vulnerabilities in all border states and island territories primarily and later in the rest of India must be assessed. Adequate consolidation of likely targets and adequate forces to deal with the envisaged threats must be achieved.

The initial costs and recurring expenditure must be funded by the government. Even then immunity could fail to deter some entities. Here our National Security Policy must clearly state that India will retaliate with all means considered necessary, including military operations against any country which violates our sovereignty.

This may be preceded or supplemented by a slew of diplomatic and economic measures such as recall of ambassadors and suspension of trade, overflights and confidence building measures and so on.

Military action, when taken, must be swift and decisive against a well-chosen target. This will invite reactions from Pakistan, leading to escalation of conflict to the level of a conventional war. We must be prepared for it. There may be some nuclear ‘brinkmanship’ too. This should be dismissed with contempt as the use of a nuclear weapon by Pakistan will bring about its own extinction.

Resurgent India will have to deal with a plethora of threats from Pakistan. Major ports, airfields, landmark buildings, power stations, surface communication systems, major defence installations/depots as well as our island territories are vulnerable to the 26/11 type of attack.

Openly proclaiming a National Defence Policy catering, inter alia, for strong reaction, should banish forever the tag of ‘soft state’ that India has carried for so long.

The writer was chief of army staff, 2000-2002.