Anti-Maoist strategy in tatters

Another successful Maoist operation, this time securing a larger toll in security force fatalities than ever before, has unleashed a storm of cliches in the political establishment — but little that is new.

Apart from the number of fatalities, there is nothing new in the Dantewada attack. The succession of Maoist attacks on security personnel is endless: two days earlier, 11 personnel were killed at Tanginiguda in Orissa; before that, 24 security personnel were killed at Sildah in West Bengal; 30 police personnel were killed in two coordinated attacks in Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh; 12 CRPF personnel were killed in a landmine blast at Tonagapal in Dantewada; 11 personnel were killed in an explosion in West Singhbhum in Jharkhand; 12 cops and a civilian were killed in Dhamtari district, Chhattisgarh; 10 CRPF officer were killed near Minta village in Dantewada… all in a year.

On the Dantewada incident, Union home minister P Chidambaram said: “Something has gone very wrong. They seem to have walked into a trap set by the Maoists. This shows the savage nature of the Maoists.”

Chhattisgarh chief minister Raman Singh described the operation as “a manifestation of their (Maoists’) cowardice”. The Congress dismissed the Maoist attack as an act of desperation because “they feel cornered” by the ongoing ‘coordinated operations’. Not to be outdone, the Bharatiya Janata Party has called for a “fight to finish” (sic) and declared that it is now “time for all-out operations against the Maoists”.

This is wrong at every level. First, it suggests a local operational failure - which may, indeed, partially be the case. However, the operational failures are a necessary consequence of the strategic incoherence of, and irrational deployment under, the current ‘coordinated’ campaigns across four states. Strategic infirmities are forcing operational failures. By now this should have been obvious - the force available is a tiny fraction of the force necessary to secure adequate saturation of Maoist-dominated areas.

Take the central paramilitary forces alone. Across the six worst-affected states, the Centre has deployed a ‘massive force’ of about 57 battalions. That comes down to about 22,800 men in actual deployment, across an area of 1.86 million square km, and a population of over 446 million. This, I have repeatedly emphasised, is like trying to irrigate the desert with dewdrops.

Political rhetoric about the ‘cowardice’, ‘savagery’ and ‘brutality’ of the Maoists will, moreover, do nothing to undermine the support base that the rebels are able to secure or coerce. On the other hand, security debacles such as the one at Dantewada will certainly and enormously undermine the authority and even the legitimacy of the state, even as they cut into the morale of the already demoralised security forces. And far from being desperate, I would suggest, the Maoists are responding strategically to the challenge of escalated state operations. As for the ‘fight to the finish’ - the Indian state simply does not have the capacity to engage in such a contest at the present time, and this is a reality that the Maoists are well aware of.

‘If you don’t have a strategy, start operations.’ This is how a senior police official characterised the anti-Maoist campaign. The mish-mash of incoherent force deployments and operations can hardly be called a strategy at all.
 
Ajai Sahni, executive director, Institute of Conflict Management, New Delhi