Can Indian Army pull off an operation Geronimo?

The Indian military leadership has responded in its own way to ‘Operation Geronimo’, the recent US attempt to neutralise Osama bin Laden by bearding the lion in his den. The army and air chiefs, General VK Singh and Air Chief Marshal PV Nayak, stated that their forces too have the capability to do an Abbottabad — meaning their commandos too can take out foes on hostile territory. The only difference to be made is between Indian covert action against Pakistan during war or peace. Indian covert action against Pakistan during war is quite different from that during peace time.

The problem is that any Indian attempt to use force or covert action during peace time will certainly trigger a ‘hot’ or shooting war with Pakistan which is most undesirable. Considering even a major Indian military exercise like the high profile Brasstacks in 1987 or earlier violations of airspace by the Indian Air Force MiG-25 reconnaissance aircraft (now decommissioned) — were adequate to ring alarm bells in the Pakistan army’s general headquarters at Rawalpindi — a surgical strike is definitely ruled out. In a sense it is akin to the US military which would never undertake a commando raid on Russian territory in the absence of a hot war between them.

Moreover, the problem with covert commando actions is that when things go wrong like the US Green Beret Special Forces raid in 1980 — authorised by then president Jimmy Carter to rescue the Americans held hostage in Teheran — was aborted because of some technical problems and because it can prove to be an international embarrassment.

Otherwise the recent US military action against OBL in Abbottabad is reminiscent of Israeli covert action to capture the Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann in 1960 from Buenos Aires. The Israeli secret service Mossad after years of detective work tracked down Eichmann who was kidnapped and flown out in a drugged and disguised state on an El Al flight to Israel and tried there. After a judicial trial he was hanged to death in 1962. The international ramifications of the episode merit mention.

In June 1960, Argentina after unsuccessful secret negotiations with Israel requested an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council to protest what Argentina regarded as the “violation of the sovereign rights of the Argentine Republic”. In the ensuing debate, Israeli representative Golda Meir claimed that the abductors were not Israeli agents but private individuals and so the incident was only an “isolated violation of Argentine law”. Eventually UNSC passed Resolution 138, which requested Israel “to make appropriate reparation”.

Importantly the Indian army is also reported to have conducted several trans-border commando raids during the 1990s across the Line of Control (LoC) into Pakistani territory from time to time in response to constant cross-border jihadi terrorist attacks. But all these were only shallow penetration raids on tactical targets of military value a few kilometres across the LoC that only technically violates another country’s sovereignty.

Though the Indian army formally designated their special forces as para-commandos between 1967-1969 at Gwalior, their first attempt at a major behind-the-lines operation was by the Meghdoot force in the 1965 India-Pakistan conflict. Thereafter, during the 1971 India-Pak conflict the newly raised 9 and 10 para-commando battalions were blooded in the Mandhol, Chachro and Virawal trans-border raids on Pakistani soil respectively. However, the Indian army undertook all these covert commando actions during an all out war with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971. Apart from this the Indian army and navy also supported the Mukti Bahini guerrilla forces in the eastern theatre during the 1971 war against Pakistan.

Clearly these commando actions prove that the Indian military has covert operations capabilities but only during war. But to do so during peace time requires political sanction and only a bold political leadership with strong national security orientation can drive the military’s special or unconventional warfare in terms of training, planning and execution. In a sense, the Indian political leadership needs to emulate their Israeli counterparts to pull off an Op Geronimo in peacetime. More importantly improved civil-military relations between the Indian military and the external intelligence service would be the first step to develop covert action capability during peace time.   

For instance, the Indian military mobilisation in 2001 against Pakistan after the terrorist attack on Parliament in New Delhi suggests a lack of strategic coherence at the political level on how to deal with limited war under a nuclear overhang. In the Indian context the political and civilian leadership have over the years curbed and blunted this military spirit of seeking and taking risks in terms of launching trans-border commando operations. Instead they are overly cautious in ordering offensive actions across the LoC. Owing to such an Indian mindset the Pakistan Army and the ISI are emboldened to repeatedly launch terrorist attacks in Jammu & Kashmir and our hinterland. Unless, India responds to use of force from across the border with similar force the message will not drive home and give the impression that India is a ‘soft’ state that can be attacked at a time and place of the enemy’s choice.

— The writer is a visiting fellow with the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi