Which power centre should India engage with in Afghanistan- Ashraf Ghani or Abdullah Abdullah?

Afghanistan is possibly the only country where India has by definition  a bullish foreign policy, and this exists for reasons well known. However, the stakes for India in Afghanistan remain high today as US led military forces get ready to end their more than 13 year long war in the country. 

Recent elections held in Afghanistan have given Kabul a fractured centre of power, with Ashraf Ghani taking over the reigns from Hamid Karzai as President, and Abdullah Abdullah, his political opponent, getting the newly created title of ‘CEO’. This arrangement has created an unreliable split-leadership situation, which by all accounts, is not expected to have a long lasting tenure. 

Friction between Ghani and Abdullah has been on show since September, as political deadlock continues over the power-sharing government’s nominees for the formation of the cabinet. Last month, a list of potential ministers that would satisfy the various pockets of contention in this new power system was presented. However, several from the list got rejected or dropped out, leaving only 9 of the 27 cabinet members to be sworn in. 

The power struggle in Kabul continues as Ghani and Abdullah’s teams negotiate on various political sour points. Both Ghani and Abdullah represent different views on how Afghanistan’s politics need to run, and what role the international community would or should play in the country. 

If indicators are anything to go by, the possibility of the US slowing down its military withdrawal from the country, slated to finish by end of next year, is high (US and Afghanistan have already signed the Bilateral Security Agreement which guarantees a minimal US military presence in the country beyond 2016). Washington has a little more than one year to try and make sure this unusual power sharing setup, which from a distant observation seems to be destined for chaos, sustains. India has high stakes on how the future of Afghanistan unravels; New Delhi has invested political, diplomatic and economic goodwill into Afghanistan, and enjoys support in many parts that come under tribal leaders as well. New Delhi sponsored agricultural projects and irrigation projects have managed to work out well as policies at a micro level in the country’s lawless regions as well. 

However, even though India and Afghanistan bolstered their ties immensely under President Hamid Karzai’s regime, Kabul had the ardent task of managing its relations with Islamabad as well, which till date has considerable influence in the spokes of the country’s political wheel. This task for both Ghani and Abdullah is also simultaneously influenced by India, which, if needed, will work towards minimising Pakistan’s clout in the country.  

Under Karzai, Afghanistan had given India a wish list of military equipment that it sought. The list was a mix between lethal and non-lethal hardware, which seemingly deliberately had a balance, so as to make it perhaps easier for India to offer the non-lethal equipment at least. Afghanistan made it clear that it was bullish on new helicopters, seen as need of the hour. India promised two ‘Cheetah’ helicopters, which were never delivered. 

However, India balked for the longest time under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s government, whose policy was largely grounded on the definition that foreign policy, is only an extension of a country’s domestic policy. Under this thought, the UPA government perhaps decided against arming a country already flooded with loose canons, both in extremist elements and the massive number of unaccounted guns. It would not be a wise idea to provide such help under the pretext of aid and have India stamped weapons ending up in hands of the Taliban. 

But it is not as if India did not brainstorm the various possibilities of how military aid could be provided without being directly seen. One of the plans that was thought of was to provide the military aid, at least the non-lethal one, via Russia.  Even though this also failed to take off from the drawing boards, it is not as if India stood hand-on-hand to Kabul’s requests, more than 500 Afghan soldiers have trained in India over past two years. 

Finally, in October last year, a month before his visit to Pakistan, President Ghani hinted to the Indians that his government is looking to place the military request initiated under Karzai on hold. This past week, Kabul officially cancelled the request after New Delhi gave up no military equipment even under a government change with Prime Minister Narendra Modi taking over. 

The decision to cancel the request came from Ghani, and Abdullah’s office’s reaction seemed to be sprinkled with decent dose sarcasm. Afghanistan’s TOLO News quoted Mohammad Mohaqeq, Second Deputy of Abdullah, as saying: “If the president has rejected this, there is the possibility that he has thought of another place to confidently get these arms from". He then continued to say “I believe that the president would have a trip to India and he will not contradict all the works of the former president, we need the equipment and should get it from anywhere”.

This new power-sharing program in Kabul perhaps has left New Delhi thinking, on which power centre, to concentrate more. Both the president and CEO posts have power roles that seem to be penciled in for now. The Indian government will have to work out how to address its engagements and policies according to this new structure, as till now it was used to dealing with the single, often pro-India entity that was Karzai. 

Ghani has already visited Pakistan and China before India, a move that perhaps will not make many happy in the South Block. However, his recent telephone conversation with Modi and plan to visit India soon is an opportunity to tinker with India’s traditional engagements and seriously work towards regaining some lost ground in Afghanistan.