Kayani, not Gilani

Summits of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (Saarc) are meant to discuss regional economic cooperation between the eight member-states. Much to the irritation of the other members, every summit ends up becoming another occasion for what a Sri Lankan friend of mine described as an “India-Pakistan soap opera”. The recent Saarc summit in Thimpu was no exception. The media focused attention on whether or not India and Pakistan would resume their much-touted “composite dialogue.”

The composite dialogue format was agreed to by prime ministers Atal Behari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif in 1998 as a compromise between Pakistan’s “Kashmir only” agenda and India’s belief that complex issues like Kashmir can be resolved only when a climate of cooperation and trust was established. The first round of the composite dialogue was held in 1998. This was followed by Vajpayee’s much hyped “bus yatra” to Lahore, ignoring the fact that the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), then backed by Nawaz Sharif and the ISI, had stepped up infiltration and had massacred over 30 innocent workers in Himachal.

Matters worsened with the Pakistani army’s intrusion across the high Himalayan peaks, leading to the Kargil conflict. Worse, ignoring the LeT attack on the Red Fort in Delhi in January, 2001, Gen Pervez Musharraf was invited to Agra. His ill-advised visit was followed by the attack on Parliament, which took India and Pakistan to the brink of war.

Recognising that dialogue and “business as usual” amidst increasing terrorism was not advisable, Vajpayee  secured an assurance from Gen Musharraf that he would not allow “territory under Pakistan’s control” to be used for terrorism against India.

The composite dialogue process was restarted and carried forward by Manmohan Singh, though progress in resolving complex issues like Jammu & Kashmir was addressed not in this dialogue, but in separate and secret meetings between designated special envoys. As Gen Musharraf’s hold over his army and country weakened, terrorism picked up, culminating in the 26/11 Mumbai terrorist outrage.

New Delhi is guilty of ignoring several indicators that, with the elevation of Gen Kayani as army chief, and with the army being the primary player in relations with India and Afghanistan, the use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy was going to increase. This should have been evident following the ISI-sponsored attack on our embassy in Kabul in July, 2008, which when ignored, culminated in the tragedy of 26/11.

After the diplomatic fiasco in Sharm el-Sheikh, prime minister Manmohan Singh has been compelled to proceed cautiously on his preferred choice of dialogue with Pakistan. Foreign secretary Nirupama Rao noted in Thimpu that both sides would address “the modalities of restoring trust and confidence in the relationship, thus paving the way to substantive dialogue on all issues of mutual concern”. This, in effect, meant that substantive issues would come up for discussion only once India was persuaded that Pakistan meant business in its stated objective of clamping down on terrorism.

Pakistan foreign minister Shah Mohammed  Qureishi, however, claimed that all issues of concern, including Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek, river waters and people-to-people contacts, would be discussed at the next round of talks. He brushed aside India’s concerns on terrorism, by glibly claiming that terrorism is a “global” concern. It remains to be seen how this difference in approach is going to be bridged.

Despite claims by aides that prime minister Yousuf Raza Gilani is now an “empowered” leader, the real power in Pakistan remains with the army led by Gen Kayani, who is now a hot favourite with US generals. The Americans, unlike us, are realists and deal on serious issues with Kayani and not Gilani. And there is nothing to suggest that given the American readiness to placate Pakistan’s army leadership, Gen Kayani is going to relent on his agenda of backing Taliban commanders like Jalaluddin Haqqani and forcing the Obama administration to seek his blessings, while restoring the Taliban to positions of influence in Afghanistan.

Moreover, even now, sections of the Obama administration reportedly believe that the ISI surely has a case in claiming that it needs its “Kashmiri militants” to force India’s hand on Jammu & Kashmir. New Delhi should surely be realistic enough to know that given American and Chinese backing, there is no reason for the ISI to discontinue measured assistance to its “jihad” in India. .
Engagement and dialogue with neighbours and adversaries is only natural and logical. But, in dealing with Pakistan’s military establishment, there is also a need for actions and responses that signal that it will have to pay a heavy price for activities intended to undermine India’s security.