Why this time the Naga Peace Accord holds more hope than earlier ceasefire agreements

The peace accord signed between the Indian government and the Isak-Muivah faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland is a historic opportunity to bring peace to the troubled North-East. Though the text of the agreement remains confidential and is expected to be placed in Parliament before being made public, newspapers quoting government sources have been unanimous that the pact does not involve the redrawing of Nagaland’s boundaries. This is a significant concession made by the NSCN(I-M) which had been pressing for the creation of a Greater Nagaland or Nagalim comprising Naga dominated areas scattered across Nagaland, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam and Myanmar. This would suggest that the government has conceded a mechanism that would allow greater autonomy to Nagaland, and Naga tribes living elsewhere. If true, the latter could lead to some disquiet in Manipur and the other states. It is imperative, then, that the Centre reveal the exact terms of the agreement without delay to put their fears to rest. Recall that the Centre’s decision to extend the Naga ceasefire in 2001 — to the states where the NSCN factions are active — was seen as a sellout, and led to large-scale violence, especially in Manipur, where other tribes took up arms to protect their turf against the Nagas.

In his statement, Prime Minister Narendra Modi took great care to recognise the historic wrongs that distanced the Nagas from Indian society. He also emphasised the “spirit of equality and respect, trust and confidence” in which the agreement has been arrived at. This is important because without an understanding of past mistakes, history is bound to repeat. Rather than a democratic experience, the Naga society’s first brush with Independent India was with the Indian Army and the Armed Forces Special Powers Act in the 1950s. PM Modi must be credited for maintaining a sustained focus on the North-East since coming to power. The ceasefire agreement with the NSCN(I-M) in 1997 was inked by the then United Front government and strengthened by the subsequent NDA government, but the decade-long Congress-led UPA government has only itself to blame for not closing the deal. Clearly, PM Modi has notched up an impressive breakthrough very early in his government’s tenure. It is also significant because the Centre entered the negotiations with the backing of the Nagaland state government and Naga political parties, and after extensive civil society consultations. 

But there are challenges ahead. In the decades since the ill-fated 1975 Shillong Accord, the NSCN(I-M), dominated by the Tangkhul tribe, has built up a phenomenal armoury, and used its firepower to brazenly cow down other Naga groups. In this context, the agreement with the NSCN(I-M) will be meaningful only if the outfit agrees to decommission its arms. It is this armed might that has made much of the North-East, including state governments and other Naga tribes, wary about the NSCN(I-M)’s pan-Naga rhetoric. But the task of disarming the NSCN(I-M) has become difficult after the NSCN(Khaplang) walked out of the ceasefire agreement with the Centre and resumed hostilities. Nevertheless, having succeeded in weaning away the NSCN(I-M) from its steadfast demand for Nagalim, the Centre is on a better footing now. Granting greater autonomy to Nagaland will not be too difficult considering that Article 371A of the Constitution already envisions special provisions for the state. But creating autonomous district councils for Nagas in other states, if part of the agreement, is a sensitive issue.

The Centre must tread with care and take the respective state governments and their people into confidence. With the longest insurgency in the North-East showing signs of folding up, attention must turn to long-pending developmental, governance and trade issues.