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| Edited By: |Source: DNA |Updated: Feb 10, 2016, 07:22 AM IST
David Coleman Headley, the Pakistani-American, who is serving jail term in the US and who has received pardon in the Indian court for turning an approver, in his video deposition against Abu Jundal, a Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), on Monday and Tuesday has been revealing details which could be crucial in getting the whole truth about the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack. He is corroborating and confirming the Indian hunch that Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) was involved along with the LeT in facilitating the audacious and diabolical raid.
The prosecution seems to believe that Headley’s evidence could be the clincher in nailing the roles of the LeT and ISI. This could at best be a sanguine expectation which is reflected in public prosecutor Ujjwal Nikam’s statements to the media. The case cannot rest on what Headley says. It is for this reason that the National Investigation Agency (NIA) is seeking access to Headley’s former Moroccan wife, Faiza Outalha. She had been to Mumbai along with Headley and stayed in Taj Mahal Hotel as part of the reconnaissance exercise. What Headley is telling the Mumbai court needs further corroboration.
The fact that there were two earlier failed attempts by the terrorists before the 26/11 operation is both interesting and important, but there is nothing surprising about it. Anyone familiar with terrorist operations knows that there are many dry runs and many failed attempts before the successful final attack. What Headley says about the aborted attempts in September and October add invaluable details to terrorist logistics, but it does not strengthen the prosecution’s case in any significant sense.
It is indeed a matter of common sense that Pakistan-based jihadi groups like the LeT and the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuJ), Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) cannot operate without the tacit support of Pakistani intelligence agencies.
But Headley’s corroborative evidence would not be sufficient to understand the connections between the ISI and the militant organisations. There is need for more reliable testimony — and it is there, especially in the memoir of former Pakistan foreign minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri — for the issue to be taken up with Pakistan. The United States is, no doubt, fully aware of the ISI’s involvement with the Islamic terror groups. As a matter of fact, Washington is still using the ISI channel to deal with the Afghan Taliban.
Headley raises other questions about his role and the credibility of his deposition. He is a vagrant who indulged in drug peddling, who was drawn to Islamic terrorist organisations like the LeT, and, according to his own confession, he was attracted to fight the Indian army in Jammu and Kashmir. His claim that he was the man who carried out the reconnaissance needs corroboration from other independent sources, including the LeT. The man who has already been convicted for his involvement in 26/11 by an American court because it involved the death of American tourists has no incentive to tell things as they are. He has the luxury of spinning self-delusionary yarns. There is need to probe the crime graph of Headley much more exhaustively than it has been done so far. His past could be an embarrassment for the Americans as well, and it might be one of the reasons that instead of extraditing him to India, the US has chosen to try and punish him on its own. It is also intriguing that a self-confessed abettor in the 26/11 attack should have received pardon for turning an approver.
