dna edit: Into deep waters

The commissioning of the INS Vikramaditya at the Sevmash shipyard in Russia today is being described as a game-changer in naval circles. It is a much-needed emphasis on a strategic reality that does not always receive the focus it deserves. The Indian Army — not surprisingly given the country’s neighbours to the north and west — commands the lion’s share of the public and media attention as well as the defence budget; 49 per cent in 2013-14. The air force’s profile has been increasing steadily with big-ticket procurement deals; it’s accounted for 28 per cent of the budget. But it’s a truism that the expression of a country’s geostrategic influence occurs primarily via its navy. The US, for instance, plays the dominant role it does in the Middle East, South East Asia and elsewhere because of the immense force-projection capabilities its navy affords it. Its 11 carrier battle groups are at the heart of these capabilities.

Given various factors — India’s rising international profile, its dependence on energy imports, its Look East policy, China’s growing naval capabilities, and above all, its central position in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) — the Indian Navy plays a particularly prominent role in its national security and strategic calculus. Forty per cent of the world’s offshore oil production comes from the Indian Ocean, after all. More, two-thirds of the world’s oil shipments, one-third of its bulk cargo and half of the container traffic transit over its sea-lanes and choke points.

Keeping these factors in mind, a brief look at a map should make the advantage India’s position in the IOR gives it, apparent — presuming commensurate naval capabilities. The military build-up of the Andaman and Nicobar islands, for instance, gives India a vital geostrategic edge — in Navy Chief Admiral Nirmal Verma’s words — when it comes to the Malacca Strait. South of the archipelago, the Strait is a chokepoint for global trade; about a quarter of the world’s traded goods pass through it, including some 77 per cent of China’s oil imports. In a larger context, a powerful navy provides New Delhi with one of the most potent tools in its toolbox to implement foreign policy objectives to the east and the west, both.

India’s Look East policy, for instance, must pivot on its navy if it is to be fleshed out. Trade and economic ties are well and good, but South East Asian nations have been increasingly looking to India for a naval presence in the region that will help counter Chinese influence. And while it would be foolish for New Delhi to allow itself to be used blatantly as a counterweight, a signal of latent capability would be appropriate given Beijing’s growing naval clout and its interest in expanding its IOR footprint.

China is not the only factor, of course. If India is to establish itself as an IOR heavyweight, it must display the intent and ability to provide public goods as the US navy does now — from combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden to protecting global shipping lanes and providing humanitarian assistance in the event of natural disasters.  INS Vikramaditya is a step in the right direction — but as 2011 CAG report highlighting delays and massive cost overruns in various key naval modernisation programs shows, much remains to be done despite the navy’s share of the defence budget being raised to 18 per cent. New Delhi began a necessary process in the early 1990s when it realised the importance of a blue water navy. Now, it must take the process forward.