The writing on the memo is on Pakistan’s walls

The summary acceptance of Husain Haqqani’s resignation as Pakistan’s ambassador to the US indicates clearly that the powerful Pakistani military establishment has had its way in sacking a civilian functionary, identified by views in his book, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military and the Kerry Lugar bill as an ardent advocate of civilian supremacy in Pakistan.

The decision was taken after a meeting at the PM’s office in Islamabad, where President  Zardari, army chief General  Kayani and DG, ISI, Lt Gen Pasha were present. A detailed enquiry ‘at an appropriate level’ has been promised, though what precise modality will be resorted to — whether through a judicial challenge or an administrative device of an empowered committee — remains unclear at present.

The issue may be too sensitive to brush under the carpet. Though Zardari has tried hard to distance himself, his position is weakened with persisting talk of invoking the treason provisions under Article 6 of the 1973 Constitution, against his protégé first, but targeting him eventually.

With Haqqani’s sacking, political temperatures may subside for now. Expectation in some quarters was that one way to further defuse the crisis could be to seek the army’s approval for the new ambassador to the US.

This has not happened. Former DG, ISI Lt Gen (rtd) Ehsan-ul Haq, foreign secretary Salman Bashir and former ambassador to the US, Begum Abida Hussain (now with the PPP) were mentioned but Zardari has once again taken a bold step, checkmating conservatives by choosing the firebrand liberal, Sherry Rehman who was running the Jinnah Institute, Karachi, after having offended radical Islamists over her views on the controversial blasphemy laws. She would be popular in the West.

However, many intriguing questions remain about the veracity, modalities and timing of what is proving to be a catastrophic ‘Memogate’ for the Zardari government.

The army and ISI stood quite discredited and hard put to hide the egg on their faces in the aftermath of the Osama bin Laden raid.

Kayani faced virulent anti-American wrath of young officers and other ranks. The thought of effecting a coup could not have been uppermost in their priorities. In fact, there was evidence to suggest that peer generals questioned the wisdom of unprecedented extensions given to Kayani and Pasha. Zardari is too politically astute to have missed this pulse. After these extensions given to key military functionaries, the PPP government was well on the way to lasting its full electoral tenure, in the process living down its traditional anti-military image.

Why then would he have authorised a risky carte blanche to Haqqani?

Could Haqqani have undertaken this exercise on his own? If his mercurial past and frequent political flip flops — right from his student days in the Jamaat-e-Islami to joining Nawaz Sharif and then Benazir — are any guide, he has an overpowering ambition to remain in the limelight. A foolhardy endeavour of this kind could well have been undertaken in excessive zeal or during a euphoric ‘post-bin Laden moment’. However, it must be considered to what extent Haqqani could have banished sanity or wisdom to take such action, sitting pretty as he was in one of the most powerful diplomatic assignments under a government in power and with over a year to go, being personally close to the President and functioning often as his ‘ghost writer’ in publications like The Washington Post.

Haqqani’s choice of emissaries like Mansoor Ijaz and former US national security adviser, Gen James Jones is also puzzling. The late Benazir Bhutto had apparently cautioned some of her close associates about the former, who acquired notoriety as a self-promoter, dabbling in several dubious peace initiatives. The latter was regarded as being close to President Obama but State Department officials did not rate him highly as a national security adviser. Admiral Mullen’s initial reference to the memo not being weighty enough but subsequent acknowledgement of its existence, by both him and Panetta raise questions.

Even as the ‘ghairat (pride & honour) brigade’ of pro-establishment apologists like Kamran Khan and Ikram Sehgal have gone to town about the serious issues raised in Ijaz’s memo and the ‘striking similarities’ of language and text to that in the much maligned first draft of the Kerry Lugar Bill authorising US aid to Pakistan, seasoned political analysts in Pakistan have raised some doubts. Former foreign secretary Tanvir Ahmed Khan has observed that the memo is much more ‘inelegant’ than Haqqani’s usual writing style. Veteran journalist Mohammed Ziauddin questions whether this could have been a sting operation of the ubiquitous ISI.

The pace with which Pasha hot-footed it to London to meet Ijaz and authenticate his Blackberry transcripts certainly leaves no one in any doubt that the establishment did not want to let go this golden opportunity to nail their bete noire. Popular TV talk show hosts have pointed out how Imran Khan could identify Haqqani by name in his October 30 public meeting in Lahore, just a week after Ijaz’s controversial article in the Financial Times spilling the beans but not naming the government official involved. This suggests he may have been privy to a briefing from the ISI.

Even after relinquishing his post, Haqqani has been bold to devote his energies to fighting bigotry and intolerance in Pakistan.

He may not find many supporters inside Pakistan or in the US for these efforts. Neither will the army easily give up its power to control the pace of or thwart the process of genuine democratisation in Pakistan at present.

The author is a former special secretary, cabinet secretariat, Government of India