The limits to e-surveillance

Following the daring terrorist strikes at military camps in Pathankot, Uri and Nagrota in 2016, the defence ministry has, in consultation with the three defence services, reportedly decided to strengthen security at vital installations and camps through cutting-edge technology. This has different implications for the three services.

For the air force and the navy, whose combat strength is measured in terms of equipment and technology, this is a good step. Since these services have less manpower and fewer field installations and camps, protection of their valuable assets like aircraft and ships at permanent locations will be boosted by technology-centric solutions.

However, for the 1.3 million strong army, whose manpower is its combat strength this will have negative implications. Unlike equipment, manpower is best protected not by cocooning it behind defence walls of various hues but by providing it motivation to take the battles into enemy camp.

In Jammu and Kashmir, where the Pakistan army has adopted an offensive posture through its proxy war across the Line of Control (LoC), the Indian army had two choices. One was to adopt a similar offensive posture by engaging the Pakistan army in regular local combat through raids and firepower assaults across the military line. Given that the Indian army’s strength is double the Pakistan army’s (13 lakh against six lakh), Rawalpindi, worried about a possible war, would have kept its attack-by-infiltration in check. On the one hand, this would have raised the morale of our own troops since they like nothing more than fighting an identifiable enemy. There would have been no beheading of our own soldiers near the LoC, and fewer suicides, fratricides and disciplinary cases. On the other hand, the paramilitary forces would have ensured good internal security allowing the army to focus on territorial defence.

India, unfortunately, has adopted the pusillanimous posture where faceless proxies now combat the state might (exemplified by its army) in pitched tactical battles. The battle-hardened Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), having outmatched two military superpowers (Soviet Union and the US), is adept at supporting terrorism into Kashmir through change of tactics and technology to demolish barriers both at the LoC and around army bases.

Commenting on the fence obstacle that the army had erected on the LoC in July 2004, the 15 Corps chief of staff in August 2005, Maj Gen VK Singh (later army chief and now minister) told me in his office in Srinagar that “If somebody is determined to get across, you cannot stop him. He will always find a way to overcome hurdles like fences. The army is not the only one to learn. The infiltrators too have been quick to learn.”

This was when all army troops are visually networked at various levels—company, battalion, brigade, and so on—to ensure all had a real-time picture of their areas. Equipment available for surveillance include handheld thermal imagers, handheld battlefield surveillance radars, thermal imaging integrated observation equipment, long-range reconnaissance and observation systems and DIGI-scope, which allow reasonably good visibility at night and during rough weather to detect infiltrations in real time. Once detections are made, a plethora of weapons are available for instant use in both area domination and punitive roles. These include 81-millimetre mortars, 84-millimetre rocket launchers, 51-millimetre mortars, 106-tank guns in ground roles, and even anti-aircraft and air defence guns in ground roles. In short, there is a seamless anti-infiltration network which includes real-time surveillance, detection and punitive means.

All this has not helped because any worthwhile military commander, the world over, will attest that a fortification induces a false sense of security and stifles the attacking spirit of an army. The technology solutions for securing army bases will certainly give the soldiers more reaction time to meet the attacks; but they will not deter the terrorists, or their ISI handlers, or Rawalpindi, the brains behind the dastardly acts.

The writer is co-author with Ghazala Wahab of the recent book Dragon On Our Doorstep