The culture of fake encounters

The legacy of fake encounters left behind by the Congress government in West Bengal in the early 70s refuses to fizzle out. Decades later, the practice has been put to prolific use in many states across the country afflicted with militancy. The latest disclosure comes from Manipur after the Supreme Court ordered a CBI probe into as many as 98 cases of killings by the security forces. Manipur or the recent report by an inspector general of CRPF highlighting a similar case in Assam is just the tip of the iceberg of the total number of innocent people killed so far in the past few decades.

Counter insurgency operations are shaped by the circumstances prevailing on the ground which varies from state to state. Even the strategies adopted by the police and the Army could be different in the same terrain given their training, affiliation, operating procedures and the competition to outdo each other. Sometimes they could be more organised with approval from the highest echelons of the government as it happened in Assam (and earlier in Punjab) in the 90s.

The killings in Manipur which have been on for quite some time were intermittent and known to the government, but there was no reason to do away with them. The assumption is that such actions would deprive the rebels access to sources of funds and reduce their support base by deterring new cadres from joining these groups.

At the root of many such actions is a palpable dearth of actionable intelligence. A "unified command" for coordination between the Army and police exists in some states. But in reality, joint operations and sharing of information are more an exception than the rule since there is competition and most officers would rather execute the operation on their own. Why miss the chance of a medal on Republic Day? The situation could be more challenging for the Army since a unit is deployed only for about three years in a specified region. It is tough to create a network of informers within that brief span or even to sustain the earlier one created by the previous unit. The alternate methods could be brutal, but there are special laws (like AFSPA) providing immunity to the security forces for their actions in conflict zones.

Under such laws, even a non-commissioned officer is granted the right to shoot to kill based on mere suspicion, or to detain the suspect at undisclosed locations for days on end. This is an easier option than the lengthy and uncertain procedure of handing the suspect or the rebel to the police and court. And the chances are always bright that he would jump bail within a few weeks and return to the jungle at the earliest. So why not put an end to these hazards when the license to kill is available? It does not matter if the victim was not a rebel. A "kill" would score points in any case in addition to delivering the message that support to these groups would only invite danger. There are many such instances in villages along the Indo-Bhutan and Indo-Myanmar borders where the line dividing an activist of a militant group from a non-activist is thin. Even if a resident is not a rebel, there is a high chance that he would have to render service at some point to these groups such as providing shelter to the rebels, providing information, etc. In the process, many among them get identified by the security forces and shot.

So there is bountiful scope to bend the rules but it must be mentioned that trigger-happy officers constitute a small percentage in the police and in the Army. The majority still prefer not to cross the lakshman rekha despite pressure to produce quick results. Then, there is another category of officers who have engaged in indirect killings by sponsoring ex-militants who wished to surrender and come over ground. Some among these are coerced to work for the security forces by providing information and taking part in operations. He might even be asked to infiltrate the rebel group and work for the security forces in disguise. Some have earned notoriety as dreaded killers. A little-known case comes from Assam when the police infiltrated Munna Mishra into ULFA's camps in Bhutan. He devised ingenious means to kill a few middle-rung functionaries before shifting to New Delhi. No wonder, the majority of these perpetrators have successfully evaded coming under the scanner so far.

The author is a senior journalist in Guwahati and author of Rendezvous With Rebels: Journey to Meet India's Most Wanted Men