Rhetoric and reality of state focus in diplomacy

The urge to impress that the new government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi is racing ahead with one new initiative after another seems to be so compelling that even the routine is being dressed up and sold as “new”.

One such example is the rhetoric of “state focus” in foreign policy. State focus, as unnamed officials who cite a Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) statement would have us believe, is more active participation by states in foreign policy.

It is put out that Modi Sarkar, within a a mere 100 days — has overhauled the MEA and brought about a transformation wherein state focus is reflected in foreign policy. The implication is that before Modi arrived at the helm, states were irrelevant to foreign policy.

The propagation of rhetoric as policy through inspired but ill-informed communications does more harm than good to the image and credibility of the MEA as well as the External Affairs Minister (EAM), particularly when the reality is otherwise.

EAM Sushma Swaraj is reported to have “unveiled” the new initiative of “state focus” during her recent visit to Singapore, where she shared her vision of building India-Singapore ties through, among other things, increased trade and connectivity and “state focus to promote engagement with Indian states”.

This triggered hype over state focus being “developed” as a new dimension of diplomacy. The question that arises is why was such a major policy initiative “unveiled” abroad and not at home.  And, if it is indeed new, why is there little or no articulation of this policy?

The emergence of state focus is sought to be buttressed by pointing out that Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee visited Singapore; and that her visit would be followed by more Chief Ministers — Vasundhara Raje, N Chandrababu Naidu and K Chandrasekhar Rao — visiting Singapore.

For over two decades, and especially since the economic reforms unleashed by Prime Minister P V Narasimha Rao, many states have been getting direct foreign investment for infrastructure, including power, projects; and, alongside this, states have been developing business, cultural and other links with these countries. It was common for Chief Ministers to go abroad for “road shows” to woo investors for developing industry and infrastructure in their states. This content has always been there to India’s foreign policy and diplomacy, and is not something new that came after May 2014.

That apart, state focus as a dimension of diplomacy would, and should, mean altogether something else: namely, federalisation of foreign policy. This would imply states being consulted in the formulation of policy and regional parties actively advancing foreign policy objectives. Such an approach and outcome would mean that, for example, Bengal would be consulted and in turn it would partner the process for success of a river waters accord with Bangladesh. Another example of state focus would be the Tamil Nadu Government, Tamil parties and the Union Government speaking and acting as one on issues such as the alleged war crimes in Sri Lanka, the rights of Sri Lankan Tamils and the problems faced by Tamil fishermen. 

State focus at another level could mean that Nepal-India relations, for example, are not based solely on the New Delhi-Kathmandu axis, but developed through Nepal engaging more directly and intensively with Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Beyond federalisation, this would be sub-regionalism. Sub-regionalism, though a proven model of cross-national political and economic success, has few takers in our establishment if one goes by the record of the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Forum.

Rhetoric carries the risk of deluding ourselves about reality. Worse, it can leave us open to ridicule.

The author is an independent political and foreign affairs commentator