Religion in diplomacy makes South Block uneasy

It is a strange coincidence that around the time Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his ministers were briefing the Hindutva parent, RSS, on the policies and performance of his government, he was also seeking to make Buddhism central to Indian diplomacy. Thus, to his controversial espousal of Hindu religiosity at home is now added the surprising embrace of Buddhism on the foreign front.

Although none in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) would venture forth to publicly express a view on religion in diplomacy, there is both consternation and confusion at the emerging emphasis on “Buddhist India”, as is being projected repeatedly by the Prime Minister to international audiences. The palpable unease among officials over the “use of religion in diplomacy” often finds expression in private conversations. The trigger for this becoming a hot topic again is Modi’s address to the International Buddhist Conclave at Bodh Gaya. He said that there was so much in common between the Hindu and the Buddhist belief systems that he felt like calling India “Buddhist India”.

The NDA government, like the UPA in its latter years, is projecting India as the land of Lord Buddha from where Buddhist thought spread to the world. Such an emphasis is obviously because it has strategic value in competing against China for leadership of Buddhist Asia.

Curiously, Buddhism can be a basis for (cultural) cooperation as well as (diplomatic) competition against China.  China is home to the world’s largest Buddhist population, and has been leveraging Buddhism to strengthen its troubled relations with Asian neighbours. The focus on Buddhism has acquired greater importance under President Xi Jinping, who, as party secretary, was the moving force being China’s first World Buddhist Forum held in 2006.

And India, which is home to the Dalai Lama, cannot leave the field uncontested to China.  Hence, Buddhism, which is invoked as a common cultural thread that can lead to greater India-China bonding, also has its diplomatic uses in India-China rivalry for winning over the Buddhist nations in East Asia and Eurasia.  Which explains the stress on India’s Buddhist heritage during Modi’s travels to China, Mongolia, Japan, South Korea, Bhutan, Nepal and Sri Lanka.

However, some in the South Block feel that the use of religion in diplomacy carries risks without any assured gains, although the Dalai Lama ‘card’ against China can be potent in strategic and economic terms. For example, Beijing has got the better of New Delhi in Sri Lanka. Emphasis on Buddhism being common to India and Sri Lanka has not necessarily deepened trust nor strengthened ties.

Elsewhere in the neighbourhood, the contradictions of using religion in diplomacy have been embarrassing. For example, on his first visit as PM to Kathmandu, Modi offering 2,500 kilos of sandalwood to Pasupatinath Temple and announcing Rs25 crore for a dharamshala in the temple complex were “Hindu acts”, although Nepal is also a part of the “Buddhist Arc”, which India is wooing. These offerings to the temple raised eyebrows, not only because sandalwood export is officially restricted, but also because the “offering”, along with 2,400 kilos of ghee, overshadowed the grants made for the upkeep of Nepal’s Buddhist sites. As a result, China is more visible for its hand in the development of Lord Buddha’s birthplace, Lumbini, in present-day Nepal.

Pakistan’s failure to exploit religion to gain leadership of the Islamic Bloc is not without cautionary tales for the Indian establishment that has now turned to rely on the “soft power” of faith and beliefs. Religion in diplomacy, as in politics and public life,  is not without its pitfalls.