Modi’s religious diplomacy

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s third visit in four years to Nepal is, perhaps, his most significant and successful attempt to win over the neighbour. The bitterness of the past, especially the 2015-16 economic blockade, may not have faded, yet both countries seem to be striving to move on from that low point.

The two are again in the mode of friendly neighbours, trying to rebuild the lost trust that has characterised bilateral relations in recent years. They have been in this mode in the past, too, in the aftermath of bilateral tensions. The new facet this time is the introduction of Hinduism as a basis for bonding. 

In that sense, Modi’s charm offensive is ‘religious diplomacy’, with emphasis on Hinduism as a binding factor — as distinct from the stress on Buddhism in the not too distant past. An earlier attempt under Modi, to project India as a ‘Buddhist power’, including in Nepal, was not very successful. That raises the question of whether Hindu religious diplomacy could be a cementing force in India-Nepal relations, regardless of political changes on both sides. The Hindu element has been a part of the relationship, but was never to the fore as it is now under Modi.

India-Nepal relationship was never at its best during the long years of Congress party rule. The crisis caused by the closing of trade and transit points on the border during the last year of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was the worst point in bilateral relations, until the economic blockade of 2015-16. But, even earlier, during Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s time, India-Nepal ties had its difficult patches.

One particular bombshell that Nepal dropped was in 1975, during the coronation of King Birendra. He mooted the idea of Nepal as a ‘Zone of Peace’ to be supported by the UN and the international community. The Government of India saw this as a China-inspired ploy to stonewall India’s nuclear ambitions, although Nepal couched the proposal in terms of ‘non-alignment’. New Delhi read this proposal as an expression of the monarchy’s displeasure over India providing refuge and supporting Nepali Congress (NC) leaders in their campaign for democracy in Nepal.

The NC leaders, particularly the Koirala brothers (BP and GP), and communist activists in exile enjoyed fraternal relations with the socialists and communists in India. Indira Gandhi did not see any reason to displease King Birendra on this score; and to win him over, she sent the Nepalese democracy activists packing. That was the time of the Emergency when most of India’s Opposition leaders were in jail. On their return to Nepal, the Koiralas, along with the others, were jailed. The memory of this ‘betrayal’ was at the root of the Nepalese political parties’ prolonged distrust of the Congress party. Rajiv Gandhi’s closure of trade and transit points compounded this distrust by earning the ill-will of the monarchy, too.

Thus it was that Chandra Shekhar and the Opposition figures in India, including Atal Behari Vajpayee, came to be seen as friends of Nepal in its struggle for democracy. The movement for democracy received a huge boost after the formation of VP Singh’s National Front-Left Front government, followed by the emergence of multi-party democracy and the eventual dismantling of the monarchy.

After Rajiv Gandhi’s electoral defeat in 1989, India-Nepal relations experienced a warm and friendly phase for the next 15 years, during which every Indian Prime Minister, including PV Narasimha Rao, enjoyed an excellent equation with Nepal’s political leaders across the spectrum. Apprehensions surfaced when the Congress returned to office at the helm of the UPA with Manmohan Singh as Prime Minister. By then, the political situation had changed in Nepal. The NC was in a state of decline, the Communists and Maoists were on a rise, and a new generation of Congress leadership had built bridges for dealing with Nepal’s new class of leaders. Even so, the Congress party was seen as a ‘player’ — pitting one party against another and at all times keeping itself leveraged to influence political outcomes in Nepal.

Thus, when Modi became the Prime Minister, it was a splendid opportunity for him and the BJP to build a strong and healthy relationship on a firm footing, free of the Congress party’s legacy. Just like Prime Minister Vajpayee broke through to Pakistan — leaving the Congress party with no choice but to support his initiatives — Prime Minister Modi, too, could have broken new ground in the neighbourhood, especially with Nepal (and Pakistan).

Unfortunately, Modi appears to have been ill-advised in the early stages, as his aides and bureaucracy did not follow up his ‘Neighbourhood First’ initiative, which he launched by inviting heads of SAARC governments for his swearing in. The advantage of this opening was never pursued. To the contrary, when Nepal was stricken by earthquake, crude elements seized it as an opportunity for self-aggrandisement and celebrity journalism (on media) at the expense of the victims. The lack of sensitivity to the devastation, which was used as a prop for televised self-promotion resulted in Indians being packed off the relief scene.

Then came the conflict over Nepal’s new constitution in 2015. On the eve of its promulgation, India’s Foreign Secretary went to Kathmandu to scuttle it and failed in his mission. This was followed by the violence in Terai and the consequent economic blockade — seen as India’s way of forcing Nepal to declare itself a Hindu state in its new constitution.

When Prime Minister KP Oli visited India last month and had productive discussions with Prime Minister Modi, it became evident that matters were on the mend. Oli, though a communist, seems to have relented and accepted that while Nepal may have proclaimed itself a secular republic, it has no choice but to strengthen Hindu religious bonds between the two countries. The fact that Modi’s visits to temples were supported by the Oli government shows that Nepal is no longer averse to New Delhi’s ‘Hindu agenda’.

Whether this is a tactical retreat made by Oli or a strategic accommodation by Nepal’s ruling class — given that it cannot resist Indian intent and influence beyond a point — may be known only in due course. Regardless of that outcome, in his fourth year, Prime Minister Modi has charted a new course for India-Nepal relations.

The author, an independent political and foreign affairs commentator, is Co-Editor of the book State of Nepal. Views are personal.