India-Pakistan spy chronicles

The recently released book “Spy Chronicles: RAW, ISI and the Illusions of Peace” jointly authored by former RAW chief Amarjit Singh Dulat and former ISI chief Asad Durrani has created a storm in Pakistan.

The book is mainly a series of discussions conducted between the two former adversaries on a range of topics, moderated by journalist Aditya Sinha. While it contains candid views on various matters of regional and global concern, there is hardly anything there to classify as “revelations”. But former Pakistan prime minister Nawaz Sharif, who landed himself in the soup, following his admission of Pakistan’s tacit role in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, is using Durrani’s book to hit back at the Army. His supporters have remarked that if a politician had teamed up with an Indian counterpart to write a book like this, he would have been branded a traitor. But Durrani already seems to be paying a heavy price. Latest reports suggest he has been placed on a no-fly list and a formal Court of Inquiry, headed by a serving Lt Gen, has been ordered to probe the matter. 

The storm in Pakistan apart, the 320-page book is a great disappointment to those looking for a spy thriller. However, it does contain revelations that have made the Pakistani establishment uncomfortable. Durrani is being attacked for mentioning the US operation to smoke out Al-Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden from his Abbottabad cantonment hideout was carried out with the ISI’s backing. In other words, the ISI knew about these operations and didn’t interfere. But in 2016, American investigative journalist Seymour Myron “Sy” Hersh had already disclosed this understanding. So there is nothing new in what Durrani is saying.

I had met first Durrani more than a decade ago at a Track-II meeting on India-Pakistan issues at Colombo. Rubbing shoulders with a former ISI chief was something mesmerising. But he soon disappointed scribes, who were in search of a juicy story. Again last year, we participated in another Track-II meeting in Dubai on Jammu and Kashmir. His demure manner and constant reference to books and authors to press home his arguments made him more of a philosophical scholar than a spook. But despite all his knowledge, Durrani lacked strategic understanding and depth. His interventions seemed more academic rather than realistic.

Just a month ago, at a closed-door seminar when an Indian Army general was repeatedly referring to General Durrani to press home his point, a former high commission told him to stop referring to him. “He has retired a long ago. He doesn’t carry any weight in the Pakistani establishment. There is no room to take him seriously,” said the diplomat, well versed with Pakistan affairs. On Kashmir as well, Durrani depends much on conventional wisdom. He, however, does have some interesting insights to offer. 

Regarding militancy in Punjab, Durrani claims the Indians were grateful for the help provided by Benazir Bhutto’s first government. He, however, expressed surprise that India took so long to make use of the information. Durrani was then the ISI chief almost at the same time from August 1990 to March 1992. 

In contrast, Durrani’s co-author Dulat is seen as the last word on Kashmir in Delhi circles. But in the present dispensation, he seems out of place. He was posted in Kashmir in 1989 almost at the same time when militancy took over the region. But due to differences with then Governor Jagmohan, he then moved to Delhi after a year where he headed the Jammu and Kashmir cell of the IB for the next 10 years.

Dulat’s idea of dealing with Kashmir has been very unconventional. His theory is to use minimum physical force and instead employ money and persuasive powers to buy loyalties. In his previous book “Kashmir: The Vajpayee Years”, he has mentioned his relations with many Kashmiri separatist leaders such as the late AbdulGhani Lone, Shabir Ahmed Shah, Abdul Ghani Bhat, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq and militant commanders like Babar Badar and others. He has mentioned how Shabir Shah was supposed to take over as chief minister in 1996, but backed out just before elections were declared. Again in 2002, he had worked on Abdul Ghani Lone to participate in the elections, but was killed. Twelve years later, Lone’s son Sajjad Gani Lone successfully contested elections in 2014 and is now a minister in the PDP-BJP government. Unlike PDP, he was perhaps the only politician in the Valley who had a pre-poll electoral alliance with the BJP. Another coup by Dulat was to get the operational commander of the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) Abdul Majeed Dar to announce a ceasefire. He mentioned the killings of Lone and Dar by Pakistani agencies had rattled New Delhi to the extent that someone had suggested killing Hurriyat hawk Syed Ali Shah Geelani in a tit-for-tat policy.

In the current book, Dulat has also revealed how RAW helped to save the life of then Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf. In 2004, RAW passed on actionable intelligence to the ISI about the JeM’s plans to hit Musharraf. He was saved by a whisker. RAW also helped in the identification and arrest of culprits. Two out of them were later executed following the Peshawar army school bombing. Another startling revelation is Dulat’s assessment that Musharraf was involved in the planning of the 26/11 Mumbai attacks. Though, Musharraf had abdicated office at the time of attacks, Dulat believes that the planning for them had almost been completed during his tenure. According to him, Musharraf was getting frustrated that despite abandoning Pakistan’s traditional stand on Kashmir, India was not responding to his peace proposals. 

Dulat’s other revelation is that the Indira-Abdullah accord in 1975 had the tacit understanding of then Pakistan prime minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. The story is that before Sheikh Abdullah went ahead, he sent his son Dr. Farooq Abdullah to Pakistan, who met Bhutto. The then Pakistan prime minister reportedly told him, “At this point we can do nothing to help you. So take what you can get. If you are offered peace and power in Kashmir, take it.”

On the current scenario, Dulat’s assessment of Kashmir is pessimistic. He believes that if the current situation is not arrested, it has the potential to produce more Burhan Wanis. However, the former spy chief’s idea that Jammu and Kashmir has the potential to work as a bridge between India and Pakistan is commendable and needs to be put to the test.

The writer is Editor, Strategic Affairs, DNA. Views are personal.