#dnaEdit | The American connection: Why US is so keen on India's NSG berth

The Obama administration’s vigorous campaign for India to be admitted to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) should come as a surprise even to the starry-eyed American lobbyists in India. The Americans have never done this kind of thing so openly and loudly anytime for anything for India. It is quite intriguing and it is something that deserves a close look. This does not mean that the US act of support should be seen with any kind suspicion or reservation. But it is worth finding out as to why the Americans are so vocal in their support for India on this issue. It should be remembered that the US support for India is not as unabashed or as unqualified as this one. There are differences on trade and other issues, including outsourcing, and there are prickly issues like the US Senate-appointed watchdog which monitors freedom of religion and religious tolerance, and which finds India wanting.

There seem to be two obvious reasons as to why the US is keen on joining the NSG. First, the American nuclear reactor manufacturing company Westinghouse, a unit of Japan’s Toshiba, is in negotiations with India’s public sector undertaking, Nuclear Power Corporation. But the talks with Westinghouse have been on since 2013 when the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was in power. At that time, the proposed site was at Mithi Virdi in Gujarat. During Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s state visit to Washington, the proposed nuclear power plant comprising six reactors each with a capacity of 1000 megawatt has now been shifted to Andhra Pradesh. A similar agreement has been negotiated with Russia and France as well. The Westinghouse commercial venture could be a reason, but it cannot be seen as a compelling one.

The other probable reason for the determined US attempt to get India into the NSG could be the China factor. It would not necessarily mean that it is intended to be anti-China. The Americans are quite clear that the stakes are too high for that kind of a hostile stance. But there is no mistaking the aggressive American stance with the ostensible motive of safeguarding the freedom on the sea-lanes in the contested South China Sea region. This does not make much sense because India is not a contiguous country with regard to South China Sea though India is expanding its commercial links with the region, including exploration of oil wells off the Vietnamese coast.

The US is a lone superpower in the post-Cold War era, where it is not able to influence policy and outcomes in different regions of the world. The US is in need of coalition partners and allies. Some of the old ones like Britain and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) have survived, but with weakened links. Britain is not a power to be reckoned with though its affiliation to the US is the most unquestioned one, especially during the Tony Blair years and the role he played in going into war with Iraq against Saddam Hussein, evoking the derisive epithet of “Bush’s poodle” for the then Labour PM.

The US has no reliable partners as in the past in the West Asian region, from Egypt to Iran. The Arab sheikhdoms do remain on the side of the US, but they are not the strong allies that the Americans can depend on. After the fall of Shah Reza Pahlavi in Iran in 1979 and the ayatollah takeover in Tehran, the only American ally in the region was Pakistan. But Pakistan, like Iran and the Arab countries in the Gulf, were security and strategic partners.

The US had common political links of democracy with Britain and the European member countries of Nato. It would appear that the US is looking for a democracy-partner in Asia, and India fits the bill. The Americans are also acutely aware that more than Israel it is India, with nearly 200 million Muslim population, that could be the ideal counter-point to the challenge posed by Islamist forces, including the terrorist groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). This is however an unstated thesis of the US’s India policy. It could have hoped to project Pakistan as an ideal modern Islamic state, but the Islamist and terrorist groups there make it an impossible venture.  

Of course, the Americans were always suspicious of Indian democracy as long as it had been seen to be as part of the anti-capitalist, pro-socialist Soviet bloc. But things were never as simple as that, and the American views in the White House and the Pentagon were nuanced and measured. When Indira Gandhi declared Emergency in June, 1975, they chose to maintain tactical silence. So, the ostensibly ideological aversion for India was a rhetorical ruse and nothing more.

It is a fact however that India and the US found themselves in each other’s arms as it were when India opened up its economy, and India’s 300 million-plus Indian middle class whetted the American market appetite. There were enough hiccups with regard to economic ties on the way, and they continue to persist. But there is recognition on the part of the Americans that the Indian market is not to be scoffed at though it is China that has opened up its market much more to US investments than India. 

It seems that India’s America policy is simplistic in contrast to the complicated American calculations for weighing in with India. Interestingly, both Prime Minister Modi and his predecessor Manmohan Singh entertained unidimensional view when it came to deciding policy towards the US. It was based on the perception that the Americans had capital and technology and that India needs both to become a developed country. It should come as a surprise both to admirers and detractors of Modi and Singh that the two leaders’ love for America is starry-eyed. India’s American lobby of strategic and economic experts share the vision of Modi and Singh with regard to the US. But in actual practice, Indian negotiators at the diplomatic and commercial levels have been playing as much a nuanced game as their American counterparts despite the naivete of the present and former Prime Ministers and the pro-US lobbyists.