Curbs against Iran far removed from original aim

The threat of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani to withdraw partially from the landmark nuclear deal of 2015, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), comes as a reaction to the US’s attempts in recent weeks to reduce Iran’s oil exports to zero. 

Riled by the US sanctions, Iran wants to see who are standing by it and demands that remaining signatories to the deal — the UK, China, France, Germany and Russia — ease restrictions on its banking and oil sectors in the next 60 days, failing which, Tehran has threatened, it will remove caps on uranium enrichment levels and resume work on the Arak nuclear facility.

From 2006 onwards, the UNSC has treated the Iranian nuclear enrichment issue as one falling within the remit of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, dealing with action with regard to threats to and breaches of “international peace and security”. 

The European Union’s economic sanctions against Iran (and Syria) have been far-reaching in immiserating the lives of ordinary people. What is worse, the bulk of the EU’s sanctions have been adopted without the authority and support of the UNSC – an organ in whose hands the coercive activities are centralised and monopolised, according to Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. 

By the decision adopted on July 26, 2010, the EU Council, though, attempting to follow the position taken by the UNSC, has introduced sanctions against Iran that go beyond those adopted within the UN system and began encompassing trade between EU states and Iran.

The US enacted major sanctions against Iran since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, freezing the Iranian government’s assets. Sanctions played a major part in the US policy of dual containment (Iran and Iraq) in the 1980s, while Israel’s role in formulating and implementing the sanctions policy of the US dominated the discourse in the 1990s. 

From the role the Carter and Reagan Administrations played in the Iran–Iraq war, the numerous sanctions imposed on Iran by the Clinton Administration and the aggressive and confrontational policy toward Iran adopted by the George W Bush Administration after the events of September 11, 2001, is a continuum that runs well into the Trump administration with exception to the interregnum of the Obama administration. And since 1984, Iran’s nuclear programme has almost never been off the US and Israeli radar.

It is a no-brainer, therefore, that the US-Iran relationship is one of unceasing hostility, bad faith and distrust, with occasional dash of rapprochement for the last four decades, firmed up by, in particular, President Bush in his “axis of evil” speech on January 29, 2002, in which Iran was accused, along with Iraq and North Korea, of aggressively pursuing weapons of mass destruction and exporting terror. 

Fourteen years down the line, the narrative remains unchanged with President Donald Trump naming Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps a terrorist organisation. The Guard is not only the official protector of the Islamic revolution, but also has enough economic leverage controlling some 20 per cent to 40 per cent of Iran’s economy.

It is thus obvious that trade restrictions against Iran have become more divorced from the original aim of stalling the nuclear enrichment effort and refocused on the overall trade and economic relations between Iran and the EU. 

As an instance of how, over the last four decades, American policymakers have increasingly used sanctions to punish countries that transgress US and international norms, or attack US interests, the Helms-Burton bill targeting Cuba and the Iran–Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) should come to mind as they were both strongly influenced by special interest lobbying – the American Israel Political Action Committee in the case of Iran, the families of the Pan Am bombing victims in the case of Libya, and the Cuban-American community with respect to Helms-Burton. 

Should Iran go ahead with its threat, there will be consequences, foremost of which is the frittering away of goodwill among countries who are generally convinced of American skullduggery and its policies of threat and 
intimidation towards Iran. 

President Hassan Rouhani, therefore, may well be advised to stave off knee-jerk reactions and adventurism that might amount to nuclear blackmail. It still enjoys the support of a few European countries. A diplomatic misstep can knock Rouhani off the rocker. 

Author is a commentator on geopolitical affairs and cultural issues