Can India-Pak ceasefire hold?

Unlike the MoU of 2003 on a ceasefire, astride the LoC, sought by Pakistan, the current initiative this week once again was taken by Pakistan’s DGMO. This time by Major General Sahir Shamshad Mirza, whose framed picture with a thumbnail sketch is located in his senior counterpart Lt Gen Anil Chauhan’s office. Incidentally, duty officers from the two countries from their respective Operations Rooms speak to each other almost on a daily basis. A Major General rank officer (not the DGMO unless specifically sought by Pakistan) from the MO Directorate speaks every Tuesday with Major General Mirza. After a protracted spell of intense firing, especially across the international border and mainly in the 16 Corps sector, south of the Pir Panjal range (15 Corps in Kashmir valley has been relatively quiet), the two MOs agreed “to fully implement in letter and spirit” the 15-year-old ceasefire pact of 2003. 

This pact/agreement is an understanding and there is nothing documented in letter and words to sanctify the MoU. Both sides have agreed to ensure peace and avoidance of hardship to civilians. The record shows that 908 unprecedented incidents of ceasefire violations have taken place in just five months of this year, compared to a total of 860 incidents in 2017. 96 per cent of CFVs have occurred in 16 Corps zone.

Pakistan has to keep the Kashmir dispute centre-stage by keeping the Valley on the boil and the stream of infiltration across the LoC in full flow. Approximately 250 terrorists are active in the Valley with their longevity progressively on the decline. The terrorist population has to be maintained at around 200 to 250 fighters, of which 60 per cent are local boys. There are two theatres of violence: one is along the LoC where infiltration takes place; and the other is in the hinterland where terrorists keep the temperature high, while waging an insurgency laced with acts of terrorism. Fifty rounds of firing of any weapon constitutes a CFV. Since the killing of Burhan Wani, calibre escalation — increasing from small arms to heavy weapons like mortars, artillery, anti-tank missiles — is the new normal. Snipers are employed with great effect to eliminate soldiers in or outside their posts.

Three main reasons can be attributed to Pakistan urging for reinstatement of 2003 ceasefire. These are a) international pressure, especially by the US on harbouring of UN and US-designated terrorists; b) civilian casualties and their collective hardship; and c) responding to the NICO — Non Initiation of Combat Operations (a kind of ceasefire undertaken by India). The belated Indian engagement of stakeholders in Kashmir by the government’s special interlocutor, Dineshwar Sharma, is tactical in nature, has elicited the equally tactical Pakistani response to a ceasefire on the LoC. External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj has ruled out any dialogue with Pakistan, stating that:

“Terrorism and talks can’t go hand-in-hand.” Till there are three mechanisms in place — internal dialogue, external engagement and a ceasefire on the LoC (NICO is bonus) — no worthwhile outcome on Kashmir can be expected.

The current initiative of a blanket ceasefire is as different from the one initiated by Pakistan on November 26, 2003, following Operation Parakram — the Jaish-e-Mohammad/Lashkar-e-Taiba attack on Parliament on December 13, 2001 — as chalk and cheese. At that time, India nearly went to war as part of coercive diplomacy, especially after the second spike at Jammu’s Kaluchak family camp, in May 2002. President Musharraf’s speeches on January 12 and May 27 contained elements of remorse and he was contrite. The US Undersecretary of State, Richard Armitage, conveyed to India that Musharraf has promised to end infiltration permanently, visibly, irreversibly and to the satisfaction of India. Infiltration did reduce by more than 53 per cent. Musharraf had also pledged to end cross-border terrorism, which he later denied.

By November 2003, India began to withdraw after elections in J&K and assurances by Pakistan, following the pounding of heavy artillery on LoC, warning Pakistan to behave. In addition, Prime Minister Vajpayee changed his tune from aar paar ki ladai in May to extending an olive branch to Pakistan. In 2004, Musharraf reciprocated by pledging not to allow any terrorist attack from its soil on India. Besides the ceasefire, an internal dialogue had started with stakeholders in Kashmir. But most significantly, a back channel dialogue authorised by Vajpayee and Musharraf had started with three sets of interlocutors one after the other — RK Mishra, Brajesh Mishra and Satinder Lambah with their Pakistani counterparts, which culminated in the four or five point Kashmir formula by April 2007.

Then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh could not muster the courage and mandate to seize the deal and fulfil his ambition of revisiting Pakistan and his village Gah. Similarly, Musharraf tripped badly by launching Pakistani special forces against Lal Masjid. Gradually, he was eased out by the Army — a case of so near and yet so far.

The current ceasefire is being held in extremely uncertain times, with elections in Pakistan in July this year and in India early next year (or who knows, maybe even later this year). Most of all, the unpredictability of President Trump and his neocons and the deteriorating civil-military relations in Pakistan are added factors. The 2003 ceasefire agreement was backed by political dialogue, both internally and externally. The current ceasefire is more accidental than with any vision and is likely to flounder in the existing political vacuum — no dialogue with Pakistan. For the ceasefire to be effective for five years as in the past, it has to be sanctified by the two armies and their respective governments. But for all that, you need a Musharraf and a Vajpayee. 

The author is founder member of Defence Planning Staff, currently the Integrated Defence Staff. Views are personal.