India’s Ballistic Missile Defence capability is grossly exaggerated

After the March 6, 2011, interceptor (endo-atmospheric at 15km altitude) test, the director general, Defence Research and Development Organisation, Dr VK Saraswat, who is leading the nation’s home-grown ballistic missile defence (BMD) programme told the media that with one more test (exo-atmospheric at 150km altitude) planned later in 2011, phase I (two-layered ballistic missile shield) of the programme would be over, and India will have the capability to intercept 2,000km range ballistic missiles.

“Only the US, Russia, France, Israel and India have the capability to put in place a ballistic missile defence shield. China is still developing it,” said the irrepressible Saraswat. Alluding to the 2007 successful Chinese anti-satellite test, he added, “India now has all the technologies and building blocks which can be used for anti-satellite missions in the low earth and polar orbits.”

With his grossly exaggerated claims, Saraswat hopes to soon get Rs10,000 crore to start work on BMD phase II meant to intercept 5,000km range ballistic missiles. With an untenable foundation, phase II will be a disaster. This is not all. Terming baby steps as giant strides has grave national security implications. While ahead of India in ballistic missiles capabilities since 2001, Pakistan continues to increase its inventory of nuclear weapons’ land vector by citing India’s BMD claims as a destabilising factor.

Given such implications, the defence minister, AK Antony needs to restrain Saraswat and the DRDO from making irresponsible statements.

Let’s start with a few basic facts. All ballistic missiles when fired leave the atmosphere and then re-enter it to hit the target. They can be intercepted at three points during the trajectory: when the ballistic missile takes off (ideal, but difficult as it requires space based detection capability), when in space (called exo-atmospheric, it is second best option as debris remains suspended in space), and when it finally re-enters (endo-atmospheric). The 30km altitude is the dividing line between the atmosphere and space; below 30km is atmosphere and above 30km is space, two mediums with different characteristics. It is evident that both the interceptors should be designed to hit the hostile missile as high as possible so that the destroyed missile’s debris falls as much away as possible from friendly territory. Moreover, as a general rule, the nuclear chain reaction (a hostile ballistic missile will have nuclear warhead), which then cannot be controlled, gets activated about 10km above the earth. If the hostile payload that has the nuclear warhead gets a direct hit before the payload drops to this low height, the nuclear core will not get activated and it will not burst. It is evident that interceptor missiles with conventional warhead should be used only if it has 100 % accuracy to hit the bull’s eye. Otherwise, the preferred option for interceptor missile warhead is a nuclear warhead which while engaging the hostile missile ideally in exo-atmosphere detonates its warhead by its blast (it need not be a direct hit), with the nuclear debris then remaining suspended in space. In short, it should be nuclear warhead for nuclear warhead.

Given these facts, let’s examine what has been achieved by the DRDO since BMD started in 1995. A total of two exo-atmospheric interceptor (called PAD) tests have been done achieving altitudes of 48km and 80km, and two endo-atmospheric tests (called AAD) have been done at altitudes of 15km and 18km. Thus, the maximum PAD interception has been at the altitude of 80km.

Saraswat hopes to do another PAD (delayed, was to happen in 2010) at the altitude of 150km for intercepting 2,000km range ballistic missile. At present, PAD cannot hit more than 1,000km range missiles.

Thus, there are six major unresolved issues. First, the choice of Prithvi missile as the target (in all the interceptions done so far) is wrong as the missile has slow speed. Pakistan does not have Prithvi missiles; all its missiles with 2,000km ranges (like the Chinese CSS-5, renamed Ghauri, as even M-11 and M-9) have faster speeds. Saraswat would do well to designate indigenous Agni-I with 700km and Agni-II with 2,000km range as the hostile missiles and then demonstrate successful interceptions. Second, the PAD, validated thus far, can attain a maximum height of 80km, which is insufficient to intercept 2,000km range missiles in exo-atmosphere. Moreover, there is a need to demonstrate high speed interceptor than the present PAD intercepting Prithvi missile. Therefore, would it not be better for DRDO to hold the claims till it has successfully test-fired the interceptor against the Agni-II missile?

Third, given the fact that the interceptors are armed with conventional warheads, there is the need to repeatedly demonstrate simultaneous exo and endo-atmospheric tests; if one misses the target, the other should be able to kill it. This has not been done. Fourth, the DRDO has not said whether the March 6 test and the earlier tests were indeed direct hits. Considering that the interceptors have radio frequency seekers and the imaging infra-red seekers have still not been demonstrated, and the proximity fuse on the warhead will explode within 20m of the target, even with a slow target like Prithvi, the interceptions may not have achieved a ‘kill’.

Fifth, all interceptor tests have been conducted from known designated sites, and have thus been stage managed. All Prithvi missiles depicting hostile missiles have been fired from the integrated test range (ITR) at Chandipur, Orissa, and the interceptors from the Wheeler’s Island 70km apart. In actual war, such ideal situations will not be unavailable. There is thus a need to do further tests in the above suggested configurations for successful interceptions of missiles with 2,000km ranges.

And, lastly, it is unclear whether India has the capability to fabricate small nuclear warheads for interceptors, which is why the DRDO keeps harping that they will be armed with conventional warheads.

On the question of Chinese anti-satellite test, Saraswat told me that with successful BMD interceptions, he need not demonstrate the anti-satellite capability. If this was so, why would the Chinese find it necessary to demonstrate anti-satellite capability? The answer lies in cold statistics. Satellites in low earth orbit (LEO) are at heights of 300km above the earth, as they will not be stable otherwise. The polar orbit is at height of 843km. The demonstrated capability of DRDO’s exo-interceptor is only 80km above the earth. Even if the DRDO were able to make an interceptor that could reach the height of 300km, it needs to be remembered that satellites in LEO move at speeds of 28,000km per hour. Thus, to demonstrate assurance, there is a need to do a successful anti-satellite test, which the Chinese did, and got the US anxious about their increasing space capabilities. The US, which has demonstrated capability to kill a satellite in LEO and polar orbits with laser on aircraft, is already thinking about the inevitability of space militarisation. Both the early warning and interception of satellites and long range missiles (5,000km onwards) by laser beams is best done through space capabilities. China is planning the catch-up with the US. Where does this leave India where the DRDO has happily declared that intercepting satellites and ballistic missiles are the same thing?

— The writer is editor, FORCE newsmagazine. He can be contacted at pravin@forceindia.net