The new President of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani, delayed his maiden visit to India by a few hours due to an unfolding security crisis in the country’s northern Kunduz province. Over the past two days, Taliban rebels and Afghan security officials have been involved in a bloody battle, which till now has reportedly claimed lives of 43 terrorists and eight Afghan security personnel. 

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The on-going battle in Kunduz highlights once again, the security challenges facing the country and its new leadership in Kabul. Prior to this, a bomb outside a bank ripped through the eastern city of Jalalabad killing 33 people and injuring more than 100. Over the next few hours, another bank was targeted with a low intensity explosive. The reason for targeting banks, a relatively new strategy, is to target government paid employees, specifically soldiers working for the Afghan military and provincial police, and dissuade people from joining the state forces. 

The above two incidents over the past few days highlight why Ghani, after being sworn in as the new president and replacing the champion of Afghan realpolitik Hamid Karzai, is trying to tweak the country’s foreign policy order. The ascend to presidency was not that easy for Ghani. His political opponent, Abdullah Abdullah, managed to stall a clear win during the post election political tussle that eventually got him the unorthodox and newly formed chair of the country’s CEO. 

The current political framework in Kabul, even though working for the time being, is fragile. It has taken more than seven months for the new government to formulate its cabinet of ministers, and the crucial portfolio of Defence Minister still remains vacant after General Mohammed Afzal Lodin, who was nominated for the job by Ghani, refused to take it citing fears that his appointment could cause “disunity” within the Afghan military ranks. 

Much has been said about the fact that Ghani’s visit to India has come late, raising questions about not just his government’s foreign policy pivot, but also the potential loss of influence built by the Indian government over the past few years under the Karzai administration. It is true that Ghani’s political manoeuvring has indeed put China and Pakistan ahead of India in the country’s sphere of influence for the time being, and this will clearly cause a great deal of unease in Delhi which is the fifth biggest aid donor to Afghanistan today. 

Ghani’s decision to engage with Pakistan at an unprecedented level, specifically when it came to counter-terrorism and military cooperation is not something sudden or out of left field. In fact, Karzai himself planted the seeds of this greater cooperation. In 2011, he had given backing to Islamabad in an event that saw the US attack Pakistan, terming both Afghanistan and Pakistan as “inseparable brothers.” Since the new government, Afghanistan and Pakistan have taken a slew of measures to strengthen cooperation on the back of Ghani believing that peace in the country cannot be achieved without Pakistan playing a role. The newly pushed greater cooperation includes Afghanistan sending personnel for training to Pakistan’s elite military institutes in Abbottabad and Kabul giving leeway to Pakistani armed forces to conduct select anti-terror operations on its side of the very porous border between the two countries. 

Pakistan has for long viewed India as a grave threat to its ambitions in Afghanistan. For Islamabad, specifically the Pakistani military complex, control over the workings of Afghanistan is a strategic play designed not just to keep Delhi out, but to also have a region within its reach where the top military brass and leadership could possibly hold fort in an event of a full scale war with India. For such reasons, it is also thought that the ISI has started to place its own men in critical Afghan military ranks to create its own internal influence zone. Nonetheless, it was in fact the entrance of China as a mediator between Kabul and the Taliban that may have caught New Delhi more by surprise. 

In November last year, Chinese diplomats reportedly visited Peshawar to push ahead the mediation process. Beijing, which usually stays away from such diplomatic manoeuvres, has its own security in mind as well. Reports of anti-China Uighur militants who are active in the country’s restive Xinjiang province getting training in both Afghanistan and Pakistan have become frequent. The Taliban delegation flying to China for talks was recently confirmed, and official dialogue between them and Ghani’s government is expected to start sometime in the near future. These talks seem to have some sort of blessing from Washington as well, as the US special envoy for Pakistan and Afghanistan, Daniel L Feldman, met with the Pakistan Army, the main pressure point of any Afghan – Taliban talks, to discuss the “regional situation.” The outcome expected from China’s mediation is to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table and somehow try to integrate them into the country’s political process. This experiment, of course, has more chances of failure than success. 

President Ghani’s first port of call after taking power was China. India did not figure in his itinerary till this week, months after taking power. After Beijing, Islamabad and Washington were Ghani’s preferred ports of call. 

Now, does this mean that Delhi may have compromised a strategic advantage that it clearly possessed? The answer is conflicting, both yes and no. 

Ghani came into power with a clear mandate as far as foreign policy was concerned, and this was to stem the growing violence in the country under all circumstances. For this, the age-old philosophy that foreign policy is only an extension of a state’s domestic policy, in parts, explains Ghani’s actions. Delhi is in the unique position of having excellent relations with both the Afghan state and its people, having spent millions of dollars on education, agriculture and power projects there. However, India holds no influence on Pakistan when it comes to Afghanistan, in fact, both are involved in a clandestine turf war in the country, a fact that has seemingly irked Ghani immensely. 

India should look to keep a gap between its policies of influence and engagement. New Delhi needs to be assertive in what it hopes to achieve as a long-term donor and partner in Afghanistan, that is development and security, two things that Ghani’s government is taking much more seriously than Karzai, action wise. Fast tracking projects in the country, announcing new ones and clearing stalled investments would be a good start from India’s point of view. The release of long-overdue Cheetal helicopters to Afghanistan in a low-key affair earlier this month has set a good precedent for Ghani’s trip to be a grand success in every possible way. The fact that the choppers were not delivered yet, due to the inability to find an appropriate ceremonial event for the handover is preposterous. 

However, India will eventually have to let go of its moralistic grandstanding and play a bigger in Afghanistan’s security structure. This does not have to mean arming them to the teeth, however exchange of non-lethal military equipment and increase in training, including Indian experts being sent to Afghanistan for these purposes, should become a priority. This, along with a bigger push in Afghanistan’s economy is what the country had strived for under Karzai, and will continue to do so. Ghani’s visit could be a litmus test for the new government in Delhi as well, as Afghanistan is one place where policies based on efficient and harsh realpolitik are required.