Finally, some signs of spine in India’s China policy

The biggest gain from the just concluded visit of Chinese premier Wen Jiabao for India is that New Delhi has finally buried the ghost of the 1962 border war.

There was a hint of a stiffening of the spine in the days leading to the visit by India’s rebuff of the Chinese move, asking the world to absent itself from the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony for a Chinese dissident incarcerated at home.

And the joint statement concluding the visit underlined a new Indian assertiveness in refusing to genuflect to Beijing that Tibet is a part of China.

In this instance, the omission of the mantra directly made the point that the new Chinese practice of stapling visas of Jammu and Kashmir residents to please Islamabad was unacceptable. In any event, as and when Beijing withdraws this gratuitous insult to India, it would not be a concession.

Despite the soft diplomacy Wen indulged in during a visit to a Delhi school and calling India and China partners, not rivals, the message he delivered at his main public speech at the Council of World Affairs was hard-edged, holding out no prospect of an early resolution of the border dispute while reiterating the careful formulations on India playing a prominent role in the United Nations Security Council.

Expectedly, the Chinese did not repeat president Barack Obama’s declaration that he favoured India’s permanent membership.

The Chinese premier’s main thrust was the further promotion of trade on Beijing’s terms, setting out a $100 billion target. Accompanying him were a posse of some 300 businessmen and executives.

He did mention the balance of trade being heavily in China’s favour and the need to give fair play to items of Indian strength such as pharmaceuticals and information technology but the proof of the pudding would lie in the eating. For instance, India exports high-quality generic drugs the world over without inviting the kind of restrictions they face in China. In any event, the present gap of nearly $20 billion is unsustainable.

Trade deals worth some $16 billion were signed and an agreement marks the beginning of Chinese banking in the country, but the colonial nature of the trade, with India supplying the raw materials and China sending manufactured goods, is hardly desirable from New Delhi’s viewpoint. China is a great and growing economic and political presence in the world and cannot be wished away, but the two countries cannot sustain the growing volume without a level playing field for long.

In a sense, Wen’s visit is the latest venture in an already complicated relationship even as Beijing made a point to show its strong links with Pakistan by going directly to Islamabad after its India visit.

Beijing’s assiduous cultivation of India’s neighbours, in particular Pakistan, is part of a long-term strategy and New Delhi must find its own counter-strategies to cope with the problem. But, obviously the pressing need now is to frame a coherent plan based on realpolitik even while taking into account Beijing’s growing power.

‘Look East’ is now a settled Indian policy, but it is important to give it more substance by undertaking substantial joint ventures with the Association of South-east Asian Nations (Asean) and in intensifying relations with South Korea and Japan.

The fact that Asean, Japan, and South Korea are demonstrating a keen desire to intensify their relations is plain for all to see. One indication in Japan’s case is an eight-member delegation of the independent thinktank, Japan Institute for National Fundamentals, that its president, Yoshiko Sakurai, has been leading to Delhi. Apart from official visits, Delhi has frequently played host to Japanese business delegations of every kind; seldom have independent political experts and academics come calling.

While India and China must keep open their lines of communication and high-level official visits too have their usefulness, if Beijing is adopting what is described as a string of pearls strategy to contain India, the least that New Delhi can do is to form vital relationships with China’s neighbours.

Asean countries have made it clear repeatedly that they would welcome a greater Indian presence in the region with an eye on China.

What is lacking so far is a coordinated Indian plan to pull together the various facets of economic, political and military relationships
to bring out the centrality of common interests the region and India have in helping to maintain regional peace and prosperity.

Being friends with Beijing’s neighbours signifies no evil intent; rather, it is an exercise in political prudence.

In any event, India’s neighbours are avidly absorbing the signals from Wen’s Delhi visit and the points the Indian leadership made even as the Chinese premier set out his hard-line political agenda.