Cornered and isolated
My view, based on firsthand experience of how the LTTE operated, was that Prabhakaran lacked the will and the wisdom to learn when violence had become counterproductive.
The former Union commerce minister and DMK leader Murasoli Maran asked me in 1997: “Do you think Prabhakaran, like Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, will ever have the wisdom to move from war to negotiations”? My answer, based on firsthand experience of how the LTTE operated, was that Prabhakaran lacked the will and the wisdom to learn when violence had become counterproductive and negotiations imperative. Twelve years later, with 37 countries including India, the United States, the UK and other members of the European Union having declared the LTTE a terrorist organisation, the noose is tightening around the LTTE leader’s neck.
With Sri Lankan armed forces surrounding Kilinochchi, the operational capital of the Tamil Tigers in northern Sri Lanka earlier this month, the US government categorically stated: “The United States does not advocate that the government of Sri Lanka negotiate with the LTTE. However, we do believe that a broad range of Tamil voices and opinion must now be brought into the political process, to reach a political solution that Tamils inside and outside Sri Lanka see as legitimate”. Interestingly, this almost echoes the position that New Delhi has taken. Despite political pressures from UPA allies like the MDMK and PMK and appeals by chief minister M Karunanidhi, India has steadfastly avoided echoing calls by these parties to demand a cease-fire, just when the Sri Lankan army was preparing to take Kilinochchi. While Karunanidhi sympathises with Tamil aspirations in Sri Lanka, he is embarrassed by Prabhakaran’s course of action.
Prabhakaran has, for over three decades now, believed in the efficacy of the gun. He started his career with a bloodbath against not only Sinhala officials and civilians, but also fellow Tamil militants and political leaders, like his principal rival Sabarathinam, who was in the 1970s, a hot favourite of Karunanidhi. He has, thereafter, brutally killed moderate Tamil leaders who believed in the ballot and not the bullet, like veteran politicians Amrithalingam and Chandrahasan, who worked tirelessly with Sinhala jurists to produce a constitutional package that would have addressed Tamil aspirations. After assuring prime minister Rajiv Gandhi that he would abide by the terms of the 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, Prabhakaran embarked on a killing spree of Sinhalese in eastern Sri Lanka, compelling New Delhi to order a crackdown by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF).
Internationally isolated, with dwindling political support even within Tamil Nadu, and finding that western governments have ordered a crackdown on Tamil expatriates remitting money to LTTE front organisations, the financial, diplomatic and military squeeze on Prabhakaran’s resources and options is tightening. Like all authoritarian leaders, he has ruthlessly killed rivals within the LTTE who could even remotely challenge his authority, including the organisation’s most brilliant military commander, Mahattya, in 1994. His military strength significantly declined when Karuna, his most influential military commander in the island’s eastern province, turned against him. Prabhakaran soon lost virtually all control over the eastern province, which he had claimed to be an integral part of the “Tamil Homelands” of Sri Lanka.
On January 2, the Sri Lankan army, now a well-trained, well-equipped and motivated force, duly backed by substantial air power, overran the LTTE stronghold and capital of Kilinochchi. Shortly thereafter, the army took control of the strategic Elephant Pass; the narrow strip of land connecting the Tamil dominated Jaffna Peninsula with the rest of the country. Prabhakaran, who has high blood pressure and diabetes, is now cornered in a narrow strip of land in the jungle areas of Mullaithivu District. This is a far cry from the situation prevailing over the past few years, when he was virtually the uncrowned king of northern Sri Lanka. Those like me who have visited this area when the IPKF was in Sri Lanka believe that Prabhakaran will try and seek shelter in a maze of underground caves and tunnels built by the LTTE. But, he has few options left, but to be continuously on the run and few places, or countries he can run to. While he could be accidentally captured like Kasab, he would rather swallow a cyanide pill than surrender.
One hopes that the Sri Lankan government will not regard the weakening of Tamil armed resistance as a green signal for continuing denial of the legitimate rights of the Tamil population. The least that president Rajapaksa needs to do, is to implement the provisions of the 13th Amendment of the Sri Lankan Constitution enacted pursuant to the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, which devolves powers to elected assemblies in the northern and eastern provinces. Failure to do so would only lead to continuing unrest and discontent in the island nation.
With Sri Lankan armed forces surrounding Kilinochchi, the operational capital of the Tamil Tigers in northern Sri Lanka earlier this month, the US government categorically stated: “The United States does not advocate that the government of Sri Lanka negotiate with the LTTE. However, we do believe that a broad range of Tamil voices and opinion must now be brought into the political process, to reach a political solution that Tamils inside and outside Sri Lanka see as legitimate”. Interestingly, this almost echoes the position that New Delhi has taken. Despite political pressures from UPA allies like the MDMK and PMK and appeals by chief minister M Karunanidhi, India has steadfastly avoided echoing calls by these parties to demand a cease-fire, just when the Sri Lankan army was preparing to take Kilinochchi. While Karunanidhi sympathises with Tamil aspirations in Sri Lanka, he is embarrassed by Prabhakaran’s course of action.
Prabhakaran has, for over three decades now, believed in the efficacy of the gun. He started his career with a bloodbath against not only Sinhala officials and civilians, but also fellow Tamil militants and political leaders, like his principal rival Sabarathinam, who was in the 1970s, a hot favourite of Karunanidhi. He has, thereafter, brutally killed moderate Tamil leaders who believed in the ballot and not the bullet, like veteran politicians Amrithalingam and Chandrahasan, who worked tirelessly with Sinhala jurists to produce a constitutional package that would have addressed Tamil aspirations. After assuring prime minister Rajiv Gandhi that he would abide by the terms of the 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, Prabhakaran embarked on a killing spree of Sinhalese in eastern Sri Lanka, compelling New Delhi to order a crackdown by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF).
Internationally isolated, with dwindling political support even within Tamil Nadu, and finding that western governments have ordered a crackdown on Tamil expatriates remitting money to LTTE front organisations, the financial, diplomatic and military squeeze on Prabhakaran’s resources and options is tightening. Like all authoritarian leaders, he has ruthlessly killed rivals within the LTTE who could even remotely challenge his authority, including the organisation’s most brilliant military commander, Mahattya, in 1994. His military strength significantly declined when Karuna, his most influential military commander in the island’s eastern province, turned against him. Prabhakaran soon lost virtually all control over the eastern province, which he had claimed to be an integral part of the “Tamil Homelands” of Sri Lanka.
On January 2, the Sri Lankan army, now a well-trained, well-equipped and motivated force, duly backed by substantial air power, overran the LTTE stronghold and capital of Kilinochchi. Shortly thereafter, the army took control of the strategic Elephant Pass; the narrow strip of land connecting the Tamil dominated Jaffna Peninsula with the rest of the country. Prabhakaran, who has high blood pressure and diabetes, is now cornered in a narrow strip of land in the jungle areas of Mullaithivu District. This is a far cry from the situation prevailing over the past few years, when he was virtually the uncrowned king of northern Sri Lanka. Those like me who have visited this area when the IPKF was in Sri Lanka believe that Prabhakaran will try and seek shelter in a maze of underground caves and tunnels built by the LTTE. But, he has few options left, but to be continuously on the run and few places, or countries he can run to. While he could be accidentally captured like Kasab, he would rather swallow a cyanide pill than surrender.
One hopes that the Sri Lankan government will not regard the weakening of Tamil armed resistance as a green signal for continuing denial of the legitimate rights of the Tamil population. The least that president Rajapaksa needs to do, is to implement the provisions of the 13th Amendment of the Sri Lankan Constitution enacted pursuant to the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, which devolves powers to elected assemblies in the northern and eastern provinces. Failure to do so would only lead to continuing unrest and discontent in the island nation.