‘Fear of creeping Islamisation is the biggest myth’

Fears of a creeping ‘Islamisation’ of Europe have provoked a cultural backlash in the form of a proposed ban on the hijab in France and a ban on new minaret construction in Switzerland. But such fears, says demographer and economist Richard Hokenson, are “based on false premises”. In an interview to DNA, he debunks this and other demographic myths: it’s not a population explosion that the world should worry about, but a population implosion, with deflationary tendencies. And although India is in a demographic sweet spot, it can realise its potential only if it invests in education for all and improves labour productivity.

What are the most profound demographic trends influencing our world today?
Planet Earth is ageing, and for the first time ever, generations are not replacing themselves in the population pool. The global population today is 6.8 billion; it may start to shrink before we get to 8 billion. Thirty years ago, the major concern was population explosion: that there would be wars and famines and pestilence because birth rates were high. But birth rates peaked in 1971, when globally the average woman had five children each. Today, the birth rate globally is below 2.5 — close to the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman — and falling fast. In less than 10 years, it will be below replacement level. Now we confront the issue of population implosion: that is, a shrinking population.

The worst example of that is Japan, which represents the dark side of an ageing population: you get caught in deflation and you never get out.

But aren’t some countries doing better?
Yes, India does better, as does Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines: their birth rates are still above replacement levels. But even their birth rates are falling, but slowly; in China and Japan, they fell rapidly.

What are the social and economic implications of population implosion?
We’ll all be working many more years. People can’t retire like in their parents’ generations because there aren’t enough workers to support them: labour force growth is slowing everywhere, including in India. Additionally, a ‘race to zero interest rates’ globally — as a result of slowing labour force growth and deflationary tendencies — makes it difficult for people to save enough during their working years in order to retire. We see that tension in Greece and France today.

Is India really in a demographic sweet spot? What does it take to harvest that dividend, and what can go wrong?
India’s demographic pyramid is a good one, but there are a couple of key issues. Economic development in Asia is driven by improvements in productivity as people move from agriculture to manufacturing or services. In India, the trend is moving the wrong way: the number of people on the farm has quadrupled — in part because India tries to protect its farms: it’s very sensitive about being self-reliant in food. But you can protect farmers the wrong way by disincentivising them from becoming productive. The right way is to encourage people to be more productive — invest in tractors and so on — and free up surplus labour to come to the cities.

The second aspect is education. Out of every dollar spent on education in India, 85% is spent at the university level.

Unlike China or Japan, where literacy levels are high across the board, India has a relatively small cadre of very well-educated and well-trained workers and a big pool of semi-literate and illiterate workers. It needs to improve educational quality across the board. If India commits itself to investing to improve education quality, it could be the demographic powerhouse in 20 years. If it doesn’t, it won’t fulfil its potential.

What about changes in ‘religious demographics’ given the widespread fears of an ‘Islamisation’ of Europe and the influx into India from Bangladesh?
It’s the world’s biggest myth. It’s in the Muslim world that birth rates are falling the fastest, including in Uzbekistan,
Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Yemen and Iraq; in Iran it’s already below replacement level. And even in Afghanistan and Pakistan, it’s falling at a slower rate.  When women from high birth rate countries move to low birth rate countries like those in Europe, they adopt the local standard. The fear about the ‘Muslimisation’ of Europe is based on false premises.

But demographic change can also be brought about by proselytisation and Islam is the world’s fastest growing religious order…
Would it not be fair to have said the same thing about Christians 2000 or even 1000 or 500 years ago? I don’t think there’s much risk of that.

What accounts for the rage in Europe: the ban on the hijab and controversies over mosques and minarets?
It’s born of fear, but it’s not a legitimate fear. That doesn’t mean politicians don’t play on it. Particularly during difficult economic times, it’s easy to blame the immigrants.

Do Muslim societies have high female literacy rates?
No, and that’s the critical issue. The most fundamental driver for lower birth rates globally is education and enfranchisement of women. If women get an education and that translates into economic opportunities, birth rates fall. Which is why when the Taliban goes in, they pull girls out of schools. It’s also an issue in Pakistan — and in some parts of northern India, where for instance, girls don’t go to school because schools don’t have toilets!

In Saudi Arabia today, there are more women enrolled in college than men; the same is the case with Iran. When Boeing sells a 747 to Saudi Air, there are twice as many rest rooms in the business class than on any other configuration. That’s because as the plane leaves Riyadh, women grab their cosmetic cases and run into the loo, strip off their burqas, wear a western dress and spend 30-45 minutes on their make-up. So, it’s changing for women in Saudi Arabia, although slowly. Likewise in the Emirates: these women will be catalysts for change in their country.

How much of China’s ageing problem is because of the one-child policy?
The consensus view is that if China reveres its one-child policy, it can solve its ageing problem. But I believe the one-child policy played a very minor role; birth rates had already collapsed in
China when the policy was implemented. China could reverse the policy tomorrow, and not much would happen.

What implications will the gender ratio imbalance in China and parts of  India?
We don’t know; there’s no precedent.