Former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had once said during his outreach to Pakistan that you can choose your friends but you can’t choose your neighbours. That hoary old maxim is one of the verities of any country’s foreign policy. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first moves in the international arena — from inviting South Asian leaders to his swearing-in ceremony to making Bhutan his first port of call — are a welcome callback to this. Thimphu might have been a somewhat unexpected choice, but it is also a logical one. For one, there are important bilateral issues on the table, ranging from energy and Bhutan’s economic issues to border security and growing Chinese interest in Bhutan. But as importantly, Thimphu is Delhi’s only unalloyed ally in the region. If Modi wishes to initiate the turnaround in regional ties that is important for the promised Indian economic resurgence, starting with low-hanging fruit is a good opening move.

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Energy linkages are one of the primary areas of mutual economic benefit. Modi’s laying the foundation stone of the 600 MW Kholongchu hydroelectric project might make for good press, but boosting this sector is going to be a little tougher. Back in 2008, Thimphu and Delhi agreed to develop at least 10,000 MW hydropower generation capacities by 2020. Six years later, three completed projects totalling a little over 1,400 MW are exporting electricity to India while 10 more projects are on the anvil with three underway. That doesn’t leave much time if the 2020 target is to be met; Delhi must ensure interrupted flows of both the necessary investment and expertise. This is as crucial for India’s quest to fuel its rising energy consumption as it is for Bhutan to manage its rupee crunch. The ngultrum, Bhutan’s currency, is pegged to the rupee; its devaluation, given the unequal trade flows, has started to hit an economy afflicted by growing national debt, high unemployment and poor infrastructure. Witness Bhutanese Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay’s shift in focus from his country’s much-cited gross national happiness to “reducing the obstacles to happiness.” 

Beijing is the ghost at the banquet, of course. For all that China is not among the 52 nations with which Bhutan maintains diplomatic relations, their boundary dispute can prove troublesome for India if it results in negotiations that see the former gaining control over territory bordering the Siliguri corridor. Chinese FDI — a distinct possibility given Beijing’s push to create investment and infrastructure linkages with other nations in the region such as Nepal and Myanmar — is another possibility that will make Delhi uncomfortable.

China’s intentions in particular and security concerns — Delhi would like Thimphu to move against North-East insurgent groups that are operating from Bhutanese territory — have the potential to bring out the worst in south block mandarins. For all of its carping about uncooperative neighbours, one of the reasons the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation remains a punch line is Delhi’s boorishness in engaging its neighbours; its briefly cutting the fuel subsidy to Bhutan last year is a case in point. India’s regional dominance will put other South Asian nations’ backs up; this is a given. Diplomatic generosity, not high-handedness — and India is dealing from a position of strength where it can well afford it — is the way to deal with this. If Bhutan is to be the first step in Delhi’s regional outreach, it is the perfect place to demonstrate this.