dna edit: Empty promise

There was less than a day between US Secretary of State John Kerry’s assurance that New Delhi’s concerns vis-a-vis Afghanistan — given Washington’s new push to open a dialogue with the Taliban — would not be overlooked, and the Taliban attack near the presidential palace and CIA headquarters in one of Kabul’s most secure zones.

As statements go, the attack is a brazen one. It underscores the Taliban’s confidence about its prospects as 2014, the date for the withdrawal of international troops from Afghanistan, approaches. Under the circumstances, looking for the US to safeguard Indian interests in Afghanistan would be more optimistic than prudent.

Washington’s opening of a dialogue with the Taliban shows the bind it is in. It was an inevitable move; a purely military victory has been off the table for a while now. But it has also reinforced the perception of a weak Kabul and time running out for the US — particularly given Washington’s climbdown when it comes to preconditions for the talks. Kerry may have said in New Delhi that negotiations would not be held if the Taliban did not break ties with al-Qaeda, end violence and accept the primacy of the Afghan Constitution, but that does not appear to be entirely accurate.

The message from Washington last week was that there were only two preconditions — abjuring international terrorism and recognising Afghan democracy — and that they had been met. The Kabul attack shows the hollowness of such claims.

That leaves New Delhi in a difficult position. Afghanistan is of prime geostrategic importance; it provides direct access to Iran and an energy and natural resource rich Central Asia. And if the country recedes into chaos come 2014, it will have a direct impact on India’s border security. India’s substantial investments in the country are at stake as well — the road from Zaranj to Delaram in southwest Afghanistan, providing a link to Iran, and the power project bringing electricity to Kabul among them.

The past week has shown that it would be unwise to depend on the US to provide long-term stability or security. New Delhi must work with Washington wherever possible, certainly, but it must also talk to Tehran and Moscow. And while continued engagement with former Northern Alliance leaders is a given, it must also do so with the Pashtun majority; not all of them support the Taliban.

Above all, it must do what it can to buttress Kabul. Direct military involvement would be unwise, but stepping up training of Afghan security forces and supplies of military hardware are possibilities. There is no getting around the fact that Afghanistan’s future past 2014 looks to be grim — but for the sake of India’s interests, New Delhi must continue to do what it can for stability.