dna edit: Afghanistan's grim future

The irony of a suicide bombing targeting former Afghan vice-president and prominent Hazara lawmaker Haji Mohammed Mohaqiq at the same time as NATO formerly handing over command of security responsibilities in the last 95 districts of the country to Afghan forces is difficult to miss. It underscores the frailty of Afghanistan’s security prospects — something the Taliban has been driving home hard with a series of recent attacks.

As a result, the total number of civilians killed until June 6 this year, according to the UN — 3,092 — is 24 per cent higher than the same period last year. The picture that is emerging of Afghanistan after the withdrawal of western forces in 2014 — until then, the 100,000 NATO troops remaining in the country will continue to play a supporting role — is not a rosy one.

There are two main problems that are likely to undercut the Afghan government’s hold on the country once it’s on its own. The first is that the Afghan security forces are simply not ready to take over responsibility for the country’s security. The coalition may have succeeded in bringing the police and army’s strength close to the projected level of 350,000 troops, but those troops lack training and equipment and suffer from serious morale problems.

And their ability to both run an effective intelligence network and operate the heavy weaponry such as howitzers that they will need to take on the Taliban is heavily compromised by low literacy levels. Little wonder attrition rates are so high — 3-4 per cent a month, which translates into recruiting 50,000 personnel every year simply to keep up troop levels. That is not likely to be sustainable.

The other problem is Kabul’s lack of political legitimacy. The endemic corruption of President Hamid Karzai’s administration and his failure to forge an agreement with the opposition on structural changes to key electoral bodies have perpetuated the belief that he is setting himself up to play kingmaker come 2014 — and made it that much more difficult for the government that comes into power then to acquire legitimacy in turn.

And this is even before Pakistan’s ties with the Taliban and its continued quest for strategic depth are taken into account. For New Delhi, few options remain if it wishes to protect its investments in Afghanistan. It must continue to cultivate its contacts among former Northern Alliance commanders — and it must also push for a regional dialogue involving all stakeholders at the same time. But the latter is a slim hope. The most likely scenario come 2014 is a struggle for control with the Taliban gaining de facto control over parts of the country.