The visit of the Indian troika to Sri Lanka comprising the national security adviser, foreign secretary and defence secretary to Colombo recently suggests that there is more to conceal than reveal in India-Sri Lanka relations. 

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Considering Colombo chose not to organise a press conference after the high powered Indian delegation’s visit only indicates such a reality.  India-Sri Lanka relations have reached a new low in 2011.

The trust deficit between New Delhi and Colombo has widened considerably. There has been no major positive development in bilateral relations since May 2009 which witnessed a military solution to the LTTE’s three decade old civil war.

The Indian delegation’s visit was in the backdrop of the Tamil Nadu Assembly passing a resolution demanding imposition of economic sanctions against Sri Lanka.

These unanimous resolutions essentially question the core issues in Indian policy towards Sri Lanka; namely the problem of Tamil ethnicity and allegations of ‘war crimes’. Importantly, it rakes up the fishing issue in relation to the ‘Kachchativu islet’, transferred to Colombo’s ownership and possession under bilateral agreements in the 1960s.

The resolution on the ethnic issue and war crimes demands an early solution to the power-devolution and rehabilitation concerns, and the resolutions also referred to the Darusmann Report for UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. It highlighted the need to name the culprits, which were glossed over in the report.  

Also the recent attacks on Tamil fishermen near Katchatheevu and the differing reports on the number of Lankan Tamils affected by the war, those admitted in the government-run camps and those resettled are contentious issues between the two States.  Besides, the Tamils living in camps should be resettled in their pre-war habitats.

That the rights and facilities enjoyed by the Sinhalese population should be extended to the Lankan Tamils, all forms part of the TN Assembly resolution. Naturally New Delhi is sensitive to these socio-political developments that have taken shape and has resulted in a new low in India-Sri Lanka relations.

Today Colombo is as divided on the ethnic issue as it was decades ago. Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajpaksa, who expectedly worsted the LTTE with military muscle, finds himself isolated in his political strategy to deliver on Tamil expectations.

There are credible reports that the first family is itself divided over several issues, particularly over the manner of Namal Rajpaksa’s ascent on the national political scene. This is eating into the Mahinda vote bank and affecting the goodwill among the brothers who played a vital role in the defeat of LTTE.

Today President Rajpaksa is being hobbled by the southern Sinhala chauvinists in efforts to tackle the Tamil issue. As the head of the State, he enjoys unprecedented political powers, the Parliament is “his” for all intents and purposes and he has no major worries.

However, there is a section of the ruling party that is yet to come to terms with the manner of his taking over the reins of the SLFP and subsequently the presidency of the State.

Two other radical outfits, the JVP and JHU still influence the Sinhala chauvinists. The JVP though a shadow of its former self, played a major anti-India role between 2004 and 2006 despite efforts by Indian diplomats to woo them. The Tamil political leadership or the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) is discredited now as it was few years ago, dubbed as a Tiger proxy.

There is no major Tamil political personality in the Northern Province, who can guide it or represent it or equal the status of Karuna as in the eastern province.  The TNA is not happy with India for the recent developments.

What has gone wrong? Why is this state of affairs worrisome? Has India lost the plot in Sri Lanka? Clearly a part of the blame is attributed to the anti-India elements in Colombo’s politico- administrative leadership.  

The Sri Lankan political spectrum and the civil service have entrenched views on India. Moreover, New Delhi has shied away from publicising its contributions to ending the insurgency in the island nation, besides those in other sectors. Colombo has chosen to hurt itself by following obdurate policies towards India. For instance, the delay in formalising the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement.

Sri Lanka is too important for India, in a strategic sense, to be ignored. New Delhi needs to re-examine its policy towards Colombo and institute a road map for the future. With the Prime Minister scheduled to pay a long overdue bilateral visit later this year, India needs to come up with out of box solutions. Will the national security and foreign policy makers set a realistic agenda for achievement?

The writer is a Visiting Fellow with the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi