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Valley’s bastions of resistance

Kashmir is split into foreign terrorists-dominated north and a Hizbul Mujahideen-dominated south

Valley’s bastions of resistance
Kashmiri militant

In the sponsored proxy conflict in Kashmir, history has a way of repeating itself. Areas stabilised after initial turbulence re-emerge into violence with alacrity if the slightest rope is given to the complex trends played out at the instance of the multitude of players. We are used to hearing about the North Kashmir towns of Handwara, Kupwara, Bandipura and Sopore and the activities there; but for the last three years we are hearing much more about the South Kashmir towns – Tral, Kulgam, Shupiyan and Pulwama, which had once turned peaceful.

Twenty years ago these towns were flush with terrorists of all hue, mercenaries from outside South Asia, terrorists from Pakistan and a fair sprinkling of local roots. Over time some very efficiently conducted operations by a larger concentration of troops broke the terrorist resistance in various pockets. Political activity in the rural areas contributed its bit to the stabilisation. At the same time the effectiveness of the strong counter-infiltration grid in the north closer to the LoC made infiltration more difficult. Those who succeeded in infiltrating tended to remain in the north to make up for dwindling numbers and not gravitate southwards through the filters of security deployment. That virtually split Kashmir into foreign terrorist (FT) dominated north and a Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) locally dominated south. Security focus was greater towards the FT domination and counter-infiltration, leaving spaces open in the south where the local new generation movement of Burhan Wani took roots reviving South Kashmir’s militancy.

Tral tehsil is located on the west, off the national highway between Anantnag and Avantipura. It’s a bowl tucked closer to the high mountain range flowing down from the Amarnath shrine. It has been a problem area for the SF for all these 30 years and is also the home tehsil of Burhan Wani. Due to its notoriety there has been comparatively lesser effort towards engagement here. Security forces (SF) operational pressure pushes terrorists into the higher reaches or towards the direction of the Lidder Valley. It is ironical too that the number of Kashmiri Army soldiers and policemen hailing from here is reasonably high.

Pulwama town is the district headquarters of the Pulwama district. More than the town itself it’s the smaller built up areas which are more notorious. The area east of the Jhelum River is peppered with such villages and towns which also have orchards around. Local terrorists find it easier to move among the villages with large number of hideouts and safe houses, and a network of lookouts for movement of SF. Most security operations through 2018 appear to have been conducted here and in and around Kakapura and Pampore.

To the South is Kulgam town, again a district headquarters. It’s also the town which houses the headquarters of the Jamat-e-Islami and ideologically is reputed to be highly radical. Army’s deployment here is comparatively sparse. In summer some ad hoc reinforcement is done from the additional troops who arrive to secure the Amarnath Yatra. This is the area where late Lieutenant Ummer Fayaz was abducted and killed in 2017.

Shupiyan district, smaller and also newly carved, is the centre of horticulture and famous as the apple bowl of Kashmir. Its orchards produce nearly two lakh tons of apples every year. However, the apple trade and the money that it brings, makes little difference when it comes to radicalisation that is rife. It is here that Aurangzeb, the young Kashmiri Indian Army soldier, was killed by terrorists. Anantnag does not find mention in the quartet of names simply because like Bijbehara it is well known.

In all of South Kashmir the terrorists’ will to directly target the SF has been low. There is more emphasis on weapon snatching, kidnapping and killing of policemen or soldiers on leave, although successful targeting of small police convoys has also been done but infrequently. The convoy ambushes of 2017 at Pampore and Bijbehara are in the past. With 253 terrorists killed all over Kashmir in 2018 it is reported that 180 were recruited in South Kashmir in the same year; possible due to frequent funerals where frenzied mobs of young people impassioned and inspired by the death of friends vow to join the ranks. Speeches at funerals and Friday sermons are the main inspiration behind recruitment and radicalisation.

If South Kashmir’s terrorism has to be neutralized it is not just the elimination of terrorists that will lead to it. The networks are so deeply embedded that making a dent is the challenge. There are financial networks affording the free flow of money, and over-ground workers (OGWs) who provide intelligence about the SF. There is an entire network to bring stone-throwing mobs to the fore and continue with radicalisation. The district and tehsil level OGW leaderships need to be targeted if more headway is to be made. Otherwise with each season, the terrorists have a new tack; targeting of policemen and families was the way in 2018. There were signs of revival of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in 2018 too, a trend which must be neutralised early. It posed a great challenge around the turn of the millennium and had subsequently faded.

Neutralisation of local terrorists has become an easier exercise with regular flow of intelligence for which the J&K Police and agencies need to be complimented but that cannot be the limited strategy alone. Penetration of networks by joint teams, targeted elimination of terrorist leaders, identification of lower OGW leaderships and eliminating the finances that afford all this is the key. In addition, getting the local political community to re-engage with the populace and strengthen the local panchayats and municipal bodies will help divert attention from the current run of separatist activity.

South Kashmir will probably be a long haul given the current status. However, if proactivity and engagement through clergy involvement, political activity and counselling can be brought to the fore, recruitment could be neutralised to some extent and that would be a game changer.

Author is ex-GOC of Chinar Corps, Srinagar

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