The Doklam standoff has reached a stalemate, or so it seems. The Chinese have been raining threats, warnings and war similes with routine regularity while raising the decibels of propaganda, psywar, and mind games — all short of an ultimatum for war. Consistently, China’s bottom line for any compromise and conversation is Indian troops must end trespass and withdraw first from the sovereign Chinese territory of Doklam — which both India and Bhutan say is disputed. India, on the other hand, has gently clarified its stand justifying its intervention on the soil of a third country in preventing PLA from unilaterally altering the status quo in disputed areas of Doklam and the tri-junction, which have been recognised as disputed by agreements signed between India and China in 2012 and China and Bhutan in 1988 and 1989. Legally, India says it is on solid ground and wishes to de-escalate the confrontation peacefully and return to negotiations after both sides have withdrawn. It calls its demand ‘not unreasonable’. Beijing’s dilemma is its repeating conditionality that ‘Indian troops must withdraw first’.

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The Chinese have a saying: ‘Those who tie the knot have to be the first to untie it.’ In 1998, India had attributed its nuclear tests to China which incensed Beijing so much that it all but severed diplomatic ties. The diplomatic impasse blew away when the then Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh travelled to Beijing the following year in the middle of the Kargil war and publicly stated that China was not a threat to India. In the current standoff, China is being unusually aggressive, its media’s warmongering and rabble-rousing unprecedented and the official organs of the State extremely belligerent in using undiplomatic and combative language. In contrast, India has been almost silent but sedate and sober. No TV gladiator is wagging a finger at China.

This Thursday, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval will be in Beijing for a BRICS meeting where he is likely to interact with his Special Representative counterpart and Special Counsellor Yang Jiechi, who also handles BRICS. In a striking departure from the shrill rhetoric of past weeks, Chinese state media hoped that Doval will manage to end the Doklam crisis. Further, Doklam is not trending on Twitter and not too many ordinary Chinese know about it. Still, a breakthrough on the standoff on the sidelines of BRICS is unlikely due to China’s unwavering conditionality. Since Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj has committed in Parliament to ‘both armies withdrawing’, Doval will have little wriggle room. Incidentally, the Chinese PLA is celebrating its 90th anniversary on August 1. It has already stated it would safeguard China’s sovereignty whatever the cost and step up deployment if there is no Indian withdrawal.

The Communist Party of China’s 19th Congress is slated for November this year when President Xi Jinping will ensure the Politburo has in it all his men, making him possibly the most powerful leader of modern China overshadowing even Mao Tsetung and Deng Xiaoping. To project himself as a strong leader, he will not countenance any deviation from the party line at Doklam till then. We should, therefore, expect no concessions from Beijing at this time and be prepared for the long haul. While neither side wants the differences to escalate into disputes and not the least, shoot into conflict, three outcomes are possible.

Firstly, the standoff could go the Sumdorong Chu (1986-87) way which took 10 months for troops to disengage and seven years for the dispute to be resolved without a shot being fired in anger. Secondly, a local skirmish a la Nathu La (1967) could happen in Doklam area but restricted to the use of small arms and artillery. At Nathu La, 400 PLA and 190 Indian soldiers were killed and several more wounded on both sides. If clashes were to take place, all the border CBMs painstakingly worked out over decades would go for a toss. It would be a major setback in India-China relations.

Finally, diplomacy may work to avoid a long eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation and prevent jostling from  turning into trigger happiness. Although it is not difficult to establish who tied the knot first — Chinese transgression into Doklam was followed by Indian intervention there — India could agree to withdraw first giving PLA a face-saver, provided PLA followed to return to a freeze of positions obtained before June 16.

A high-level strategic dialogue with a new Indian envoy is required in case the Special Representatives talks process fails. India has to get ahead of the curve to handle China.

The author has served extensively in Sikkim and Bhutan