Manipur’s conflict economy: CM Okram Ibobi Singh’s gambits making him protector-in-chief of a choked state

This is how winner-takes-all works, even if it kills a state. Look at Manipur, where assembly elections are due in early 2017, and its three-term chief minister, Okram Ibobi Singh of the Congress.

 In 2010, Ibobi was in crisis. The second-term chief minister presided over Manipur, corrupted to the political and administrative core, ethnically rent, inundated by dozens of rebel groups, bludgeoned by central government paramilitaries and local police who worked a robust sideshow of intimidation, torture and faked ‘encounters’. Civilians were mostly the victims.

Then, in May of that year, Ibobi prevented the entry in Manipur of Thuingaleng Muivah, General Secretary of National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah), or NSCN (I-M), the largest Naga rebel group, and in ceasefire with Government of India. Muivah had returned to India to further peace talks, and moved freely between Nagaland and New Delhi. A Tangkhul Naga, Muivah could after some decades finally seek to visit Somdal, his village in northern Ukhrul district of Manipur, the traditional homeland of his tribe.

This was important to Muivah, besides sentimental reasons. He hoped to reinforce the point that much of Manipur, roughly a hilly ninth of the state, was occupied by Naga, Kuki and Zomi tribes—mostly Naga tribes—comprising about 40 per cent of the population. The majority Meitei, of whom Ibobi is one, occupy the remainder, mostly Imphal Valley, entirely surrounded by hills. There has long been concern among the Meitei that a deal between the government and Naga rebels might lead to carving of Naga territories from Manipur.

Ibobi’s decision to bar Muivah’s entry defied the request of the Home Minister of India at the time, P Chidambaram, and a Congress colleague. Protests broke out at the border of Manipur and Nagaland at Mao Gate, the main entry point from Nagaland into Manipur. Manipur’s police fired on Naga protesters. More than a hundred were injured. Two students died.

While it took a shaky relationship between the hills and the plains—the non-Meitei and Meitei—to a new low, in a bizarre way it resurrected Ibobi’s political fortune. Many Meitei, even if they reviled Ibobi, now saw him as a protector of Meitei interests, and a person who would not compromise Manipur’s territory.  Moreover, there was simply no alternative to Ibobi in Congress or outside it.

Ibobi and the Congress won the Assembly elections in 2012, ultimately cleaning up nearly 80 per cent of the 60 seats, winning handsomely in the plains and hills—which account for 20 seats. It was a result of Ibobi’s political craft married to ingrained insecurity and quid pro quo.

Today Manipur is in worse shape. NSCN (I-M), pushing for a conclusive peace deal with the government, is increasingly aggressive. The United Naga Council, the apex body of Naga tribes in Manipur, and now exposed as a political vehicle of NSCN (I-M), has strived to disassociate all Naga areas from the control of Imphal, the capital. It has repeatedly imposed highway blockades to fulfill its agenda of autonomy, starving the plains of transport, fuel and other commodities. A weeks-long blockade is ongoing as I write this.

Last year Ibobi also upset other hill tribes by introducing in the assembly a bill restricting the entry of outsiders into Manipur, and amendments restricting residency and commerce. It was seen as discriminatory by all tribes, already chafing at what is seen by them as overwhelmingly pro-Meitei policies in everything from resource allocation to employment. Riots erupted in southern Churachandpur district. Quelling by police killed several men: their bodies lie unclaimed at the local morgue as a mark of protest. Consent to the bills was withheld by the President of India.

Meanwhile, corruption deepened by the economy of conflict remains unabated. Infrastructure continues to be among the worst in India. The Bharatiya Janata Party, which extended its focus to Manipur after gaining Assam, has allowed this drift, letting the bills die, doing nothing to ease blockades, hoping to balance the Naga peace process and political gains in Manipur into a winning gambit.

Only, that is Ibobi’s signature move.

He has spectacularly clawed back advantage. On November 25, Manipur police commandos arrested the president and information secretary of UNC. Ibobi didn’t budge when protests broke out in Naga areas, and threats of blockades and violence escalated. Ibobi called the bluff by ordering security forces to escort convoys of trucks into the valley.

On December 9, Ibobi announced the formation of seven new districts adding to the existing nine. Of these, four were earlier a part of the Naga-majority districts of Tamenglong, Senapati, Ukhrul and Chandel. This effectively cut non-Naga areas from the districts, or subtly played into misgivings that even some Naga tribes and clans have towards either the domineering NSCN (I-M) or the Tangkhul. Naga rebels subsequently attacked police and paramilitaries, but Ibobi hasn’t budged. He is again back as saviour.

NSCN (I-M) is left looking silly. The UNC is emasculated. The government of India and the BJP in particular, is left looking inept, too-clever-by-half. Ibobi thus far looks good for a fourth term—even at the cost of toxic Manipur.

Sudeep Chakravarti is a commentator on matters related to Northeast India.  He is the author of several books, including ‘Highway 39: Journeys through a Fractured Land’, set in Manipur and Nagaland. Reach him @chakraview and sudeep.chakravarti@gmail.com